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MARRIAGE
M.AURA I. STRASSBERG*
The arguments on either side of the same-sex marriage debate
originate from an array of personal, philosophical, religious, and
scientific premises. In recent years, the legal debate has attempted
to distill these arguments and arrive at a valid legal analysis that
adequately complements our existing marriage jurisprudence. In
this article, Professor Maura Strassberg exposes the philosophical
and social flaws apparent in the legal comparison of same-sex
marriage to the Mormon practice of polygamy. Analyzing the
line of anti-polygamy precedent cited in Justice Scalia's dissent in
Romer v. Evans, Professor Strassberg identifies Francis Lieber's
argument that polygamy promotes despotism as the foundation of
the Supreme Court's decision upholding the criminalization of
Mormon polygamy in Reynolds v. United States. Finding
Lieber's explanation of this relationship between polygamy and
despotism insufficient, Professor Strassberg substitutes a
reconstruction of Georg W.F. Hegel's more extensive analysis of
how polygamous marriage contributes to the development of
despotic states and monogamous marriage contributes to the
development of the modem liberal state. Professor Strassberg's
reconstruction of the Hegelian analysis provides both a
justification for the prohibition of Morman polygamy and an
explanation of the fundamental right to marry. Next, she
considers whether this analysis justifies the prohibition of same-
sex marriage and concludes that no valid justification exists.
Instead, Professor Strassberg concludes that legalization of same-
sex marriage is both consistent with and essential to maintaining
the valuable role of marriage in the modem liberal state.
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1977; M.A., Boston University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University Law School, 1984.
Maura.Strassberg@drake.edu. I would like to express my gratitude to Dean David Walker
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I. INTRODUCrION
Well before it has become a reality, the possibility of the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage in Hawaii' has generated strong state
and federal responses. Many states have introduced legislation that
bans recognition of same-sex marriages valid under the laws of other
states, and a number of states have signed such legislation into law.2
1. On May 5, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded a case seeking to overturn
the denial of marriage licenses to three same-sex couples, instructing that strict scrutiny
should be applied to Hawaii laws limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. See Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
The lower court subsequently held the sex-based classification in § 572-1 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes to be "on its face and as applied ... unconstitutional and in violation of
the equal protection clause of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution." Baehr v.
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *48 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The court en-
joined the Hawaii Department of Health from "denying an application for a marriage
license solely because the applicants are of the same sex." Id. A day after the decision,
the court granted the state's motion to delay the judicial order pending an appeal to the
Hawaii Supreme Court. See John Gallagher, Marriage, Hawaiian Style, ADvOC., Feb. 4,
1997, at 25. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Hawaii likely will hear the final appeal on
whether Hawaii violates state constitutional prohibitions on gender discrimination by de-
nying same-sex couples marriage licenses. See Joan Biskupic & John E. Yang, Gay
Marriage Is Allowed by Hawaii Court; Trial Judge Says Ban Fails Key Test, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1996, at Al. It is highly likely that the Hawaii Supreme Court will uphold the
lower court's decision that no compelling reason exists for Hawaii's heterosexual-only
marriage laws. See Gallagher, supra, at 22.
2. As of March 2, 1997, 18 states have passed legislation intended to have this effect.
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101(c), 25-
112 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107, 9-11-109 (Michie Supp. 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a), (d) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1997);
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-201, 32-209 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/201, 5/213.1 (West
1993 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §8 23-101, 23-115 (Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1-.4, 551.271 (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (Supp.
1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2
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Through the Defense of Marriage Act, Congress has sought to avoid
any requirement of full faith and credit recognition by states of pos-
sible same-sex marriages and to preclude federal recognition of such
marriages.' Should same-sex marriage become a reality in Hawaii,
this legislation will quickly come under constitutional scrutiny. In
what was surely a foreshadowing of the debate that will take place,
Justice Scalia argued in his dissent in Romer v. Evans4 that the consti-
tutional legitimacy of nineteenth-century statutes discriminating
against polygamists' provides strong support for the constitutional
(Michie 1995). Similar legislation was introduced this year in 23 states: Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Legislative Reac-
tions to Hawaii Same-Sex Marriage (visited April, 1997) <http://www.buddybuddy.com/+-
line-2.html>; Evan Wolfson, Freedom to Marry 1996: Making the Transition From Defen-
sive to Affirmative Work, LAMBDA UPDATE (Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, New
York, N.Y.), Summer 1996, at 5.
3. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7). The Defense of Marriage Act was de-
signed to "define and protect the institution of marriage." H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996).
The Act states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relation-
ship.
110 Stat. at 2419. In addition, the Act defines "marriage" and "spouse" for purposes of
federal benefits, respectively, as "legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife," and "only ... a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." Id.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). In Romer, the respondents brought suit in state court
seeking to have Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution declared invalid. See id. at
1624. The amendment prohibited state and local governments from taking any legislative,
executive, or judicial action designed to protect citizens' status based upon their homo-
sexuality. See id. at 1623. The Supreme Court, despite a vehement dissent by Justice
Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas), declared the statute in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1629.
5. Enacted in response to the possibility that the Territory of Utah might become a
state in which polygamous marriage would be legal, the Morrill Act criminalized the prac-
tice of polygamy in the territories. See The Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501
(1862) (repealed 1910). Later legislation made cohabitation a crime and prohibited po-
lygamists and polygamist sympathizers from voting, sitting on juries, and holding public
office. See The Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 1, 5, 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882) (repealed 1983).
Congress also abrogated the charter of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
dissolved its corporate status, and confiscated most of its property for its role in encour-
aging and assisting polygamous marriages. See The Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, §§ 13,
17, 24 Stat. 635, 637, 638 (1887). See generally R. Michael Otto, Comment, "Wait 'Til
Your Mothers Get Home": Assessing the Rights of Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive
Parents, 1991 UTAH L. Rnv. 881, 888-94 (detailing congressional attacks on polygamy in
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Utah prior to statehood).
After the Mormon Church renounced the practice of polygamy in 1890, Congress
authorized the return of its property. See Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The
Polygamy Cases, pt. 2, 9 UTAH L. REV. 543, 580 (1965) [hereinafter Linford, Polygamy
Cases, pt. 2]. When Utah finally gained admission to the Union, the Utah Enabling Act
conditioned admission upon the prohibition of polygamy. See Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138,
28 Stat. 107 (1894). The act stated "[t]hat the inhabitants of all that part of the area of the
United States now constituting the Territory of Utah, as at present described, may become
the State of Utah," id. § 1, 28 Stat. at 107, "[p]rovided, [t]hat polygamous or plural mar-
riages are forever prohibited," id. § 3, 28 Stat. at 108.
This federal interference with Mormon religious practices was first held to be consti-
tutionally permissible in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that
the practice of polygamy could be criminalized despite being derived from Mormon relig-
ious beliefs). Further unsuccessful challenges to anti-polygamy laws followed Reynolds.
See Clawson v. United States, 114 U.S. 477, 482 (1885) (upholding challenges to grand
jurors who stated belief in Mormon doctrines and polygamy); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15, 40-42,45 (1885) (upholding disenfranchisement of polygamists, but limiting the disen-
franchisement to those who maintained a marriage relationship with a plurality of wives
after 1882); cf. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 45, 64-65 (1890) (holding that Congress had the power to repeal the
charter incorporating the Church and confiscate all assets other than places of worship,
parsonages, and burial grounds for public use, in order to destroy the practice of polyg-
amy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,341,345-46 (1890) (holding that mere membership in
the Mormon Church, which continued to perform polygamous marriages, was a legitimate
basis for denying an applicant the right to vote); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 190 (1889)
(holding that charges of cohabitation and adultery could not be made for the same con-
duct); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274,285-86 (1887) (holding that cohabitation was a continuous
offense, rather than a series of offenses); Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 79 (1885)
(affirming the interpretation of criminal cohabitation as living together under the appear-
ance of being married). For a detailed description of criminal prosecutions under the anti-
polygamy laws, see generally Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy
Cases, pt. 1, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 331-70 (1964) [hereinafter Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt.
1]. See also Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 2, supra, at 543-82 (detailing the cases affirming
civil disabilities under the anti-polygamy laws).
As recently as 1985, the continuing practice of polygamy among fundamentalist Mor-
mons sparked a challenge to the provision in the Utah Enabling Act, in which Congress
had uniquely conditioned Utah's admission into the Union on a constitutional prohibition
on polygamous marriages. See Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 1985)
(challenging the termination of a Utah police officer due to his polygamous marriages on
the ground that the Enabling Act was unconstitutional). The argument was made that this
condition violated the constitutional requirement that states enter the Union on an "equal
footing." See id. See generally Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and
the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 833-39 (1980) (discussing the equal
footing doctrine). This anti-polygamy condition would have put Utah on an unequal foot-
ing with the other states if state sovereign power over domestic matters ordinarily includes
the right to legalize alternative marriage relationships such as polygamy. The anti-
polygamy condition in the Enabling Act would be constitutional, however, if Congress
would have been able to legislatively prohibit polygamy in Utah after it attained state-
hood. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911). The constitutionality of such
legislation, in turn, would depend upon the existence of a constitutional right to monoga-
mous marriage that would be so undermined by the legalization of polygamy that no state
could constitutionally legalize polygamy. Whil the Potter court "[a]ssum[ed], arguendo,
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legitimacy of statutes denying special protection to citizens on the
basis of their homosexuality.6 Although the majority in Romer
avoided Justice Scalia's comparison of polygamy and homosexuality,
the analogy will not be as easily dodged when the legislation at issue
is narrowly targeted at same-sex marriage.
On first glance, there is no apparent explanation for treating one
non-traditional form of marriage any differently than another.' In-
deed, it might be argued that if any non-traditional form of marriage
could be permissible, Mormon polygamy would have the stronger
claim, due to its former grounding in Mormon religious doctrine.9
that the Enabling Act does violate the equal footing doctrine," Potter, 760 F.2d at 1067-68,
the constitutionality of the anti-polygamy condition in the Enabling Act was not decided
because, since entering the union, Utah had never sought to legalize polygamy, but instead
had established monogamous marriage "'as the cornerstone of its regulation of mar-
riage.'" Id. at 1068 (quoting Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (D. Utah
1984)).
6. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. To make his argument, Justice Scalia relied upon Davis, 133 U.S. at 346-47, which
prohibited convicted polygamists and those who believed in polygamy from voting or
holding office. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority de-
flected the argument by disapproving of that part of the case which upheld the denial of
voting rights to believers in polygamy and by subsuming the denial of voting rights to con-
victed polygamists under the general principle that convicted felons may be denied the
right to vote. See id. at 1628. The majority thereby avoided the underlying question
whether the criminalization of polygamy itself was constitutionally permissible. See id.
8. Cf. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in Ameri-
can Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L. REv. 273, 306-07 (1995) (describing same-sex
marriage as fulfilling the role of "family law folk devil" prominently filled by polygamy in
the nineteenth century); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for
Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 47, 51 (suggesting that there is no principled
way of distinguishing same-sex marriages from polygamous marriages and that permitting
same-sex marriage would require permitting polygamous marriage).
9. From 1843 to 1890, the practice of polygamy was a doctrinal tenet of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, which had its headquarters in the Utah Territory. See
Otto, supra note 5, at 881. Modem-day commentators have argued that polygamy could
not have been constitutionally criminalized under contemporary free exercise jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A
Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
569, 635-36 (1984) (arguing that criminalization of polygamy could not survive a compel-
ling state interest test). Such an argument assumes that no compelling state purpose
supported making polygamy a crime. Cf Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the
Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 393, 442-45 (1994) (suggesting that the federal attack on Mormon polyg-
amy could serve as precedent for a modern attack on religions "that stubbornly cling to old
fashioned beliefs about sexual morality and marriage between husband and wife" in the
event that homosexual rights laws are passed). However, this Article proposes that a
compelling state interest existed which could have justified restraining free exercise of the
Mormon religion, although it was not articulated in Reynolds. Arguably, Mormon polyg-
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However, no comparison between polygamy and same-sex marriage
can be made without a clear understanding of the basis for the nine-
teenth-century determination that Congress could constitutionally
regulate polygamy. This basis was set out in the first polygamy case,
Reynolds v. United States,"0 in which the Court speculated that the
practice of polygamy could be linked to a political despotism that
threatened to undermine the liberal foundation of United States
government." Implicit in this holding was a view of monogamous
marriage as part of the foundation of free government. However,
the posited relationships between marriage and a free and demo-
cratic government, and polygamy and despotism, were not further
elaborated by the case law12 because the main branch of the Mormon
Church repudiated polygamy after Reynolds and its progeny, 3 and
the State of Utah came into existence with both a constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting polygamous or plural marriages14  and
corresponding criminal laws. 5 Therefore, in order to understand
what it was about polygamy that appeared to undermine the consti-
tutional interest in free government and whether same-sex marriage
is similarly problematic, it is necessary to articulate more fully the
Reynolds theory of monogamous marriage as fundamental to a
amy posed a threat to the foundations of the democratic state. See infra notes 431-530 and
accompanying text.
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Although many other polygamy cases followed Reynolds,
legal scholars consider the issue of congressional power to prohibit and penalize polygamy
conclusively established by Reynolds. See Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 2, supra note 5, at
546 n.16, 575.
11. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (crediting Professor Lieber with the proposition that
"polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, ... which, when applied to large communi-
ties, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in
connection with monogamy").
12. Cf. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 472 (1983)
(noting that "the case law ... on our traditional assumptions [about marriage and family
relationships] seldom go[es] beyond platitudes and cliches").
13. The Mormon Church officially repudiated polygamy in 1890. See Otto, supra note
5, at 895. Nonetheless, there continue to be two major Mormon sects that espouse and
practice polygamy: the Fundamentalist Church and the Allred Church, which together
may have as many as 11,000 followers. See iL at 881-82 n.4. As a result, the effects of
polygamy on parental custody rights and qualification to adopt continue to be a developing
issue. See id. at 902-31 (discussing a recent development in Utah law that may have re-
moved polygamy as an absolute disqualification for custody decisions, and arguing that it
should not be an absolute bar to adoption either).
14. See UTAH CONST. art. HI, § 1 (stating that "polygamous or plural marriages are
forever prohibited").
15. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (1978) (making bigamy a felony).
1997] 1507
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democratic and free nation.
Such a theory also will help in evaluating the suggestion of the
Governor of Hawaii that the state could respond to the possibility of
legal same-sex marriage by eliminating marriage as a legal institution
and by offering only domestic partnership registration for heterosex-
ual and homosexual couples. 6 Because no state has attempted to
abolish marriage, the issue of whether a right exists to marriage per
se has never been tested.7 Thus, while it is almost a truism in
American legal thinking that marriage is a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the Constitution,18 it has never been necessary for the Court
to articulate precisely why marriage should be viewed as a right
rather than a mere privilege subject to equal protection. Indeed, the
modern cases affirming a due process right to marriage all involve
exclusions of certain people or combinations of people from existing
state marriage rights. 9 For the most part, courts could have justified
the same results on equal protection grounds, as evidenced by courts
that bolstered their due process analysis with equal protection ex-
20
amination.
16. See John Gallagher, The Great Gay Marriage Debate, ADvoc., Feb. 20, 1996, at
36.
17. Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629
(1819) ("When any state legislature shall pass an act annulling all marriage contracts, ...
it will be time enough to inquire, whether such an act be constitutional.").
18. The Supreme Court's first specific mention of marriage as a right described mar-
riage as "[w]ithout doubt ... essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U.S. 390,399 (1923). By 1987, the status of marriage as a funda-
mental right became a point which litigants were required to simply concede. See Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[Petitioners] concede that the decision to marry is a
fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) and Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).").
19. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (striking down a Missouri statute prohibiting mar-
riage of prison inmates except under special circumstances); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 376-77
(striking down a Wisconsin statute denying marriage licenses to those who owed child
support); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (striking down Virginia statutes criminalizing and refusing
recognition to certain interracial marriages).
20. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the state's
means did not bear an adequate relation to any of its objectives); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12
(expressly grounding decision on invalid racial classification). However, it is not clear that
the result in Turner could be justified purely on the grounds of an irrational classification.
While the Court did adopt a rational relation test, it considered a number of factors-
existence of an alternative means of exercising the right, the impact of accommodation of
the right, and the existence of easy, obvious alternatives that do not impinge upon the
right-that clearly enhance the scrutiny beyond that given to a statutory classification
unrelated to a fundamental right. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. As a result, Turner, more
than any other modern case, attempts to explain the social and personal value of marriage.
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Indeed, declaring that citizens have a right to the legal institu-
tion of marriage sounds somewhat peculiar." A distinct difference
exists between stating that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of liberty protects "the freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage, 2 2 should such a state-created institution be provided, and
suggesting, as does the language now used by the Court, that the or-
derly pursuit of happiness requires that the state provide the legal
institution of marriage. Under the former view, proposals for abol-
ishing the legal institution of marriage, such as those made by the
Governor of Hawaii or by scholars such as Martha Fineman, can be
seriously entertained. Under the latter view, it would be unconstitu-
tional for a state to fail to provide its residents with the opportunity
to enter into this privileged legal relationship. A theory which fully
articulates how monogamous marriage creates the foundation for a
democratic state will make it possible to understand not only why the
right to marry should be considered a fundamental right, but also
why polygamy could not be included within a fundamental right to
marry and why same-sex marriage could coherently be part of such a
right.24
This Article will therefore seek to develop more fully a theory
of how monogamous marriage can be said to be fundamental to or-
dered liberty in the context of contemporary society.25 It will begin
21. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392-93 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 397-99 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
22. Id. at 393 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Martha Fineman has argued that, as a matter of wise policy, the state should no
longer provide the legally protected and defined relationship called "marriage," but should
allow such relationships to be governed by private contracts between the parties. See
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 4-5 (1995).
24. Cf Michael Sandel, MoralArgument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homo-
sexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (1989) (arguing that any right to engage in same-sex
sex would have to be justified by showing "that much that is valuable in conventional mar-
riage is also present in homosexual unions").
25. See infra notes 37-60 and accompanying text. Insofar as this Article attempts to
articulate a theory of marriage that explains its fundamental role in democracy, it clearly
sidesteps long-standing critiques of heterosexual marriage as essentially an institution of
domination inconsistent with the possibility of freedom or equality for women. See, e.g.,
Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY
31, 48-50 (1991) (arguing that homosexuals might do well to avoid an institution that
"strengthens the force of dominant ideologies both in its symbolic and social influences,
and in more concrete ways"). Why bother articulating a defense of an institution which
may be indefensible? Despite these critiques, the Supreme Court and the mainstream of
American society continue to view marriage as fundamental to ordered liberty and of con-
stitutional significance. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84. To the extent that it is
1997] 1509
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by considering the peculiarly affirmative quality of a right to marry.6
It will demonstrate that a similar affirmative quality can also be
found in a number of both natural and acquired rights, and suggest
that marriage might best be understood as a right which can only be
acquired within civil government." The Article will then demon-
strate that a similar view of marriage can be found in Reynolds v.
United States,8 which posited an intriguing connection between the
institution of marriage, the possibility of a freely chosen government,
and a society in which liberty flourishes.29
This view of marriage, attributed by the Court to the work of the
nineteenth-century American legal philosopher Francis Lieber, will
be shown to be most fully developed in the earlier work of the Ger-
man philosopher Georg W.F. Hegel, whose treatment of the family
and marriage in the Philosophy of Righ? revealed for the first time
the function of family life as an essential part of the institutional
structure of the liberal state." The Article will then argue that a He-
gelian understanding of marriage, revised so as to take into account
current views on gender equality, is not only consistent with our cur-
rent views on marriage, as revealed in contemporary Supreme Court
marriage cases, but also is capable of explaining more thoroughly
some of the Court's positions.32 In particular, an examination of
Mormon polygamy in light of this theory of marriage will reveal why
polygamy was accurately perceived as a threat to fundamental
American political ideals and was, therefore, a legitimate federal and
state target.3
The Article will then turn to the question of same-sex mar-
riage. 4 At issue is whether same-sex marriage is consistent with the
fundamental role of marriage in securing and maintaining our form
possible to articulate the role of marriage in a liberal democracy, it may be possible to
prevent the use of arguments premised upon the fundamental nature of marriage from
being used as a weapon against same-sex marriage in the way they were used against po-
lygamy. Even a flawed tool should have a clearly defined and limited function that may
prevent its use as a mere blunt instrument of destruction.
26. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
28. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
29. See id. at 166; infra notes 61-117 and accompanying text.
30. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1952) (1821) [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
31. See infra notes 118-217 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 218-430 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 431-530 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 531-641 and accompanying text.
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of government. This Article will argue not only that same-sex mar-
riage would function in the same way as heterosexual marriage, but
also that revision of the Hegelian theory of marriage to accommo-
date gender equality renders attempts to distinguish between
heterosexual and homosexual marriage incoherent. 5 Finally, the Ar-
ticle will argue that the failure of government to recognize same-sex
marriage will destroy the stabilizing and socially unifying force of the
institution of marriage.
II. UNDERSTANDING MARRIAGE AS AN ACQUIRED RIGHT
A. The Negative and Affirmative Structure of Fundamental Rights
The initial concern is to determine why it might be argued that
the state must provide the legal institution of marriage in some form.
Marriage can be described as an affirmative right in the sense that
the right cannot exist in the absence of some state action, such as
legislation;3 7 indeed, marriage is the state recognition of a relation-
ship. In contrast, a negative right would be one which can be
exercised without the direct assistance of the state. While we tend
to view our constitutional rights as primarily negative, that is, as sub-
stantive variations on the right "to be let alone,"39 in truth, many
recognized fundamental rights under the Constitution may be seen as
affirmative.40
In what follows, this Article will compare the negative and af-
firmative structure of two paradigmatic negative rights, "freedom
from bodily restraint [and] ... the right of the individual to con-
tract, 4 1 with the right to vote, which has always been understood as
35. See infra notes 531-628 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 629-41 and accompanying text.
37. See William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy,
103 YALE LJ. 1495, 1496 (1994) (noting that the right to marry is distinctive because it
"imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework").
38. For example, a right to choose and associate with our friends.
39. THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ONTORTS 29(1880).
40. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 109 n.43 (1995) (noting that
"constitutional protection of these rights may include both a 'negative' duty of government
to refrain from infringing these rights and a 'positive' duty upon government to protect the
rights of its citizens from infringement by others").
41. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (listing these as two of several rights,
including the right to marry, that are part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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more affirmative.42 While freedom from bodily restraint has a pri-
marily negative focus in the sense that it guarantees bodily freedom
as it might be impeded by governmental restraint, an affirmative
element also is present in recognition of this right. The underlying
value of bodily freedom was derived from its status as a natural right;
all human beings were seen as inherently and equally free in the pre-
governmental state of nature. Natural reason dictated that the
maintenance of such freedom required restraints on individual free-
dom to kidnap, murder, batter, and rape. Thus, prohibitions on such
behavior were viewed as dictates of natural law.44 Yet, without social
enforcement, natural law is simply a matter of individual con-
science. It is undoubtedly one of the prime functions of
government to maximize bodily freedom by substantially controlling
the private restraints individual citizens can and would impose on
each other in the absence of such laws.46 This maximization of bodily
freedom can occur through the establishment of civil law that reflects
the natural law's protection of natural rights.47 Such civil law could
be in the form of the common law of torts and crimes, or in the form
of statutory tort or criminal law.48  Thus, underlying the constitu-
tional right to be free from governmental bodily restraint is what
could be characterized as an affirmative right to a government that
fulfills its essential function of controlling the private violence of its
citizens. Recognition of a fundamental right to be free from bodily
restraint would necessarily entail some minimal tort and criminal
law, even if the precise enforcement mechanism might not be consti-
42. "Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely con-
ceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded
as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356,370 (1886).
43. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitu-
tions, 102 YALE LJ. 907, 927 (1993).
44. See id. at 923 ("[N]atural law was a limitation on natural liberty in the sense that
humans were capable of reasoning about their liberty and interests.").
45. See id. at 930 ("[I]n the state of nature, each individual was his or her own judge as
to what natural law required .... ).
46. See id. at 930-31 (describing the basis of civil government as the sacrifice of some
portion of natural liberty in order to obtain the protection of other natural liberties by the
government).
47. See id. at 937.
48. While natural law could not dictate the precise content of civil law, due both to the
imprecision of natural law and the difference between the circumstances of civil society
and those of a state of nature, natural law nonetheless provides a foundation for civil law.




The right to contract as a feature of the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment is similarly composed of both negative
and affirmative elements. As with the right to be free from bodily
restraint, the right to contract prohibits states from disturbing those
substantive common-law rules which reflect the natural right to en-
gage in voluntary exchanges. As a negative liberty, therefore, it is
the freedom to choose the nature and terms of contracts, subject, of
course, to reasonable regulation under state police powers. 50 Yet, in
the absence of valid contract law to establish enforceable rights and
obligations resulting from such agreed-upon exchange, such ex-
changes cannot be said to be contracts.5' The affirmative element of
the right to contract, therefore, is a right to such civil law as is neces-
sary to preserve and enforce the fundamental features of exchange
transactions. To the extent this substantive civil law pre-exists the
state in the form of common law, it might be argued that the state
has no affirmative duty to provide this substantive law, but merely a
negative duty not to interfere with it through acts of legislation. Yet
the common law is articulated only through judicial opinions, which
require state law to give them authority.5 The state is free to abolish
the common law of sales only so long as it is replaced with the Uni-
form Commercial Code; citizens possess a right either to state
articulation of the common law or to a statutory equivalent, based
49. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), this kind of affirmative demand was
made upon the state to provide protection by means of positive law in the context of a
labor dispute that was viewed as injuring the employer's right to property. See id. at 322.
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit guarantee of a right not to be
deprived of property without due process of law rendered unconstitutional an Arizona
statute that provided complete civil and criminal immunity for acts that were otherwise
tortious or criminal. See id at 328-30. The impermissible action of the state was a legisla-
tive act that undermined features of pre-existing common law. See id. The Court
understood the background of the common law of torts and crimes as essential to meaning-
ful private ownership of property because the definition of particular acts as invasions of
private property established what the right of property ownership amounts to. See id. at.
327-40. Thus, due process of law includes the substantive law which both shapes and pro-
tects the right of property.
50. See Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45,53,61 (1905).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (defining a contract as
"a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty").
52. Judicial power must be granted by the state through some form of positive law,
usually but not necessarily constitutional law, before any judicial action has authority. See
generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that secondary
rules of adjudication and recognition are necessary to confer judicial powers).
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either in common law or civil law.53
A negative and affirmative structure is also present in the right
to vote. Its negative element can be understood as the freedom to
choose a candidate. At the same time, a state-created institution of
voting is necessary for such negative liberty to be exercised. Yet,
unlike some of the other rights discussed above, the right to vote is
strictly a statutory creation, indeed often described as a privilege, 4
which depends for its existence on some affirmative action by the
state. There is no natural or even common-law right to vote that the
states are prohibited from impairing; rather, it is an acquired right.5
The state must provide precisely what legal significance any particu-
lar act of voting will have by distinguishing between officially
recognized votes and unofficial votes that private individuals may
cast whenever they please.56
At the same time, the state is not free to withdraw the privilege
of voting from the populace in general. One could argue that this is
because voting is derived from a natural right of self-government
which is inherent both in the notion of freedom in a state of nature
and in the notion of natural law as the product of human "reasoning
about natural liberty."57 As a civil right, voting can be seen as re-
flecting such a natural right of self-government and as preserving
whatever vestige of natural liberty is feasible within the constraints of
civil government. The institution of voting, therefore, is recognized
as an affirmative right precisely because it fundamentally constitutes
the kind of government that will acknowledge both its affirmative
and negative role in establishing and preserving fundamental rights
to life, liberty, and property. Yet, for all its roots in the natural lib-
erty of the state of nature, voting is an artificial institution that is
motivated merely by our sense of a natural right of self-government.
53. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,389 (1898) (holding that a state is free to adopt
civil law rather than common law as its substantive law).
54. See supra note 42.
55. See Hamburger, supra note 43, at 921 (noting that habeas corpus and jury rights
are "rights that did not exist in the state of nature" but "were rights that could exist only
under civil government"). Voting would seem to fall under this rubric, as a right which has
no meaning except within civil government.
56. Public opinion polls, straw polls in elementary schools on presidential candidates,
and position votes by organizations on matters of public interest (e.g., voting by the ABA
House of Delegates on such issues as abortion) are all examples of votes which have no
legal significance.
57. Hamburger, supra note 43, at 927.
58. See id. at 921.
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The shape of the institution of voting cannot be traced to this natural
right."
One might inquire what the right to marry resembles more-the
acquired right to vote or the more directly natural law-based rights of
freedom from bodily restraint, of ownership of property, and of con-
tract. Because marriage as a common-law and religious institution
pre-dated state legislation, marriage might be understood as an insti-
tution to which we have an affirmative right as a matter of either
natural law or religious freedom. At the same time, however, our
understanding of marriage as a fundamental right may be enhanced
by analysis of marriage as something of an acquired right as well.
Government is often viewed as having an extraordinary power to
shape the institution of marriage, well beyond the power viewed as
ceded to government with regard to other natural rights. Further-
more, marriage as a statutory creation, like voting, may be better
understood under the Reynolds Court's view of marriage as a civil
right whose shape arises from its function in and relation to the gov-
ernment that gives it legal existence."
B. Reynolds and Marriage as an Acquired Right
1. Reynolds
In Reynolds, the Court explained the traditional Western prohi-
bition against polygamy as arising from a view of polygamy as a
social offense "subversive of good order."'" Describing marriage as
the foundation upon which society is built,62 the Court cited legal
59. Other institutions, similarly motivated, might derive equal legitimization from this
surrendered natural right. The present shape of our voting rights, in which "one man, one
vote" can be regularly diluted by the composition of the geographic district, may not re-
flect our ideals of equality and freedom as well as limited or cumulative voting schemes.
See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 223 (1989)
(demonstrating how limited and cumulative voting can promote "greater diversity on gov-
erning bodies by increasing the number of groups large enough to elect the representatives
of their choice").
60. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
61. Id. at 164 (stating that "from the earliest history of England polygamy has been
treated as an offence against society").
62. See id. at 165. This theme was familiar in nineteenth-century legal discourse. See,
e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as "the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress");
Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 147 (1874) (describing marriage as "the basis of
the entire fabric of all civilized society"); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 485 (1863)
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philosopher Francis Lieber's63 argument that a society built upon a
foundation of polygamous marriage inherits patriarchal political
principles that lead to despotism." On the other hand, a foundation
of monogamous marriage was viewed as antithetical to such despot-
ism,65 and nurturing of democratic principles. A "colony of
polygamists" within a democratic, monogamous society was seen as
ultimately destructive of democratic society,66 particularly because
those who embraced polygamy would also have the power to vote
and shape government. Consequently, the Court later upheld laws
denying voter registration to bigamists and polygamists, 6' as wen as
to members of organizations that taught polygamy as a religious
duty.6" The Court justified its decisions on the ground that in order
to assure that the nascent state of Utah would be a "free, self-
governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one of the coordinate
States of the Union,"69 it was necessary to make sure that the state
was established
on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and
springing from the union for life of one man and one
woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation
of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all
(describing marriage as "a relation the most important as affecting the happiness of indi-
viduals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life,
and the true basis of human progress"); Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland, 479, 481 (Md. 1828)
("Marriage... [is] the parent, not the child of civil society.").
63. Francis Lieber, born in Berlin in 1798 and trained at the Universities of Berlin and
Jena, emigrated to the United States in 1827. See Michael Herz, Rediscovering Francis
Lieber: An Afterword and Introduction, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2107, 2108-10 (1995).
Known for his path-breaking work on legal hermeneutics or interpretation, political ethics,
constitutional philosophy, and the law of warfare, Lieber was a highly influential thinker
within nineteenth-century legal circles. See id. at 2111-15.
64. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (referring to Francis Lieber). One of the arguments
made for the Morrill Act by Representative Thayer mirrored Lieber's views: "Wherever
[polygamy] has existed,... it has always been protected by absolute military despotism. It
can be sustained under no other system of government." CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1520 (1860); cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Re-
ligious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106, 1127-28
(1994) (explaining the perceived relationship between monogamous marriage and the
proper functioning of the republic as protecting Protestant Christianity in America by
protecting women, who were considered to be the font of religious faith and moral virtue).
65. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
66. Id.
67. See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15,44-45 (1885).
68. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,347 (1890).
69. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45.
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beneficent progress in social and political improvement."
However, the Reynolds Court viewed the expanded capacity of
polygamous families to procreate and "spread themselves over the
land"71 as a threat to a larger democracy72 which could be countered
only if juries enforced the criminalization of polygamy. Although
the Court in Reynolds noted that marriage creates "social relations
and social obligations and duties, with which government is neces-
sarily required to deal,"73 it failed to provide details explaining how
monogamous marriage is critically important for democracy or how
polygamous marriage undermines democracy and promotes despot-
ism.74 Later polygamy cases added only a few details to the analysis,
positing that polygamy destroys the purity of the marriage relation,
disturbs the peace of families, and degrades women and debases
men,75 while also reiterating the view that polygamy represented a
"return to barbarism., 76
70. Id.
71. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. See id. at 167-68 (affirming the legitimacy of a jury instruction in Reynolds re-
minding jurors that the victims of polygamy, women and children, were rapidly multiplying
because of the widespread belief that polygamy was protected as a free exercise of relig-
ion).
73. Id. at 165.
74. Cf. Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 341 (arguing that the link be-
tween polygamy, patriarchy, and despotism is "not self-evident" and that "the Court never
quite explained why plural marriage was a threat to the public well-being"). As a result of
the Court's minimal explanation of the non-religious grounds for prohibiting polygamy,
commentators on Reynolds often deemphasize the political thrust of the argument. See,
e.g., Rodney I. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of
the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 377-78 (1994) (speculating
that the state interest in monogamy that trumped the free exercise claims of Mormons
might be tied to better child-rearing or the achievement of more intimate bonding in mo-
nogamous marriages).
75. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890). Michael Grossberg explains the
decision in Reynolds as based on Congress's power to punish antisocial acts, but he also
argues that the attack on polygamy was part of a wider late nineteenth-century movement
to regulate marriage and prohibit practices that gave considerable freedom to individuals
with regard to marriage. See Grossberg, supra note 8, at 283. This movement, in his view,
was triggered by a "moral panic" which demonized marital freedom as the cause of family
destabilization more likely caused by economic and social upheaval. See id. at 275. The
question remains, however, whether polygamy was a legitimate target. The political focus
of the reasoning in Reynolds suggested above would, if accurate, suggest that at least this
form of marital freedom is, in fact, socially and civilly problematic.
76. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
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2. Reynolds' Reliance on Francis Lieber's Theory of Marriage
The Reynolds Court placed considerable emphasis on Francis
Lieber's view of polygamy as an institution inconsistent with demo-
cratic government." Lieber's view of marriage as a fundamental
political institution was premised on his view of social institutions as
clarifying and revealing the possibilities of human moral character. 8
However, in Lieber's view, not all social and political institutions are
equally in tune with the possibilities of human moral character.7 9
Therefore, we may understand Lieber's statement that polygamy is
based on principles incompatible with democratic government as a
critique of a social institution which he viewed as inhibiting or failing
to fully develop our human potential. The institution in question is
the family, which was fundamental for Lieber not only because it
recreates the primitive conditions of human "sociality,"8 for exam-
ple, the need of human infants for extensive, long-term care,"1 but
also because the family promotes the development of sociality be-
yond these primitive physical origins 82 to include the possibility of
mutual dependence, division of labor,83 and the transmittal of ac-
77. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66.
78. See 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS, DESIGNED CHIEFLY
FOR THE USE OF COLLEGES AND STUDENTS AT LAW 120-21 (2d ed. 1911) [hereinafter
LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS] ("Everything that characterizes man as man appears clearer
and more distinct with each advancing stage of civilization.").
79. For example, Lieber criticized the static and unresponsive nature of the nine-
teenth-century French and German states, see Mike Robert Horenstein, The Virtues of
Interpretation in a Jural Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2301-02 & n.112 (1995), in
which centralized government drew power away from communities and citizens, as com-
pared to what he saw as the dynamic and self-regulating nature of Britain and America,
see Paul D. Carrington, William Gardner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2135, 2148 (1995), where political and social institutions of self-governance, from
local governments to civic, religious, and charitable organizations, wove liberty into the
social fabric, see 2 VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
92-93 (1927).
80. See 1 LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 102 (describing "sociality" as
"the necessity imposed upon [man] to associate, both for the purpose of obtaining ends of
the highest importance in the physical as well as the intellectual and moral world").
81. See 1 id. at 103; see also Horenstein, supra note 79, at 2297 (describing Lieber's
view of the family as the primordial society because it provides the most basic means of
self-development).
82. See 1 LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 103-04 ("So little is man in-
stinctive, that even his sociality, so indispensable to his whole existence, has first to be
developed. He is led to it indeed by the natural relations between the progenitors and
their offspring, as we have seen; but he is not, strictly speaking, a gregarious animal.").
83. See 1 id. at 103.
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quired knowledge." Thus, the family creates social relations and
abilities which are essential for the existence of a society larger than
the family.
Lieber argued that the family created by monogamous marriage
allows human beings and society to reach their highest develop-
ment.' Monogamy accomplishes this by reinforcing romantic love,
rather than sex, as the tie between spouses.86 This in turn makes pos-
sible marriage as a permanent and exclusive union of different
sexes." While Lieber recognized that sexual attraction arising out of
the distinctively different nature of women might be the wellspring of
family," he insisted that the family as a human, rather than animal,
institution does not rest on mere sexual desire89 or the possibility of
procreation." Monogamous relationships structured by reverence
and romantic love9 encourage sexual continence,92 which grounds
family life on a longstanding, unselfish interest in another person."
Conversely, when sexual relations are possible outside the monoga-
mous family, sexuality itself becomes more emphasized.94 The
selfishness which accompanies such a focus on sexuality invades the
family and leads, in Lieber's view, to a weakening or destruction of
parental interest in children's education and moral character, and to
the reduction of women to sexual objects.s
The development of the moral individuality of women from sex-
84. See 1 id.
85. See 1 id. at 139 ("The Family cannnot exist without marriage, nor can it develop its
highest importance... without monogamy. Civilization, in its highest state, requires it, as
well as the natural organization and wants of man.").
86. See 1 id. at 123-25.
87. See 2 iL at 65.
8& See 2 id. at 122-24; 1 id. at 143.
89. See 2 id. at 123-24.
90. See I id. at 104-05 n.1 (arguing that those who view procreation as the essence of
marriage fail to grasp the human, rather than animal, nature of this institution, an error
which is induced by looking toward primitive rather than civilized humanity to reveal hu-
man nature); see infra notes 563-604 and accompanying text (discussing the romantic love
and non-procreative aspects of marriage).
91. See 2 LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 123-25. In particular, he de-
rived reverence of women by men from women's "bashfulness" regarding sexual desire.
See 2 id. at 124. This he described as a "natural" characteristic of women developed only
by civilization, and not to be found in uncivilized women. See 1 id- at 139.
92 See 2 id. at 65.
93. See 2 id.
94. See 2 id.
95. See 2 id. at 65, 110-11.
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ual property or slave status" to their civilized roles as wives and
mothers was, for Lieber, a progressive development in the moral
character of women." These limited roles for women were both ac-
ceptable and essential to Lieber because he viewed women as
different in nature from men98 and, therefore, as requiring different
social institutions to fulfill their potential.99 By making women the
distinctively different object of love and reverence,' the modem in-
stitution of monogamous marriage creates a protected legal space
within which women can devote themselves to the emotional support
of husbands and children,"1 thus making it possible for women to
fulfill their highest potential as wives and mothers."2 Although po-
lygamy, as well as monogamy, creates such a protected legal space by
requiring some exclusiveness of relationship,'03 it would seem that
polygamy-by making it possible for men to continue to indulge
their sexual interest in multiple women-would fail to provide the
conditions under which non-sexual male love and reverence can de-
96. See2iLatl33.
97. See2 id. at 133-35.
98. Lieber took issue with Mary Wollstonecraft and others who claimed that men and
women are the same, and acknowledged that his justification of a limited role for women
(excluding them from politics, voting, etc.) depends upon the premise that the sexes are
distinctly different. See 2 id. at 135-38.
99. Lieber proposed:
Woman has received, in the great order of things, a different physiologic organi-
zation and mental bias from those of man. The Creator has directed her to
receive her impressions more through the channel of feeling; she has been en-
dowed with a more tender sensibility; man has to rely more upon reflection....
[S]he steps beyond her proper circle of activity, which is emphatically that of the
family, through which nevertheless she becomes a most essential ingredient of
the state, if she abandons the sphere of tender sentiment, of affection, peace, and
love. And as nowhere the essential order of things can be violated without incur-
ring great danger, so does the woman expose her morality and whole true
character, and, therefore, society, to danger, the moment she interferes with poli-
tics.
1 id. at 138-39.
100. Lieber argued that if a woman were able to participate physically in defending the
state, "she would necessarily lose her peculiar character as woman, and thus a necessary
element of civilization would be extinguished." 2 id. at 125.
101. See 1 id. at 137-38. Lieber viewed laws prohibiting rape, fornication, prostitution,
and adultery, see 1 id., as well as laws mandating financial support for wives and children,
creating rights of inheritance, and allowing for spousal privileges and defenses as both
clarifying and facilitating the fulfillment of female nature. See 2 id. at 63-67 (discussing
the evil effects on society of "prostitution," "libertinism," "dissoluteness," "profligacy,"
and "shamelessness").
102. See 2 id at 124.
103. See 1 id. at 104 n.1.
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velop.'0 4 As a result, women in polygamous societies failed to
achieve the moral and legal individuality achieved by women in mo-
nogamous societies."'5
Lieber may also have viewed monogamy as more civilizing be-
cause it could advance the other purposes of the family, such as the
development of affectionate relationships and the education of the
young, more effectively than polygamy."6 A single wife reduces the
number of adults and children within the family, placing less finan-
cial pressure on the family, and allowing for more involvement by
the husband in the rearing of children.0 7 The monogamous family,
therefore, is less internally competitive for physical resources and
emotional attention. This lack of competition would appear to pro-
mote more affectionate and sympathetic relations between family
members. Since Lieber considered the development of our moral
capacity of sympathy through simple care-giving, personal self-
sacrifice and affection08 as forming the foundation for the develop-
ment of "friendship, charity, public spirit,"'0 9 and ultimately,
patriotism, 0 he viewed the increased development of our moral ca-
pacity of sympathy within families defined by monogamous marriage
as leading to greater social cohesion.
At the same time, Lieber viewed countries with polygamous
marriage as developing a notion of patriarchal authority and filial
duty within the family that is more easily confused with state author-
ity than would be the case if such families were monogamous.' In
all families, parental action is neither motivated nor legitimated by
104. Cf 2 UL at 64-66 (describing sexual activity outside of monogamous marriages as
preventing the development of reverence for women, without specifically mentioning po-
lygamy).
105. See 2 id. at 134.
106. See 1id. at 103.
107. See 1 id. at 140.
108. See 1id at 145.
109. Horenstein, supra note 79, at 2285.
110. See 1 LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 141. Explaining the origin of
patriotism, Lieber wrote:
As he has affection for the members of the same family, so he found them en-
larged into affections for a wider society, he felt himself mingled with it, with its
recollections, its history, and its future destiny; he loves his tribe, his nation, his
country, until at last this feeling becomes a distinct and ardent devotedness to his
country, becomes patriotism ....
1 id at 107.
111. See 1 id. at 146 n.1.
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ideals of equality and justice, but rather by care and affection."' In
Lieber's view, confusion between the authority of the father, which is
kept in check by the love and lack of self-interest characteristic of
family relations, and the authority of the state, which is not so
checked, leads to acceptance of absolutism and tyranny."1 It would
seem that such confusion is more likely in polygamous families be-
cause the inherent internecine conflict and competition create
distinctly less affectionate and altruistic family relationships. Po-
lygamous families, therefore, resemble broader social relations, and
the legitimacy of parental despotism creates a foundation for the le-
gitimacy of political despotism.1
In addition, Lieber viewed the absolute power of such despot-
ism as presupposing an absolute obedience of subjects which
"annihilate[s] the moral character, that is, individual moral value
(requiring free agency) and responsibility." '  Only in societies
where the state and government are not understood as outgrowths of
familial power relationships may political subjects with individual
moral character emerge from families, and may notions of rights and
liberty emerge as the justifications for state authority.116 Thus, for
Lieber, families created by polygamous marriage are antithetical to
the possibility of individual liberty within a state.
The Court's reliance on Lieber in Reynolds commits it to a view
of marriage as an acquired right. Reynolds suggests a view of mar-
riage as essential to civilized society, not only because of its role in
the "phylogenetic" development of modern society out of primitive
societies, but also because marriage continues to contribute to the
ongoing "ontological" shaping of new generations into the citizens
112. See I id. at 145.
113. See 1 id. at 146 & n.1.
114. See 1 id. at 390 ("[rMhe patriarchal principle, if applied to larger communities, that
is, if family relations are made the fundamental principle of the state, fetters the people in
stationary depotism,--a species of government to which, it seems to me, polygamy must
almost irresistibly lead, and which I cannot imagine to exist long in connection with mo-
nogamy .... )_
115. 1 id. at 180-81.
116. See 1 id. at 390. Lieber argued that the European institution of monogamy re-
sulted from the perceived relationship between the individual and the state. He explained:
[I]n Europe that Right was first distinctly grounded upon man's ethical character;
that there, consequently, State and Government first became subjects of deep in-
quiry, because they were not any longer considered either as mere effects of
force or the unalterable family relation; and that there man first maintained lib-
erty as a civil institution and became ready to bear great sacrifices for it.
1522 [Vol. 75
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
required by a modem democratic government. The right to mar-
riage, understood as based on the essential role marriage plays as a
socially constructive institution, is thus less a personal, natural right
than a social precondition to personal rights within a state.
III. A HEGELIAN THEORY OF MARRIAGE
In the context of the considerable challenge posed to monoga-
mous marriage by Mormon polygamy, the nineteenth-century
Supreme Court turned to Francis Lieber's explanation of the funda-
mental significance of heterosexual, monogamous marriage to a
society that values liberty in order to justify federal prohibitions on
polygamy. Yet neither Lieber nor the Court ever fully explained
how monogamous marriage nurtures democratic principles beyond
arguing that polygamous marriages undermine such principles. Lie-
ber himself left substantially unexplained how monogamous
marriage allows for both the development of individuals and a politi-
cal sphere where individuals have rights. Furthermore, Lieber's
understanding of marriage as essentially constituted by a man and a
woman" is derived from a view of women as so fundamentally dif-
ferent from men as to be both repugnant to contemporary
sensibilities and inconsistent with contemporary constitutional un-
derstandings of gender equality."'
Lieber's insufficiently detailed explanation of the relationship
between monogamous marriage and a free society may be filled out,
in part, by reference to Georg W. F. Hegel's much more detailed
theory of the role of the family in the social construction of civil soci-
ety and the state. There is little doubt that Lieber's own views on
this subject were influenced by Hegel, who was at the peak of his
academic career while Lieber was pursuing his education in Ger-
many.' In particular, Hegel's analysis of the historical development
117. The expression "ontology recapitulates phylogeny" refers to the way in which fetal
development parallels the evolutionary development of life from fish to amphibian to air
breather. One can argue that in the modem liberal state, the development of individual
citizens may also have to proceed in stages through institutions that resemble more primi-
tive societal forms. Thus, marriage can be seen as a holdover in modem society of
primitive tribal societies.
118. See 1 LIEBER, POLrICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 104-05 n.1.
119. See 2 Ud at 121-27, 138-39; supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
120. Hegel taught at the University of Jena between 1801 and 1807. See GEORG W.F.
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT xxxiii (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B.
Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) [hereinafter HEGEL, ELEMENTS] (a time-line). As a Professor
at the University of Heidelberg between 1816 and 1818, he lectured on the material that
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of the modem state developed in considerably more detail the con-
nections between polygamy and historically despotic political
structures, as well as the connections between monogamy and the
modem state of free individuals. This level of detail enables this Ar-
ticle to further develop the compressed analysis of polygamy in
Reynolds.12 ' As with Lieber, Hegel grounded his understanding of
monogamy on out-moded views of women. 2 Yet, in the case of He-
gel, the ultimate justification for these views flows from his logic,
rather than from mere convention. Redirection of Hegel's logic al-
lows this Article to reconstruct the Hegelian theory of marriage free
of gender prejudices. The more egalitarian analysis that results can
then be used to determine whether same-sex marriage undermines
monogamous heterosexual marriage or complements it.
A. Interpretation and Analysis of Hegel's Theory of Marriage
1. The Role of Marriage in the State
Hegel viewed marriage and the family as foundations for the
modem civil state:
The piety of the family relation should be respected in the
eventually became The Philosophy of Right. See id. at xxxiv. He succeeded to Fichte's
chair in philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1818, at which point he became the
"recognized leader of philosophic thought in Germany." Biographical Note to GEORG
W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY [hereinafter HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY], in 46 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD vi (Robert Maynard Hutchins
et al. eds. & J. Sibree trans., 1952). Although The Philosophy of Right was not published
until 1821, and The Philosophy of History was not published until after his death in 1831,
both works reflected his regular lecture series on these subjects. See id. (discussing the
origins of The Philosophy of History); HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, at 1.
Francis Lieber was born in 1798. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER:
NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL 21-22 (1968). He received his Doctorate from the Uni-
versity of Jena in 1820, id. at 27-28, and studied at the University of Berlin during the
period in which Hegel occupied a professorship, id. at 40-41. Whether Lieber actually
attended Hegel's lectures, it seems likely that Lieber would have been exposed to Hegel's
views via his influence on the world of German philosophy during Lieber's formative years
and his substantial written works available in print before Lieber left Germany for London
in 1826. See id. at 46. Indeed, Frank Freidel, Lieber's biographer, notes that although
Lieber disliked and often criticized Hegelian thought, Hegel gave many of Lieber's fun-
damental ideas "their most outstanding development." Id. at 154-55 n.25.
121. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
122. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, IT 165-66 & remarks, at 114-
15. The Knox translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right includes Hegel's original para-
graphs (" "), remarks written by Hegel on those paragraphs ("remarks"), and two
appendices of notes on Hegel's work. The first appendix, "Additions," is comprised of
notes taken from Hegel's lectures and refers directly to the numbered paragraphs in the
original text. The second appendix consists of "Translator's Notes," for which it is named.
1524 [Vol. 75
SAME-SEXMARRIAGE
highest degree by the state; by its means the state obtains as
its members individuals who are already moral (for as mere
persons they are not) and who in uniting to form a state
bring with them that sound basis of a political edifice-the
capacity of feeling one with a whole.'2
Thus, according to Hegel's philosophy, marriage provides the indi-
vidual with an experience of unity which is at the same time
inextricably tied to individual personality.'24 This allows the individ-
ual to reconcile personal freedom with the universal order imposed
by the state." Marriage also makes possible the development of in-
dependent individual consciousness, capable of both recognizing the
imprint of its own rationality in the laws and structure of the state,
and freely choosing to submit its personal desires to the rule of the
state.2 6
The experience of unity was necessary for the Hegelian citizen
because Hegel, like Lieber, rejected the contractual view of the state
as premised on a necessary antagonism between free subjects, a view
proposed by seventeenth-century liberal theorists. 27 Hegel viewed
the modern state as a "a genuine public community, ' in which
subjects achieve freedom only through the transcendence of individ-
ual personality. 29 The freedom that the Hegelian citizen achieves,
however, is not the uninhibited pursuit of that citizen's particular
ends,' but rather the full identification of his particular ends with a
123. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 151,172.
124. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, app. Additions n.101, at 261
(referring to 158).
125. See id. ("Love, however, is feeling, i.e., ethical life in the form of something natu-
ral. In the state, feeling disappears; there we are conscious of unity as law; there the
content must be rational and known to us.").
126. See iL 264-65, at 163; see also id app. Additions n.158, at 281 (referring to
T 265).
127. See Joan B. Landes, Hegel's Conception of the Family, in THE FAMILY IN PO-
LITICAL THOUGHT 125, 142 (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1982).
128. Id. at 126.
129. See id. at 142-43.
130. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 29 & remarks, at 33. In his
Philosophy of History, Hegel wrote:
The perpetually recurring misapprehension of freedom consists in regarding that
term only in its formal, subjective sense, abstracted from its essential objects and
aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, desire, passion-pertaining to the par-
ticular individual as such-a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a
fettering of freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the
indispensable proviso of emancipation.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 172.
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universal and rationally ordered state."' Hegel explained:
Only that will which obeys law is free; for it obeys itself-it
is independent and so free. When the state or our country
constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective
will of man submits to laws-the contradiction between lib-
erty and necessity vanishes. The rational has necessary
existence, as being the reality and substance of things, and
we are free in recognizing it as law, and following it as the
substance of our own being.
32
Therefore, the state is not merely a means to individual ends,
but has independent value as the embodiment of freedom. The
existence of such a state requires citizens who are conscious of indi-
vidual moral agency' 34 and are capable of possessing the negative
fights necessary to exercise individual free will, 3' yet who are pre-
131. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 258 & remarks, at 155-58;
see also HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 181 ("Freedom is nothing
but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial objects as right and law, and
the production of a reality that is accordant with them-the state."); id. at 205 ("[T]he
individual personality, instead of following its own capricious choice, is purified and ele-
vated into universality; a subjectivity that of its own free will adopts principles tending to
the good of all .... ").
This identification of the particular and universal is experienced on the level of feeling
as respect or trust in political institutions, and as patriotism. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 30, 268, at 163-64. On a more conscious level, both the rational con-
tent of law, see id. app. Additions n.101, at 261 (referring to T 158), and the rationality
expressed by the shape of the state, see id. 270, at 164-65, are experienced as expressions
of our individual, yet universal, rationality. Individual willingness to bow to the authority
of the state, and even die to protect it, see id. 258 & remarks, at 156-57, can thus be un-
derstood as based on the recognition that the state objectifies all that is universal in us, see
id. remarks to 1289, at 189.
132. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OFHISTORY, supra note 120, at 171.
133. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, %T 260-61, at 160-61. Hegel
wrote:
[I]t is the moral whole, the state, which is that form of reality in which the indi-
vidual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognizing,
believing in, and willing that which is common to the whole. And this must not be
understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and
enjoyment through that common will; as if this were a means provided for its
benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his
freedom, in order that this universal limitation-the mutual constraint of all-
might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are law, mo-
rality, government, and they alone, the positive reality and completion of
freedom.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 170.
134. See Landes, supra note 127, at 126.
135. See id. at 128.
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pared for the transcendence of individual personality'36 required by
the "communitarian aspect of political life in the modem state.'
13 7
For Hegel, the family was the social institution that provided the ma-
terial and ethical foundation for the development of this modern
individual subject.'
Marriage, the first phase of the family,'39 provides this experi-
ence of unity by converting what at first appears to be a mere
physical sexual connection between people into "a union on the level
of mind,"'4 a sense that one's essential being is inextricable from the
being of another. 4' "Love means in general terms the consciousness
of my unity with another, so that I am not in selfish isolation but win
my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence
and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and
of the other with me."'42 Love produces self-consciousness which is
conditioned towards universality by the paradox of love, meaning
that even as the lover experiences individuality through the specific-
ity of love, the lover achieves dissolution of individuality through
unity with the beloved.' Thus, the essence of marriage for Hegel is
not contract, which has as its premise independent individuals recip-
rocally using each other to achieve individual ends, but rather a
transcendence of contract and individual self-interest in which two
individuals become one person.'44 This unity is the first step toward
the unification of the particular and the universal which produces
concrete freedom.'45 The importance of this experience was such that
Hegel viewed marriage as not only a right, but a "socio-ethical
136. See id. at 129.
137. Id. at 142.
138. See id. at 125.
139. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 160, at 111.
140. Id. 161, at 111.
141. See id.
142. Id. app. Additions n.101, at 261-62 (referring to 158).
143. See id.
144. See id. remarks to 163, at 112.
145. See Rudolf J. Siebert, Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family: The Origin of
Subjective Freedom, in HEGEL'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE OBJECTIVE SPIRIT 177, 178-79 (Donald Phillip Verene ed., 1980) [hereinafter
HEGEL'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT]; see also Michael Theunissen, The Repressed
Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 8
(Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1991) ("The resulting 'unity of myself with the other and the
other with myself' is, however, simultaneously freedom, an equally communal freedom."
(citation omitted)).
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duty.'
146
Contrary to the Romantic views of his contemporary, Friedrich
Schlegel, who championed free love147 and the superfluousness of
118marriage ceremonies, Hegel argued that marriage should not be
viewed as based on passionate love alone, 49 but should be "more
precisely characterized as ethico-legal... love,... [which] eliminates
from marriage the transient, fickle, and purely subjective aspects of
love."' s Passionate love so values the particularity of each individual
that the partners may not achieve dispassionate love, which reflects a
subsuming of individual personality to the greater unity of the mar-
riage."' In addition, a commitment of love is worthless, as no one
can truly will feelings.5 2 Consequently, Hegel placed great signifi-
cance on the formal marriage ceremony, arguing that it is "the
solemn declaration by the parties of their consent to enter the ethical
bond of marriage, and its corresponding recognition and confirma-
tion by their family and community,' 5 3 rather than "the sensuous
moment,' ', 4 that makes marriage ethical and not a mere matter of
146. Siebert, supra note 145, at 205.
147. See Clark Butler, Commentary to HEGEL: THE LETrERS 234, 235 (Clark Butler &
Christiane Seiler trans., 1984) (comparing Hegel's views on marriage to Schlegel's).
148. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, app. Additions n.106, at 263
(describing Schlegel's novel Lucinde, see FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL'S LUCINDE AND THE
FRAGMENTS 41-140 (Peter Firchow trans., Univ. Minn. Press. 1971) (1799), as putting
"forward the view that the wedding ceremony is superfluous and a formality which might
be discarded").
149. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, app. Additions n.105, at 262-
63 (referring to 163).
150. Id. app. Additions n.103, at 262 (referring to 161).
151. See id. remarks to 162, at 111-12. Hegel argued that the universalizing effect of
marriage is enhanced when marriages are arranged, and the parties' inclinations are forced
to conform to their consent to enter into a unity valued as such, which is "inherently dis-
soluble... [because it is] above the contingency of passion and the transience of particular
caprice." Id. T 163, at 112. The successful ethical family further suppresses and limits the
role of physical passion to what is necessary for reproduction, see Landes, supra note 127,
at 141, thus transforming the merely contingent and arbitrary into children who objectively
embody the ethical bond between the parents. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra
note 30, app. Additions n.110, at 264 (referring to q 173).
152. Hegel characterizes love as a feeling which is contingent, transient and fickle. See
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, app. Additions, n.103, at 262 (referring to
161). This is because feelings have their source in nature and are a source of arbitrary
and external determination of the will, rather than an internal and rational determination
of the will. See id. remarks to 15, at 27; id. app. Additions n.12, at 230-31 (referring to
15). In other words, to will a feeling is to give in to external determination, which may
well change because external determination is, by definition, not under internal control.




feeling and inclination. Indeed, a view of the ceremony as a mere
formality or civil requirement improperly identifies the true connec-
tion of the parties as physical and subjective and treats the civil
institution of marriage as an alien and irrelevant intruder.'
2. The Importance of Monogamy
Monogamy, for Hegel, is what makes possible the transcendent
unity of marriage, which in turn grounds the transcendent unity of
the state."5 6 "Marriage, and especially monogamy, is one of the ab-
solute principles on which the ethical life of a community
depends."'' 7 Only "mutual, whole-hearted, surrender""1 8 of individ-
ual personality results in each having the identical relationship with
the other which allows both to become conscious of their person-
hood in the other.'59 Monogamy requires that each come to the
marriage viewing the other as sufficiently equal in personhood that
each must completely surrender to achieve the transcendent person-
ality of the family. 6' Through the family created by monogamous
marriage, "the constitutional state has for its citizens such individuals
who bring with them already the solid foundation of being able to
feel themselves as being one with its socio-ethical concrete total-
ity.
161
However, the citizen must also be a fully particularized subject 62
in order for the unity of the state to be experienced as freedom.
This is because, as we have seen, the highest human freedom arises
when individuals can recognize the universal focus of the state as an
essential foundation for the development and expression of their
particular individuality.164 However, the state cannot develop or
maintain a focus that is both respectful and nurturing of individuality
if it does not have fully developed individuals upon which to focus.65
155. See id. remarks to 164, at 114.
156. See id. remarks to $ 167, at 115.
157. Id.
158. Id. 167, at 115.
159. See id.
160. See Landes, supra note 127, at 137.
161. Siebert, supra note 145, at 204.
162. As defined by Hegel, "[p]articularity is ... characterized in general by its contrast
with the universal principle of the will and thus is subjective need." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 189, at 126.
163. See id T 260, at 160-61.
164. See id H 152-53, at 109.
165. See id T 34-36, at 37 (stating that abstract rights require that development of
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Nor can those who are not fully developed individuals recognize
themselves in their state.166 Without the full development of indi-
viduality, the universality of the state can be experienced only as
external and oppressive.'67 Thus, at the same time that the family
produces individuals capable of taking the universal ends of the state
as their own, the family must also develop the particularity and sub-
jectivity of the individual."8 According to Siebert,
[T]he family is the only social unit, which has the individual
as such for its purpose. Neither the state nor the society are
[sic], as such, concerned with the individual. The family is
therefore of utmost importance for the development of the
individuality of the individual. In the family, free subjec-
tivity arises.'69
This free subjectivity can be discovered in the relationship shared by
marital partners as well as in the emerging subjectivity of the chil-
dren of the marriage.
particularity which creates personality); id. app. Additions nn.154-55, at 280 (referring to
260-61) (explaining that immature and despotic states are those in which the particu-
larity of individuals has not yet developed).
166. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 203. Hegel contended:
[A]s the state is the universal spiritual life, to which individuals by birth sustain a
relation of confidence and habit, and in which they have their existence and real-
ity-the first question is, whether their actual life is an unreflecting use and habit
combining them in this unity, or whether its constituent individuals are reflective
and personal beings having a properly subjective and independent existence. In
view of this, substantial freedom must be distinguished from subjective freedom.
Substantial freedom is the abstract undeveloped reason implicit in volition, pro-
ceeding to develop itself in the state. But in this phase of reason there is still
wanting personal insight and freedom, which is realized only in the individual,
and which constitutes the reflection of the individual in his own conscience.
Where there is merely substantial freedom, commands and laws are regarded as
something fixed and abstract, to which the subject holds himself in absolute servi-
tude. These laws need not concur with the desire of the individual, and the
subjects are consequently like children, who obey their parents without will or in-
sight of their own.
Id
167. See idL
168. Hegel believed that civil society is the realm in which the particular needs and
wants of individuals are satisfied through property and work. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 30, 256, at 154. It is here that freedom is objectified in its particular-
ity. At the same time, however, civil society provides the experience and objectification of
universality in the form of the creation of social needs, see id. 190-94, at 127-28, the
dependence of individuals on a market of labor and goods, see id. 198, at 129, and a sys-
tem of justice that, in its view of individuals as possessing rights, only abstractly
acknowledges individual particularity, see id. 209 & remarks, at 134, and makes possible
each individual's pursuit of that individual's own particular ends, see id. T 116, at 266-67.
169. Siebert, supra note 145, at 192.
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3. The Role of Marriage in the Development of Children into
Citizens
While Hegel did not view children as either essential to mar-
riage or its chief end,17° he did view children within a marital family
as the objective embodiment of the unity of marriage."' However,
children are only potentially free and emerging consciousnesses.
They can only fully reflect the unity of mind which is at the center of
marriage through their individual achievement of the substantive
freedom of sef-consciousness.Y2 This self-consciousness can arise
only if the child learns to understand herself as a being who is fun-
damentally universal, rather than as a being who is purely
particular,7 3 as infants and small children necessarily are.7  Since
reason is what is universal in them, children achieve self-
consciousness by experiencing themselves as rational beings.75 Par-
ents, therefore, have the duty to educate children 76 so that their wills
are freed from the control of instinct and physical need and are
guided by universality in the form of ethical principles. 7 "[S]ince
ethical principles must be implanted in the child in the form of feel-
ing,,'78 this education can occur only through the love, trust, and
170. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 164, at 113. This
seems similar to the Supreme Court's view of marriage in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-
96 (1987), in which the Court recognized that the incarceration of one of the partners
eliminated the sexual and procreative facets of marriage without destroying what Hegel
would describe as marriage's "ethical character." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra
note 30, remarks to 164, at 113. For a fuller discussion of the relationship of marriage
and procreation in Supreme Court case law, see infra notes 316-29 and accompanying text.
171. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, % 173, at 117. Common family
property also serves to consolidate and embody the single personhood of the family. The
family itself becomes the locus of property rights against external persons as well as
against the rights of individual family members. See Landes, supra note 127, at 129-30.
Children, however, represent the unity of marriage more accurately as spirit, i.e., free self-
contained existence, rather than as a material thing, see HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,
supra note 30, 110, at 264-65, which is merely composite and never truly unitary. See
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 160.
172. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 175, at 117-18; see also Sie-
bert, supra note 145, at 188-89 ("It is their child, in which the lovers recognize themselves
as being one with each other in one consciousness, that of their child.").
173. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 187, at 125-26.
174. See id. 175, at 117.
175. See id. remarks to T 187, at 125-26.
176. See id. 174, at 117.
177. See id. 174-75, at 117.
178. Id. app. Additions n.112, at 265 (referring to % 175).
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obedience by which family relations are characterized. 79
Although children achieve self-consciousness and individuality
through the love and care of the family, they cannot truly exercise
their individuality within the family because "[i]n this social relation,
morality consists in the members behaving towards each other not as
individuals ... possessing an independent will.""' In order to be
treated as individuals with rights, children must leave the family. 81
"The ethical meaning of a concrete family-life is that it is a transition:
Children are destined to acquire in and through it their independ-
ence, and have the right and duty to leave it. 182  Thus, the
recognition of children as independent persons capable of holding
property and creating new families of their own not only completes
the ethical life of the family, but results in its dissolution.8 3
4. Polygamy
In Hegel's view, polygamous marriages are destructive of the
possibility of individuality of family members,"84 and also perpetuate
a deceptive illusion of universality which is ultimately inconsistent
with free rationality. 185 Societies built on the patriarchal principle
cannot partake of the love, confidence, and trust of the monogamous
family,186 or the freedom of the modem state.'87  Indeed, Hegel
viewed the assumption that the unity of the modem state can be di-
rectly derived from the extended patriarchal family as a pernicious
error of political theory.
188
In any marital family, whether monogamous or polygamous, the
surrender of individual personality by the marital partners, combined
with the natural dependence of children, means that no rights exist
within the family'89 and that behavior is governed solely by natural
179. See id.
180. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 180.
181. See GEORG W.F. HEGEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY §§ 434-35, at 247-48
(Gustav Emil Mueller trans., 1959) (1817) [hereinafter HEGEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY].
182. Id.
183. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, T 177, at 118-19.
184. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 206-16 and accompanying text.
188. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 171-72.
189. See ia. at 180.
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feelings.19 Hegel believed that in a monogamous marriage, a
"mutual, whole-hearted, surrender"1 91 of individuality that acknowl-
edges the husband and wife as fundamentally equal9 2 creates positive
feelings of love, confidence and faith. Certainly, a husband in a po-
lygamous family cannot make such an undivided surrender to any
single wife.93 As a result, none of his wives will return such senti-
ments of surrender. Because no mutuality of individual sacrifice for
the union exists, positive natural feelings cannot characterize the
polygamous family. 94  Competition between individual wives and
between their children not only precludes love, trust, and confidence
between these sub-units of the family, but must breed jealousy and
disharmony within the fully consanguineous family sub-units as well.
Indeed, modern studies of formal and informal polygamy across
many historical and contemporary cultures have suggested that so
little loyalty naturally develops among polygamous family members
that strong external controls, such as walls, armed guards, or the
threat of torture, mutilation, or death for sexual or political disloy-
alty to the patriarch, are frequently utilized to preserve family
integrity.'95 In the polygamous family, therefore, neither love nor
justice is likely to flourish.
190. See HEGEL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 181, §§ 434-35, at 247
("The natural life of the family is one of ultimate affection and feeling, in which the chil-
dren are loved simply because they are children.").
191. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 167, at 115.
192. As I will take up later, see infra notes 265-315 and accompanying text, Hegel's
view of the equality of men and women as persons was nonetheless qualified by his view
that a natural and ethical division of labor assigned women exclusively to the family and
allowed men to emerge from family life into the independence of economic and political
life. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 166, at 114.
193. Hegel did not analyze polygamous family relations in the abstract, but rather only
in the historical context of polygamous societies. See generally HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY, supra note 120, at 198 (African polygamy), 211-16 (Chinese polygamy), 222-30
(Hindu polygamy). As a result, he did not always fully articulate the precise nature or
consequences of polygamous family relations. However, it is possible to bridge these gaps
by evaluating the polygamous family using the same rubric Hegel followed in analyzing the
monogamous family. The observation cited here, and other unsupported observations that
immediately follow, reflect my own efforts in this regard.
194. For example, Hegel recounts a report of a Hindu husband, who, when questioned
why he was standing by indifferently as his wife burned herself to death, stated that he had
more wives at home. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 224.
195. See LAURA L. BETZIG, DESPOTISM AND DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION: A
DARWINIAN VIEW OF HISTORY 79-82 (1986) (describing various means of "claustration,"
or seclusion of the despotic patriarchs' wives or concubines); see also Otto, supra note 5, at
883 & nn.10-11 (detailing "grisly blood feuds among rival polygamous groups" and
"ritualistic slayings" among contemporary Mormon fundamentalists practicing polygamy).
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The lack of love in the polygamous family inhibits the full de-
velopment of independent personality. Hegel illustrated this by
reference to descriptions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
polygamous family relations in China,' which were so regulated by
law that the way each member of the family was required to behave
toward various other members was spelled out precisely by statute.197
The result of this regulation was that "free sentiment, the moral
standpoint generally, [was] thereby thoroughly obliterated."'' 8
Where individual feelings of love cannot be drawn upon and ex-
pressed in any unique or idiosyncratic way, neither adult nor child
members of the family can experience their individuality as an essen-
tial part of the unitary family.'99 This was especially a problem for
women, whom Hegel viewed as achieving the full development of
their personalities only within the family: ' " 'The woman must
come into her right just as much as the man. Where [there is] polyg-
196. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 212. Hegel's sources of
information on Chinese government and family relations were reports of Jesuit missionar-
ies to China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See CLARK BUTLER,
G.W.F. HEGEL 46-47 (1977). Hegel's accounts of China exaggerated the negative to the
point of racism, failed to take into account the coexistence of Buddhist and Taoist religious
traditions alongside the official Confucianism, and failed to give proper credit for the
emergence of individual subjectivity in China evidenced by peasant uprisings, lyric poetry,
and veins of individualist and anarchist thought. See id. at 47. Nonetheless, Hegel's basic
characterizations of the Chinese family as patriarchal and the government as despotic
seem accurate. See id. ("Still, none of these facts contradicts the claim that China was
predominantly despotic .... ).
197. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 211-12. Hegel com-
mented:
The duties of the family are absolutely binding, and established and regulated by
law. The son may not accost the father, when he comes into the room; he must
seem to contract himself to nothing at the side of the door, and may not leave the
room without his father's permission.... The same minuteness of regulation
which prevails in the relation between father and children, characterizes also that
between the elder brother and the younger ones.
Id.
198. Id. at 214.
199. See id. at 207. Hegel wrote:
[iThe internal law, the knowledge on the part of the individual of the nature of
his volition, as his own inmost self-even this is the subject of external statutory
enactment. The sphere of subjectivity does not then attain to maturity here,
since moral laws are treated as legislative enactments ....
Id.
200. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 166, at 114 ("The [female]
sex is mind maintaining itself in unity as knowledge and volition ... in the form of concrete
individuality and feeling.... Woman... has her substantive destiny in the family, and to
be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind.").
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amy, [there is] slavery of women.' ,201
Furthermore, multi-generational polygamous families do not
dissolve to release either the children or the marital partners as indi-
viduals capable of independent and free existences, but rather
persist, maintaining a crushing hold over their members. 2  Even
men cannot fully escape their past status as sons." Where the family
is the primary value, the particularity of the individual can be neither
cherished nor nurtured. Indeed, Hegel argued that the legal exter-
nality of seventeenth-century family relations essentially reduced all
these relations to slavery. 4 Thus, while the basis of monogamy is
the equality and mutual recognition necessary for the development
of individuality, the basis of polygamy is lordship and bondage., °5
The seventeenth-century Chinese state, which Hegel character-
ized as extending the form of the patriarchal family to government,. 6
similarly stifled individual conscience and freedom. Just as rights are
inconceivable within the family, individual rights cannot exist in the
patriarchal state.m7  Thus, Hegel viewed the seventeenth-century
Chinese people as existing in relation to a paternal emperor in the
same way that children in a family relate to their parents, which
meant that they could exist in the state only with the same lack of
individual personality that necessarily characterizes family exis-
201. HEGEL, ELEMENTS, supra note 120, at 440 (quoting the transcription by C.G.
Homeyer of Hegel's second series of lectures on The Philosophy of Right, prior to the
publication of the manuscript in 1821) (alterations in original).
202. Hegel noted that the Chinese practice of punishing entire families for the crimes
of any of its members subverted the development of individuality by putting a heavy price
on independent action and distorting the moral connection between responsibility and free
will. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 215 ("[I]f the person who
has committed the insult... can be discovered, he and his whole family are exe-
cuted... [AII subjective freedom and moral concernment with an action are ignored.").
203. Even the Emperor was required to suspend the business of the state to mourn his
father or make daily visits to pay his respects to his mother. See id. at 211-12. The son's
development of a sense of independent personhood was similarly frustrated by the attribu-
tion of all of a son's successes to his father. See id. at 212.
204. See id. at 214 ("Every one has the power of selling himself and his children; every
Chinese buys his wife. Only the chief wife is a free woman. The concubines are slaves,
and, like the children and every other chattel, may be seized upon in case of confisca-
tion.").
205. See BUTLER, supra note 196, at 147.
206. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 211.
207. See BUTLER, supra note 196, at 42-43 ("[T]he patriarchal family as such assures no
rights whatsoever to the children or wife.... A despotic state is an imitation family, the
despot an imitation father, with the result that all his subjects become imitation chil-
dren.").
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tence."8 This lack of individuality may have resulted in an absolute
equality of all, but it was an equality untouched by freedom, since
freedom consists of the right to have individual interests and privi-
legese 9 and to be a distinctive personality.1 ' Indeed, the governing
patriarch, like Abraham, was free to murder his subjects."' The re-
sult is a despotic government whose benevolence or cruelty is
determined by the charact er of the emperor,' and whose subjects
have no conscience, freedom, or subjectivity.214 Only the despot is
free in a patriarchal political system. 15 Thus, Hegel saw both the in-
stitution of polygamy, and the patriarchal form of government
derived from it, as essentially despotic and inconsistent with the
achievement of both particular and universal freedom by individuals.
Although Hegel's data on polygamy were limited, modem anthro-
pological studies of polygamous societies have confirmed his
perception of the association of polygamy with despotic rule.16
5. Summary
Monogamous families appear to advance the particular and uni-
versal freedom of those who participate in them in a number of ways.
First, monogamous marriage acknowledges the human equality of
men and women. Although Hegel excluded women from civil soci-
20& See id.
209. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 213.
210. See id. at 219 ("And though there is no distinction conferred by birth, and every-
one can attain the highest dignity, this very equality testifies to no triumphant assertion of
the worth of the inner mind, but a servile consciousness-one which has not yet matured
itself so far as to recognize distinctions.").
211. Abraham, the polygamous patriarch of the Hebrew Bible, appears to have had the
legal and political power to murder his son when commanded to do so by God. Genesis
22:10 (Revised Standard Version) ("Abraham put forth his hand, and took the knife to slay
his son."). A ruler whose subjects were individuals with rights, however, would not have
the legal or political power to murder a subject, even upon God's command.
212 See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OFHISTORY, supra note 120, at 213.
213. See id. at 214 ("[T]he emperor is the centre, around which everything turns .....
214. See id. at 207 ("[Ihe internal law, the knowledge on the part of the individual of
the nature of his volition, as his inmost self-even this is the subject of statutory enact-
ment.").
215. See BUTLER, supra note 196, at 40.
216. See BETZIG, supra note 195, at 88 (concluding that "[d]espotism, defined as an
exercised right to murder arbitrarily and with impunity, virtually invariably coincides with
the greatest degree of polygyny"). The term "polygyny" refers to the marriage of one
man to multiple women, whereas the term polygamy encompasses polygyny and polyan-
dry, which is the marriage of one woman to multiple men. This Article explores the
polygamy at issue in Mormon culture, which was strictly polygyny.
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ety, monogamous marriage provides women with a sphere in which
their equality can be protected and nurtured through love and care.
Furthermore, as this Article will explain, the implicit recognition of
the equality of men and women which is at the foundation of mo-
nogamy must ultimately lead to an explicit recognition of the
equality of men and women.217 Monogamous marriage also provides
the experience of a unity which simultaneously sustains and pro-
motes individuality. It transforms the self-interested adults of the
civil economy into individuals who have the ability to identify the
state as their highest individual end. This transformation ensures
that the universal focus of the state can withstand the pressure of less
rational individual wants and desires. The universal focus of the
state, in turn, maintains those conditions under which individual par-
ticularity can develop and flourish, i.e., a limited and private realm of
family and a public realm of civil society. Finally, the limited and
transient character of the family created by monogamous-as op-
posed to polygamous-marriage ensures that the focus of the family
will be on the nurturing and development of individuals who can
emerge from the family and take their place in civil society as holders
of rights. Monogamous marriage is therefore peculiarly suited to
cultivate the freedom to pursue particular ends and the freedom of
self-governance by rational ethical principles which must be charac-
teristic of citizens of a free state.
B. Hegel and the Modern Liberal State
Any use of Hegel's theory of the relationship between the fam-
ily and the state to explain the constitutional significance of marriage
in the United States must overcome two basic barriers: concerns
about Hegel's politics and concerns about Hegel's sexism. Hegel's
politics may be problematic if his communitarian view of the state
217. See infra notes 283-302 and accompanying text.
218. The term "communitarian" refers to Hegel's overall methodology of providing
rational content to freedom by situating it in a concrete community which is structured
according to the demands of reason. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND
MODERN SOCIETY 80-84 (1979) [hereinafter TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIETY] (explaining
Hegel's state as an attempt to divert the divisiveness of liberal individualism by situating
the individual in a concrete social setting that, while encouraging the development of
unique individual potential, also reveals the unity of this diverse community as the most
profound human creation). Modem communitarians, characterized by their insistence that
social justice can only be a function of shared understandings arising out of traditional or
non-traditional communities, include Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre,
and Roberto Unger. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
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is viewed as inconsistent with the underlying premises of American
constitutional, representative democracy. Indeed, many have argued
that Hegel's political philosophy is essentially totalitarian."9 Hegel's
sexism becomes problematic if his understanding of marriage re-
quires the exclusion of women from civil and political society. A
resolution of these concerns is necessary before his explanation of
the political significance of family and marriage becomes relevant to
our understanding of American democratic institutions.
1. Hegel's Politics
We may start by disposing of the claim that Hegel's communi-
tarianism is essentially supportive of totalitarianism. That argument
distorts or ignores his insistence on the full development of and re-
spect for individual conscience' and the necessary development of a
private sphere of family and economy in which individual freedom
could flourish.?' Henning Ottman and others have shown quite con-
FAMILY 42 (1989) (characterizing Taylor's, Sandel's, and MacIntyre's communitarianism
as reactionary because it substantially relies on existing communities characterized by
inegalitarian social relations); id. at 117 (contrasting "reactionary" communitarianism with
Unger's radical communitarianism, which insists that only new communities purged of
traditional relations of domination can fully realize the liberal goal of equality).
219. See, ag., KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 257 (1950)
(attributing "modem totalitarian doctrines" to Hegel's teachings). Henning Ottman has
produced a comprehensive historical overview of the many distortions of Hegel's political
philosophy to serve the political purposes of the time. See Henning Ottman, Hegel and
Political Trends. A Criticism of the Political Hegel Legends, in THE HEGEL MYTHS AND
LEGENDS 53, 53-69 (Jon Stewart ed., 1996). He traces the characterization of Hegel as
supporting a totalitarian state from the Bismark Hegelians of the mid- and late-1800s, see
id. at 59-61, to the nationalists and national socialists of the early- and mid-1900s, see id. at
61-63, and to the liberal responses to German aggression after each of the world wars, see
id. at 64-65.
220. See e.g., Fred Dallmayr, Rethinking the Hegelian State, in HEGEL AND LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 145, at 321, 338 (arguing that "the Popperian charge of collectivism
and totalitarian repression can readily be countered"); Franz Gr6goire, Is the Hegelian
State Totalitarian?, in THE HEGEL MYTHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 219, at 104, 107
(arguing that Hegel's doctrine that "the state and the individual... each has its own
value ... precludes us from accusing Hegel of 'totalitarianism,'" and noting that "Hegel
was much too careful to harmonize diverse points of view to fall into such a one-sided con-
ception"); Walter A. Kauffman, The Hegel Myth and its Method, in THE HEGEL MYTHS
AND LEGENDS, supra note 219, at 82, 90 ("We are bound to misunderstand Hegel when
we construe his remarks about conscience in terms of the Nazi state."); T.M. Knox, Hegel
and Prussianism, in THE HEGEL MYTHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 219, at 70, 78 ("[I]t is
to turn [Hegel's] doctrine upside down to hold that he thinks that the triumph of one
'world-historical' nation over another is a triumph of mere brute force.., when he tiinks
in fact that it is a triumph of reason.").
221. See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 220, at 91 ("While Hegel considers the state su-
preme among human institutions, he does so precisely because we would subordinate the
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vincingly that this view of Hegel was developed to serve the political
ends of Hegel's various misinterpreters. m However, even if Hegel's
state is neither totalitarian, fascist, nationalistic nor racist, there can
still be genuine concern that his vision of an organic, unitary state is
inconsistent with the foundational liberalism of the American politi-
cal system.
Hegel's communitarianism emerges in his proposals for the ra-
tionally structured state.m The feature of his ideal modern state
which may be most difficult to harmonize with the American political
system is Hegel's non-elective legislature, where the family and the
natural sphere of ethical life are represented by the agricultural class,
which enters the legislature by right of birth,"4 and civil society and
the economic sphere of ethical life are represented by the business
class,'m which enters the legislature not by election in a political con-
test, but rather through deputies who have emerged from civil
society as managers or leaders of some branch of civil society.n6
whole realm of institutions to the highest spiritual pursuits .... [This] does not im-
ply... that Hegel's state is 'totalitarian'..... "); Knox, supra note 220, at 79 ("[Hegel] tries
to find a place in the state both for individual liberty and for strong government ....");
Ottman, supra note 219, at 65 (noting that Hegel's doctrines of "the emancipation of the
state from religion and secularization" and the "prepar[ation] ... [of] the private citizen of
the ideologically neutral state for the political universality... hinderfl extremism").
222. See, e.g., Ottman, supra note 219, at 53 ("Every political trend, whether liberalism,
socialism, communism, conservatism, nationalism, or national socialism, has tried to bring
[Hegel] over to its side.").
223. Hegel's ideal state includes a constitutional monarchy, see HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 273, at 176, with state support for religion, see id. 270, at 168,
separation of powers motivated more by organizational needs, see id. 272, at 175, than
distrust, see id. app. Additions n.178, at 292 (referring to 1 300), and a non-elective legisla-
ture structured by class, see id. 1 306-07, at 199. However, Hegel's ideal monarch was
neither despotic nor feudal. See Errol E. Harris, Hegel's Theory of Sovereignty, Interna-
tional Relations, and War, in HEGEL'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 145,
at 137, 138. Hegel's proposal for state support of religion was moderated by several fac-
tors. First, he was unwilling to allow the state to force a particular religion upon the
individual. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 270, at 168. Second, he
insisted that church doctrine was not a state matter, but rather a matter of individual free-
dom. See id. 270, at 169-70. Third, he distinguished between political truth and religious
truth. See id. 270, at 166-67. Fourth, he argued that the division of the church into vari-
ous sects promotes freedom of thought. See id. 270, at 168. Fifth, he stated that only the
state can offer true universality. See id. 270, at 173-74.
224. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, I 306-07, at 199.
225. See id. [ 308 & remarks, at 200.
226. See id. Hegel argued:
Since these deputies are the deputies of civil society, it follows as a direct conse-
quence that their appointment is made by the society as a society. That is to say,
in making the appointments, society is not dispersed into atomic units, collected
to perform only a single and temporary act, and kept together for a moment and
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Hegel's legislature was not elective because he viewed both di-
rect democracy and representative democracy as reproducing in the
government the particularistic character of civil society:' "[T]he
Many, as units-a congenial interpretation of 'people,' are of course
something connected, but they are connected only as an aggregate, a
formless mass whose commotion and activity could therefore only be
elementary, irrational, barbarous, and frightful."' ' For Hegel, the
irrationality of pure democracy in the modem state springs from the
fact that, in the modem world, unlike the ancient Greek world, 9 the
moment of individuality has been fully developed." Such pure par-
ticularity cannot produce anything universal; the basis of political life
"could then only be the abstract individuality of caprice and opin-ion."23'
Indeed, the immediate compromise of all democracies from con-
sensus to majority rule reveals the fallacy of any claim of universality
arising from a democracy in which there is not already an underlying
no longer. On the contrary, it makes the appointment as a society, articulated
into associations, communities, and Corporations, which although constituted al-
ready for other purposes, acquire in this way a connexion with politics.
Id.
227. See id. remarks to % 308, at 200. Hegel explained:
To hold that every single person should share in deliberating and deciding on po-
litical matters of general concern on the ground that all individuals are members
of the state.., is tantamount to a proposal to put the democratic element without
any rational form into the organism of the state, although it is only in virtue of
the possession of such a form that the state is an organism at all.
Id.; see also HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 174 ("[P]articularity
and individuality assert themselves in the form of aristocracy and democracy.").
228. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 303, at 198.
229. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 272. Hegel wrote:
The democratic constitution is here the only possible one: the citizens are still
unconscious of particular interests, and therefore of a corrupting element: the
objective will is in their case not disintegrated.... That very subjective freedom
which constitutes the principle and determines the peculiar form of freedom in
our world, which forms the absolute basis of our political and religious life, could
not manifest itself in Greece otherwise than as a destructive element.
Id.
230. In Hegel's view, the full development of individuality was brought about by two
factors: first, the freeing influence of Luther's proclamation that Christ, representing uni-
versal truth, is imminently present in each human being only through individual, subjective
faith, and second, the complex economic world of civil society. Cf HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to % 124, at 84 ("The right of the subject's particularity
... is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times. This
right in its infinity is given expression in Christianity."); id. app. Additions, n.116, at 267
("In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to him.")
(referring to 182).
231. Id. remarks to 303, at 198.
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agreement; there will always be a minority in the modern world, and
its views will be trampled in a pure democracy. 2 Furthermore, be-
cause the demand of pure democracy for self-rule of particular
individuals is inconsistent with the practical necessity of an executive
government, obedience to the government always appears as a con-
straint on liberty 3 and results in distrust and hostility toward
government officials, no matter who they are.z4
Hegel suggests that universality could emerge within civil society
only in the form of social groups formed by the kind of work one
does, i.e., classes s and "Corporations."' 36 Organized around par-
ticular trades or skills, the Corporation is like a second family for
workers.0 7 It serves, as does the family, to connect otherwise iso-
232. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 173 ("[T]here would be
no longer freedom, for the will of the minority would cease to be respected."). Hegel also
stated:
[E]specially in large states[, popular suffrage] leads inevitably to electoral indif-
ference, since the casting of a single vote is of no significance where there is a
multitude of electors .... Thus, the result of an institution of this kind is more
likely to be the opposite of what was intended; election actually falls into the
power of a few, of a caucus, and so of the particular and contingent interest which
is precisely what was to have been neutralized.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 311, at 202-03.
233. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 173. Hegel argued:
The state is an abstraction, having even its generic existence in its citizens; but it
is an actuality, and its simply generic existence must embody itself in individual
will and activity.... [This necessitates the selection and separation from the rest
of those who have to take the helm in political affairs, to decide concerning them,
and to give orders to other citizens, with a view to the execution of their
plans.... Yet obedience seems inconsistent with liberty, and those who command
appear to do the very opposite of that which the fundamental idea of the state,
viz., that of freedom, requires.
Id.
234. See id. at 366 ("The particular arrangements of the government are forthwith op-
posed by the advocates of liberty as the mandates of a particular will and branded as
displays of arbitrary power."). Hegel noted that the Sophists' introduction of subjective
reflection and individual conscience caused the downfall of the Greek world. See id. at 272
("[Tihis decay even Thucydides notices, when he speaks of every one's thinking that things
are going on badly when he has not a hand in the management.").
235. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 201, at 130-31 ("The infi-
nitely complex, criss-cross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the
equally infinite multiplicity of means therein employed, become crystallized, owing to the
universality inherent in their content, and distinguished into general groups... in other
words, into class-divisions.").
236. See id. 251-52, at 152-53.
237. See id. ("[A] selfish purpose, directed toward its particular self-
interest ... [makes] a member of civil society ... a member of a Corporation .... [The
corporation's] right is to come on the scene like a second family for its members, while
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lated individuals and provide them with a sense of unity and com-
mon purpose. 8 As members of such social groups, not only do the
particular wants and desires of individuals acquire universality, 29 but
the individual reexperiences the possible unity of particular and uni-
versal.240 Consequently, Hegel saw the Corporation and marriage as
"the two fixed points round which the unorganized atoms of civil so-
ciety revolve., 24' By arranging the legislature so that it existed to
represent these family, class, and corporation interests, Hegel hoped
to ensure that legislators contribute something universal to the
state.2 At the same time, he also hoped to avoid the hostility to
government bred by liberal democracy, by making representation
itself arise out of unity rather than isolation, so that the individuals
represented would see the state as a larger unity of which they were
an essential part.243
Hegel predicted that the "problem... with which history is now
occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future",
244
civil society can only be an indeterminate sort of family.... ").
238. See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 434 (1975) [hereinafter TAYLOR, HEGEL] ("The
three classes represent each a dimension which must be present in the modern state.
There must be the sense of allegiance to a whole which is above and greater than oneself,
the dependence on something bigger .... ).
239. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 308, at 200-01.
Hegel explained:
The concrete state is the whole, articulated into its particular groups. The mem-
ber of a state is a member of such a group, i.e. of a social class, and it is only as
characterized in this objective way that he comes into consideration when we are
dealing with the state. His mere character as universal implies that he is at one
and the same time both a private person and also a thinking consciousness, a will
which wills the universal. This consciousness and will, however, lose their empti-
ness and acquire a content and a living actuality only when they are filled with
particularity, and particularity means determinacy as particular and a particular
class-status .... Hence the single person attains his actual and living destiny for
universality only when he becomes a member of a Corporation, a society, [etc.].
Id.
240. In the Corporation, the "particularity of need and satisfaction" is united with the
"universality of abstract rights." Id. 255, at 154.
241. Id. remarks to 1255, at 154 (footnote omitted).
242. Cf W. Ver Eecke, Relation Between Economics and Politics in Hegel, in HEGEL'S
SOCIAL AND POLIrICAL THOUGHT, supra note 145, at 91, 98 ("[The economic order edu-
cates all particulars toward universality .... ).
243. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 253, at 153 ("It is also rec-
ognized that he belongs to a whole which is itself an organ of the entire society, and that he
is actively concerned in promoting the comparatively disinterested end of this whole."); see
also TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 445 (indicating that estates must be founded on
"organic articulation of the estates of society" to link people to government).
244. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OFHISTORY, supra note 120, at 367.
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would be the collision of "'[liberalism' ... which insists upon the
sway of individual wills 245 with the communitarian aspects of the
modem state.26 He believed that the atomism of the civil economy
must be balanced by institutions which unify people, and that these
institutions must further be reflected in and protected by the state in
order for the state to gain the trust of its citizens.
Clearly, a legislature structured and constituted as Hegel pro-
posed is inconsistent with American democracy. At the same time,
the American insistence on an elected executive and an elected leg-
islature, which reflects a continued "liberal" distrust of those
officials, appears to indicate a rejection of Hegel's critique of liberal-
ism. However, the modem economy has produced a level of social
fragmentation and homogenization that went well beyond anything
Hegel anticipated.247 The classes and Corporations which Hegel
thought would provide a communal experience in civil society par-
allel to the communal experience of the family in private life have
been destroyed,2 8 at least as positive institutions.249 However, if the
continued strength and vitality of the American state is traceable to
new institutions that provide unity and cohesion sufficient to balance
the fragmentation of modem society, or if the contemporary fracture
and decay of American society is attributable to the lack of such bal-
ancing,'o then we may say that in principle Hegel was correct. This
245. Id. at 366.
246. See id. (defining these aspects as "the establishment of rational rights, with free-
dom of person and property, with the existence of a political organization in which are to
be found various circles of civil life each having its own functions to perform").
247. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 456 ("[T]he manufacturing economy
based on division of labour and exchange tended to extend itself endlessly, and in the
process to prize men loose from any group allegiance, to accelerate their individual mobil-
ity while at the same time intensifying their reciprocal dependence in a vast, impersonal
system.").
248. See TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 218, at 111 (arguing that Hegel was
wrong about the vitality of rigid social differentiation because he failed to take into ac-
count the "increasing 'classlessness' of modern society").
249. See id. at 116-17 (arguing that the modem commitment to ideologies of equality
requires making all real differences between individuals insignificant).
250. Charles Taylor argues that Hegel's insight about the necessity of unifying institu-
tions is relevant to contemporary liberal states:
If these common meanings fail, then the foundations of liberal society are in dan-
ger. And this indeed, seems a distinct possibility today. The problem of
recovering Sittlichkeit, of reforming a set of institutions and practices with which
men can identify, is with us in an acute way in the apathy and alienation of mod-
em society. For instance the central institutions of representative government
are challenged by a growing sense that the individual's vote has no significance.
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assertion, in turn, would support the attempt of this Article to
ground the constitutional significance of marriage in a Hegelian view
of marriage as a critical political institution that nurtures individual-
ity and promotes social unity. Indeed, the contemporary
philosopher Charles Taylor has argued that "liberal society, like any
other, cannot hold together simply by the satisfaction of its members'
needs and interests. It also requires a common, or at least wide-
spread set of beliefs which link its structure and practices with what
its members see as of ultimate significance." 1 In other words, a lib-
eral society, if it is to survive as a free society, must not fulfill the
infinite possibility of individual diversification, or it will lose the glue
of commonality which holds it together.s
2
I would suggest that the ideology of the American state as
purely liberal is moderated by the reality of an American society that
generates forces of cohesion and community which counterbalance
fragmentation from the emphasis on individual liberty.23 To the ex-
tent that these counterbalancing unifying institutions are no longer
as obvious as class and occupation, marriage might be seen as the
sole remaining "pillar" upon which a unified society rests. This
might then explain why "the family" and "family values" have
emerged as so politically significant in contemporary American poli-
tics." Yet other unifying forces are present. In the United States, as
in the rest of the world, nationalism has emerged to provide an
enormously unifying counterbalance to people unconnected by tradi-
tional communities of culture, religion, or geography. 5 A world of
TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 460. "Sittlichkeit" is the idea of "a community in
which the good is realized in common life... reconcil[ing] the fully developed individual
subjectivity and the universal." Id. at 438.
251. Id. at 459.
252. See id. at 460. Taylor argues as follows:
A liberal society which is a going concern has a Sittlichkeit of its own, although
paradoxically this is grounded on a vision of things which denies the need for Sit-
tlichkeit and portrays the ideal society as created and sustained by the will of its
members. Liberal societies, in other words, are lucky when they do not live up, in
this respect, to their own specifications.
Id.
253. See Charles Taylor, Hegel's Ambitious Legacy for Modem Liberalism, in HEGEL
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 145, at 64, 75 (arguing that a free state requires liberal-
ism balanced by the Hegelian civic humanism, in which defense of individual rights is
complemented by "a strong sense of common values ... particularized and bonded to a
particular people in history").
254. Cf Hafen, supra note 12, at 479-80 (noting that "mediating structures" such as the
family are essential to overcome alienation from the political order).
255. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 455. Taylor explains:
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nation-states, involvement in several world and localized wars, and
clear conflicts in national ideologies have made national identity and
international political and economic dominance strongly unifying
factors in modem life.
One can identify features in the American electoral system
which could be seen as moderating what Hegel would have consid-
ered a dangerously democratic system. Pure popular suffrage is, in
fact, almost non-existent in this country. The requirement that can-
didates represent a party before being placed on the ballot requires,
in Hegel's terms, that elected officials take on some of the universal
character of their party.s Finally, the division of the electoral
populace into states and districts for purposes of representation,
along with the electoral college system, can also be seen as mecha-
nisms for universalizing the representative who emerges victorious.
[Tihe most important force to fill the gap left by the decline of traditional alle-
giances has been nationalism.... [T]he continued, unchecked operation of this
drive [toward individualism and homogenization], sweeping all traditional
authority and social differentiation before it... opened the void that nationalism
has been called to fill. And reciprocally, the religion of nationalism... has been
a powerful instrument of homogenization. How many modem societies could
command sufficient loyalty and civic spirit to carry on without a strong dose of
nationalism?
Id.
256. Prospective candidates on the general ballot are chosen by a more select group of
electors based on their achievements in civil society that identify them as representing
certain universal aspects of the electorate. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 43.65 (1995) (providing
that the candidates who receive the highest number of votes in each of the political parties'
primaries shall be placed on the ballot in the general election). This system of selecting
nominators is similar to the way that the deputies of the business class were chosen. See
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, TT 310-11, at 201-02. The Democratic
and Republican parties each espouse positions that they hope will appeal to particular
social groups. See generally SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 273 (1982) (explaining that a "major element in campaign strategy is the need to
put together a coalition of interest groups"); NICHOLAS J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, THE
PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL MARKETING 6-8 (1990) (explaining the role of political
marketing in American politics as persuading narrowly defined groups that a particular
candidate has their interest at heart). The continued success of these traditional parties
depends upon their ability to appear to represent the "average American" in a way that
allows a substantial number of otherwise diverse individuals to identify with and be unified
by "the party." See FRED DALLMAYR, G.W.F. HEGEL: MODERNITY AND POLITICS 253-
54 (1993) (arguing that political parties moderate the tendencies of democracy toward
atomization of the populace).
257. Suggestions that proportional or cumulative voting would produce elected officials
representative of more socially cohesive groups are premised on a recognition that the
fairness of representative democracy requires that elected representatives reflect an inter-
est group. See, e.g., LANI GUINER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 148-49 (1994) (arguing that "[b]ecause
geographic districting wastes votes, neither minority groups nor majority voters are fairly
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Other unifying forces at work include complex social identifica-
tionS25 that can be reflected in our government both formally and
informally. Various alliances, such as "fraternal organizations,
'rainbow coalitions,' base communities, and especially the so-called
'new social movements' concerned with such issues as ecology, nu-
clear disarmament, and the dismantling of discriminatory
practices," 9 which cut across racial, economic, and other divides,
may be the modern bases of public unification.260 Also, a strongly
developed system of public education makes possible the learning of
a common language and body of knowledge, and forms the core of
many communities." Even ethnicity, which in America creates a
multitude of partial communities and can be enormously divisive,
2 62
may be transformed into a largely unifying force. 63  Finally, the
United States has a shared political culture based on the Constitu-
tion, which grounds a deep and abiding trust in the structure and
institutions of our government, even when particular governments
fail individuals among us.264
represented," but that "semiproportional systems such as cumulative voting give more
voters, not just racial minorities, the opportunity to vote for a winning candidate").
258. Fred Dallmayr has argued that our complex social relationships "cannot be con-
fined to the level of conflict or hostility ... but must include bonds of sympathy .... The
same relationism... can still be invoked as locus of an open-ended public space and thus
as emblem of a democratic 'social bond.'" Dallmayr, supra note 220, at 342.
259. Id. at 341.
260. See id. Charles Taylor, on the other hand, sees one of the primary unifying fea-
tures of Western society as the continuing ideology of conquering the frontier, see
TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 411, modernized as the transformation of society
through mastery of nature and technology, see TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIETY, supra note
218, at 128.
261. See TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 218, at 87-88 (identifying language,
culture, home teams, and politics as community-creating institutions).
262. See id at 117 (noting that ethnic differences can become "foci of identity," but
suggesting they are "exclusive and divisive"). But see MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) [hereinafter MULTICUL.
TURALISM] (containing essays by Charles Taylor, K. Anthony Appiah, Jurgen Habermas,
Steven Rockefeller, Michael Waltzer, and Susan Wolf arguing about the coherence of
recognizing ethnic and cultural communities/identities within a liberal state).
263. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE 26-27 (1992) (suggesting the possibility of "liberating unities of
culture" where ethnicity is a matter of consent rather than descent).
264. See Taylor, supra note 253, at 73 (arguing that the contemporary American polity
embodies, in part, Hegel's demand that a stable free society requires "a very strong at-
tachment to particular institutions"); see also CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 505 (1989) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SOURCES OF
THE SELF] (suggesting that neoconservative politics that undercut welfare programs erode
the existing and necessary identification of American (and British) citizens as part of a
community whose unity is both assisted and reflected in public institutions and politics).
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In these and other features of American life, and especially in
the institution of marriage, we may find the sustaining forces of co-
hesion and community which give weight to Hegel's view that the
modem state must be jointly grounded on individual liberty and so-
cial connection and commitment. This in turn justifies the use of
Hegel's explanation of the political significance of marriage as being
at the heart of our respect for the individual as well as our coherence
as a nation.
2. Hegel's Sexism
The second substantial barrier to our use of Hegelian theory is
that it premises the transcendent unity of monogamous love upon a
radical distinction between men and women, in which women are
viewed as arriving at a rather concrete and passive personhood
through intuition and feeling, while men achieve a more universal
personhood through conceptual thought. 5 Indeed, Hegel is notori-
ous for suggesting that "[t]he difference between men and women is
like that between the difference between animals and plants. Men
correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants .... ."266
For Hegel, women are uniquely, albeit primitively, cognizant of their
universality and communal unity without further struggle in the pub-
lic sphere because they are essentially emotive and immediately
focused on the concrete realities of daily existence.' 7 Women can,
therefore, reach their highest potential of universality within the
family. At the same time, women's presence in the family creates the
unity of feeling that is such an essential contribution of marriage to
the development of citizens and the possibility of a coherent state.26
This distinction between the nature of men and the nature of women
grounds Hegel's insistence that women be confined to the private
sphere of the family, and not be permitted to take part in either the
public economic sphere 9 or the public political sphere.Y
265. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OFRIGHT, supra note 30, 1 166, at 114.
266. Id. app. Additions n.107, at 263 (referring to 166).
267. See id. 166, at 114.
268. See id.
269. Hegel makes the man the legal representative of the family, and "it is his preroga-
tive to go out and work for [the family's] living, to attend to its needs, and to control and
administer capital." Id. 171, at 116.
270. See id. app. Additions, n.107, at 263-64 (referring to 166). Hegel explained:
When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, be-
cause women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by
arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are educated-who knows how?-as
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Whatever the outcome of the continuing public debate on the
meaning of physiological or neurochemical bases of behavioral dif-
ferences between men and women, as a matter of constitutional law
the Court no longer gives any legal weight to claims that men and
women have differing capacities to be educated,271 engage in work,
or function in nurturing family roles. 3 The question that this Article
must address, therefore, is whether Hegel's understanding of the na-
ture of marriage and its contributions to the possibility of a stable
and free government can withstand the modem erosion of the tradi-
tionally perceived difference between men and women.
This inquiry must begin by recognizing that Hegel's view of
marital unity arising out of difference was based not merely on ac-
ceptance of traditional gender roles,274 but rather upon Hegel's belief
that differentiation and contradiction275 are fundamental logi-
cal/ontological principles to which the structure of reality must
it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge. The
status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought
and much technical exertion.
Id.; see also id. remarks to 301, at 195 (noting that the empirical universality claimed for
universal suffrage is immediately defeated by the fact that it necessarily "excludes at least
children [and] women").
271. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2280 (1996) ("State actors
controlling gates to opportunity ... may not exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.'" (quoting Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982))).
272. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 547 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("[E]mployment opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that
are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.").
273. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding unconstitutional an
Illinois statute that terminated the parental rights of unwed fathers, while married fathers
and both married and unmarried mothers could have such rights terminated only upon a
finding of neglect and lack of fitness).
274. See DALLMAYR, supra note 256, at 255 (arguing that Hegel's strict gender roles
"should be attributed not simply to personal (patriarchal) leanings of the philosopher, but
rather to deep-seated metaphysical premises").
275. Hegel proposed that logic was a system of movement and vitality powered by in-
herent contradiction. See Robert Pippin, Hegel's Metaphysics and the Problem of
Contradiction, in THE HEGEL MYTHS AND LEGENDS, supra note 219, at 239, 241. Hegel
demonstrated how important metaphysical concepts were basically incoherent; close ex-
amination of their essential meaning revealed that they must be understood as the
apparent contradiction of this meaning. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 229.
This inherent contradiction forces a movement to a new concept that, while reconciling the
initial contradiction, contains contradictions of its own. See, e.g., id. at 232 (explaining the
opening argument of Hegel's Science of Logic, that pure simple being is at the same time
nothing unless it is not simple being, but rather being with some determinate quality




conform. 6 Thus, Hegel saw the differentiation of sex as recapitu-
lating the basic political contradiction of individuality/particularity
and unity/universality. 7 Men were characterized by individuality
and women were characterized by simply emotive unity. The unity
which arose from the marriage of a man and a woman would, there-
fore, be a more complex unity which took into account individuality,
while the individuality which persisted or arose out of such a mar-
riage would be a more complex individuality that took into account
the necessity of unity.7
Thus, under Hegel's philosophy, it is the difference of sex that
allows a simple unity of family which can nonetheless nurture and
develop individuals, just as it is differentiation of class and corpora-
tion which makes possible a unity of state which nonetheless respects
and protects individuals.279 Instead of being just a "heap" of arbi-
trarily different individuals, the Hegelian state utilizes these
"rational" differences in its organization to produce a greater whole,
just as the organization of differentiated cells into organs makes pos-
sible an organism which is more than the sum of its parts." The
Hegelian state, therefore, is organic,"m and human differentiation by
class, corporation, and sex is, consequently, essential to the possibil-
ity of both individual freedom and community. 2
276. For Hegel, external reality was the embodiment of thought or reason, and there-
fore reality could be shown to reflect the logic of reason. See generally TAYLOR, HEGEL,
supra note 238, at 225-26 (explaining the difference between modem dualism, which posits
thought and reality as distinct, and the Hegelian view that reality is the embodiment of
pure, infinite rationality, in which we participate as individual thinkers). For Hegel, logic
was therefore both transcendental, in that it revealed the necessary structure of human
knowledge, and ontological, in that it revealed the necessary structure of reality as well.
See id. at 226-27.
277, It is the resolution of this contradiction which creates the possibility of freedom.
See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 260, at 160-61.
278. See id. 166, at 114. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills argues that while, for Hegel, male
individuality is directly benefited by female universality, PATRICIA JAGENTOWICZ MILLS,
WoMAN, NATURE, AND PSYCHE 42 (1987), female universality is not, under Hegel's ac-
count, permitted to achieve independent individuality, see id. at 39. Instead, the
individuality that arises out of female unity takes the form of communal family property
which is inheritable. See id at 40-41.
279. See Raymond Plant, Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philoso-
phy, in HEGEL'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 145, at 59, 71 (explaining
the way in which labor for Hegel not only developed individuality, but also developed
community by creating rationally structured interdependent social relations).
280. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 308 & remarks, at 200-01.
281. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 380.
282. See id. at 406-09 (discussing Hegel's view that differentiation by rationally distin-
guished classes is essential to the possibility of a representative government that can
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We must begin by noting that the assumption that women were
not individuated in the same way as men produces an internal con-
tradiction in Hegel's account of monogamous marriage.283 In light of
the rather radical differences Hegel posited between men and
women, it is difficult to understand how heterosexual marriage could
provide enough of an "other" for the man to experience the tran-
scendence of his individual personhood into marital unity. 4 Indeed,
Hegel's view of the role of the man as the legal representative of the
family' would seem to require that the full surrender of male per-
sonality in the marriage be inhibited2S Hegel's emphasis on the
ethical significance of monogamy is "marred by the subordinate
status and incomplete individuality of the woman." 7 Only a mar-
riage of equals can allow monogamy to fully achieve its promise of a
unity which both transcends and nurtures individuality."
Despite this contradiction, Hegel clung to this view of women as
essentially incapable of individuality. However, it is important to
recognize that Hegel's sexism is fundamentally related to the classism
which led him to presume that freedom could be the product of a
non-elective legislature."' Because he believed that society could
only achieve unity out of pure particularity by weaving together par-
tial unities, he took as a given, as "rational," the differentiation of his
time, gender and class, and enshrined them in state institutions.
achieve integration of this differentiation); ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL'S ETHICAL
THOUGHT 243-45 (1990) (explaining Hegel's insistence that gender roles are rational and
essential as gaining its primary strength from the political need to ensure that the family
would remain a place of simple, concrete unity created by feeling).
283. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 147, at 235 (commenting that the impossibility of total
mutual commitment where only men retain a role in civil society and the state was a con-
tradiction Hegel "might have recognized more explicitly if he had been as concerned to
ferret out the objective, institutionalized contradictions of the present as he was to justify
the present as a rational triumph over the contradictions of the past"); MILLS, supra note
278, at 39 (arguing that given Hegel's view of women as unindividuated, men cannot rec-
ognize themselves in women, and "a truly human love is only possible between men");
Andrew Koppelman, Sex Equality and/or the Family: Bloom vs. Okin to Rousseau vs. He-
gel, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 399, 420 & n.98 (1992) (listing and agreeing with numerous
other Hegel commentators who have found his views on gender contradictory to his views
on marriage).
284. See MILLS, supra note 278, at 39.
285. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, T 171, at 116.
286. See MILLS, supra note 278, at 40.
287. Landes, supra note 127, at 139.
288. See Koppelman, supra note 283, at 424 (arguing that "the equality of women, far
from destroying the essential goods of family life, is necessary for the full realization of
those goods").
289. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, T 307, at 199.
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While none of the specific differentiations he relied upon appears
particularly "rational" today, this Article has nonetheless defended
Hegel's insight that some kind of rational differentiation is critical to
the possibility of unifying individuals into at least partial communi-
ties, ' even if such modem differentiations are considerably more
fluid and voluntary than those proposed by Hegel. Recognition that
it is this insight that is at the root of Hegel's insistence that a truly
free society must institutionalize social, economic, and gender differ-
entiations means that we can reconcile Hegel's sexism with the
modem notions of legal and social equality by explaining how the
modem family may achieve unity through differentiation without
relying on gender differentiation.29
The easiest way to reconcile Hegel's outmoded views of gender
roles would be to argue that modem men and women possess an
equal understanding of unity of family, of the differentiation of eco-
nomic life, and of the interdependent community of the nation.
292
This position is the obvious outgrowth of the liberal demand for
equality by homogenization. However, anticipating this, Hegel in-
sisted that only a deep immersion in the concrete life reflecting that
particular value could bring proper development of it:293 "[a] man
actualizes himself only in becoming something definite, i.e., some-
thing specifically particularized; this means restricting himself
exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need., 294 Thus, Hegel
might have argued that without women devoting themselves exclu-
sively to the family, the family as a real place of unity would not
exist.
This argument still has appeal, as conservatives blame the de-
struction of the family and family values on working women,29 and as
290. See supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
291. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 410 (noting that Hegel was wrong about
the future of class and social differentiation based on kinds of labor because "[t]he great
homogenization of modem society shows that however varied may be the functions per-
formed by citizens they can develop to a unity of outlook and life-style which puts paid to
any argument for different relations to the process of decision").
292- See DALLMAYR, supra note 256, at 255 (arguing that in the modern "democratic
setting, universalism or commonality can no longer be embodied in a specially trained
class (of higher civil servants) but must be dispersed or disseminated in the social fabric
itself, in a manner allowing all members to be active also as public citizens").
293. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 434.
294. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 1 207, at 133.
295. See Koppelman, supra note 283, at 399 (describing the conservative argument as
stating that "[t]he family... cannot endure unless women willingly subordinate themselves
to men and children").
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feminists and working women perceive the extraordinary difficulty of
creating a family and maintaining family life while devoting substan-
tial energy to work and civic life.29 Some contemporary feminist
theorists, like Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, who argue for
"women's distinctive moral capacities and viewpoint, ', 297 might be
viewed as giving modem currency to Hegel's view that women are
better at grasping ethics in the form of concrete social relationships,
which promotes unity, while men are better at grasping ethics in the
form of abstract principles, which promotes individual independ-
ence. 2 98 However, other scholars, such as Jessica Benjamin, see these
genderized abilities as the pathological consequence of the construc-
tion of gender in relations of domination.299 Indeed, Benjamin
argues that a healthy individual must integrate these different abili-
ties rather than develop one at the expense of the other." Similarly,
Susan Moller Okin disputes the dualism of an "ethic of justice and an
ethic of care,"3'' arguing instead that ethics of justice must be re-
thought to take into account the essential role that feelings, care, and
empathy play in the development of a sense of justice."2 Conse-
quently, modem commentators do not resolve the issue of whether
Hegel was correct in arguing that the same person cannot be the
emotional heart of a family, a self-interested business person, and a
politician who can see the greater good.
If Hegel was correct, and the conflict between liberalism and
simple communitarianism cannot be coherently resolved within a
single individual, 3 then either the squeezing of the family by the
296. See OKIN, supra note 218, at 5.
297. WOOD, supra note 282, at 245 (footnote omitted).
298. See id.; see also ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 114,129
(1987) (arguing the conservative position that because men are inherently selfish and indi-
vidualistic and only women are altruistic, sexual egalitarianism spells the downfall of the
family).
299. See JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM,
AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION 77 (1988).
300. See id. at 130-31.
301. OKIN, supra note 218, at 15.
302- See id. at 97-101 (arguing that John Rawls's detailed account in A Theory of Jus-
tice of moral development as essentially familial results in a notion of justice that is social
rather than purely individualistic); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 462-72
(1971) (tracing the development of a sense of justice to a child's upbringing by loving par-
ents who enforce their own standards of morality).
303. Charles Taylor argues that modem crises of alienation stem from the systematic
eradication of partial-community identification as a positive contribution to individual
identity. See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 411-14. In his view,
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economic and civic activities of both parents will be fatal to the fam-
ily or we will find that one partner will drop out of public life rather
than allowing the family to fall apart. However, nothing requires
that the female partner be the one to leave public life. One could
agree with Hegel that a difference exists between family-creating
emotive abilities and individual-creating rational abilities, while
viewing his attribution of the ability to make a family to women
alone as incorrect. Men arguably can develop the same emotional
abilities by taking their roles as nurturing parents more seriously and
spending more time with their children. The capacity for creating a
unity of feeling which is ethical is more a consequence of how indi-
viduals spend their time, rather than biology. Such men may find it
as difficult to function in a working world as some family women do
when that world gives little weight to family responsibilities. If con-
current roles are impossible, serial roles may be the answer for many.
If, on the other hand, Hegel was wrong and social differentiation
can be replicated in modern society by individuals taking on a num-
ber of different roles,"0 4 then we can acknowledge Hegel's insight
simply by insisting that the role of marital partner and parent be a
valued and protected role in our society and that the unique ethics of
the family be acknowledged. In such circumstances, it would seem
appropriate that both marital partners take on the role of creators of
emotional family unity.05 Hegel's claim that it is impossible for one
individual to take on substantial public as well as private responsi-
bilities may simply reflect the realities of eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century family, economic, and political life. Time- and
labor-saving devices have made the concrete work of sustaining
modem families less consuming. Entirely new kinds of labor have
developed within civil society to fill in the gaps that working parents
cannot cover in their more limited private time.0 6
one of the great needs of the modem democratic polity is to recover a sense of
significant differentiation, so that its partial communities, be they geographical,
or cultural, or occupational, can become again important centres of concern and
activity for their members in a way which connects them to the whole.
Id. at 416.
304. See WOOD, supra note 282, at 246 (suggesting one solution to the inequality that
necessarily results from Hegel's essentialist distinction between men and women is to have
both sexes integrate both "the substantive and reflective principles").
305. See DALLMAYR, supra note 256, at 256 (arguing that the modem transformation
of the Hegelian family requires that everyone develop emotive as well as rational abilities
and that everyone take part in the nurturing life as well as the economic and public life).
306. See Cathleen D. Zick et al., Trade-Offs Between Purchased Services and Time in
Single-Parent and Two-Parent Families, 30 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 1, 14-15 (1996)
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Relieving women of the full burden of creating the unity of fam-
ily frees women to take up the same position of individuality that
men were able to maintain in the traditional Hegelian family. In-
deed, if the unity of the Hegelian family is not to rest upon the same
destabilizing contradiction upon which the simple unity of the Greek
city-state rested, i.e., the exploitation, domination, and exclusion
from public life of women, slaves, and non-citizens 07 it must arise
out of a partnership of two individuals,"' both of whom are respon-
sible for the emotional stability and concrete life of the family and
(detailing the purchase of meals, child-care and housekeeping services by single parent
families). This is not to suggest that the current exploitation of poor and immigrant
women that makes possible the careers of middle- and upper-class women is a positive
development. Rather, this Article suggests that the evolution of women's work within the
family into distinct forms of socially valuable labor that may be performed by non-family
members is a necessary step in allowing men and women to balance the demands of family
and work. See OKIN, supra note 218, at 115. If careers requiring care, nurture, and sensi-
tivity to relationships are given proper social value, i.e., paid in accordance with their real
value, the economic sphere could be a place where unifying emotional relationships are
created and individual particularity is developed and expressed. At the same time, even
non-nurturing work can be transformed by recognition of the demands of family. Today,
parental leaves, flexible schedules, shared positions, and work from home all allow for
concurrent integration of parental and economic roles by both men and women. This inte-
gration of family and work, however, need not be seen as destroying the distinct autonomy
of private family units. Contrary to Frederick Engels' vision of the family dissolving as
housekeeping and child-rearing become social enterprises, see FREDERICK ENGELS,
ORIGIN OFTHE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 110 (1972) (1884), the role
of families as a critical nurturing and educating institution remains, even if much of the
labor of family life is commercialized. See Richard W. Krouse, Patriarchal Liberalism and
Beyond: From John Stuart Mill to Harriet Taylor, in THE FAMILY IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT, supra note 127, at 145, 152 (arguing that where "individual autonomy and self-
consciousness" are valued, a distinction between public life and private families must be
preserved); id. at 170 (arguing that "cognitive and moral autonomy and self-development,
as well as individual creativity of thought and action... require for their cultivation in
children and adults alike.., pluralistic loci of private thought and action, including fami-
lies (or functionally equivalent forms of affective community)").
307. See MILLS, supra note 278, at 49 (arguing that the reciprocal recognition by men of
each other in the Hegelian state depends, in part, on the domination of women, as it did in
the Greek world); see also Krouse, supra note 306, at 147 (noting that "while the polis of
classical political philosophy cultivates the intellectual and moral perfection of its citizens,
it does so only by permitting them to stand on the bodies of their disenfranchised sub-
jects"); cf. Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1566 (1994) (noting that in order to counter the hierarchy that
was implicit in our medieval view of the family as a holistic community, we may have
"sacrifice[d] community for independence").
308. Cf. Dolgin, supra note 307, at 1545 (arguing that the decision in Eisenstadt pro-
viding rights of privacy to individuals, whether married or unmarried, rather than to
marital units, marked a legal turning point from a view of marriage as an indivisible unit to




for emerging from the family to take up identities in the public
arena. Of course, since Hegel intended the family in the modern
state to represent both what was good and bad about Greek soci-
ety,"9 he would not have seen this contradiction as a problem. As
this Article has shown, this inability of families to tolerate independ-
ent individuality was precisely what made the family inadequate as a
principle of political organization in Hegel's schema. Forcing the
family to include the husband and wife as full individuals would,
from his perspective, force the institution of marriage to solve the
conflict between community and individuality, rather than allowing
this conflict to be resolved by a state which preserves separate
spheres for the development of both strands of human character.
Hegel would undoubtedly say that a family of two individuals cannot
maintain a connection of love and trust which creates a simple unity
of feeling.
To the extent we see the relationships of the modem family le-
galized,310 i.e., structured and judged by the criteria of justice rather
than love, Hegel is certainly right. A marriage and family cannot
remain intact if spouses do not value the relationship more than their
309. In particular, Hegel saw the unity that characterized the marital family as paral-
leling the relatively unreflective unity of the Greek city-state, a unity created by custom
and tradition. Compare TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 395-96 (describing the im-
mediate and unreflecting unity of the Greek city-state grounded in parochialism), with id
at 431 (describing the family as "immediate unreflecting unity based on feeling"). Like
the Greek city-state, which took on a definite shape only in relation to other Greek city-
states with different customs and traditions and in relation to the barbarian world, see id.
at 395-96, the family is defined by the particular idiosyncrasies of multiple families and in
distinction to the public arena, see HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 181,
at 122. At the same time, the family also reproduces the fundamental contradiction of the
Greek city-state, where unreflective unity was made possible by the use of slaves and non-
citizens whose existence within the state immediately contradicted the perceived unity.
See TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 395-96. It was this inability of the Greek city-
state to acknowledge the freedom and individuality of all rational men that made it unable
to persist as a long-term political structure. See id. at 396. In the case of the modem fam-
ily, the unreflective unity which arises is made possible by the non-individuality of women.
However, in Hegel's view, the emotive and non-rational nature of women guarantees the
basic stability of the family as a unifying but limited social institution that can fade into the
background to allow all who are fully capable of individuality, i.e., men, to take up their
individuality in civil society. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 166, at
114; cf Landes, supra note 127, at 142 (explaining that "the modem battle of the sexes is
seen by Hegel as a degraded substitute for the conflict between family piety (the law of
woman) and public law (the law of the land and man)").
310. See Dolgin, supra note 307, at 1560-61 (noting that courts and legislatures have
become increasingly willing to view marital relationships as contracts between individuals
that can be more freely negotiated and terminated).
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individual desires.311 However, reconciliation of the demands of love
and justice is the challenge of a modem individuality, which is con-
siderably more complex than Hegel ever imagined. Modern society
should not retreat to a reconciliation which denies justice to some"
and love to others. The modem marriage is the testing ground for
modem society.313 If the bonds of love cannot restrain the forces of
individuality,3"4 then little hope remains that the weaker bonds of a
community or nation can do so.3'5 Hegel was certainly right about
the critical role the family plays in the realization of the modern lib-
eral state. We must hope, however, that he was wrong about the
shape that family must take.
311. See Koppelman, supra note 283, at 406 (discussing the argument that the injustice
of a world in which gender subordination preserves "women's spirit of generosity and self-
sacrifice" may be preferable to the justice of an egalitarian society in which everyone is
"self-centered and indifferent to the needs of others" (citation omitted)).
312. See generally OKIN, supra note 218, at 134-69 (detailing the ways in which gender-
structured marriage results in injustice to women and children).
313. See id. at 119. Okin criticizes the failure to see the transforming possibilities of
families as places
where reason and emotion are equally called for, where all people care for others
on a day-to-day basis and, through doing so, can learn to reconcile their own am-
bitions and desires with those of others and to see things from the points of view
of others who may differ from themselves in important respects.
IdL (citation omitted); see also Dolgin, supra note 307, at 1566 (arguing that maintaining
the family as a "model of responsible community in the modem world," while at the same
time protecting the individuals within it from enforced inequality, is "one of the most im-
portant moral tasks of our time").
314. The extent to which modem family law has tended to protect individuals within
the family from the injustices of family life is a reflection of the fact that only where love
makes possible the transcendence of individuality can deviation from abstract principles of
fairness and equality be tolerated. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 30-34 (1982) (arguing that affection and generosity within families
obviates the need for justice within families). Modem family law reflects the insights that
love cannot be presumed merely from the fact of marriage, and that the sacrifice of indi-
viduality cannot be enforced, but must be voluntary. See OKIN, supra note 218, at 29-34
(noting that, since in reality, families are sites of selfishness and violence which systemati-
cally harm women, we cannot rely upon the presence of generosity but rather must seek to
achieve at least justice within the family, even as we continue to aspire to the ideal of the
unselfish and generous family); Dolgin, supra note 307, at 1553-54 (noting that modern
family law has tended to protect individuals within the family rather than the family unit as
a whole).
315. Okin argues that a transformation of families from venues of total selflessness
may well be accompanied by a transformation of civil society from a venue of total selfish-
ness. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 285-86
(1979).
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IV. IS THE HEGELIAN VIEW OF MARRIAGE CONSISTENT WITH
AMERICAN CASE LAW ON MARRIAGE?
As this Article has explained, the two main functions of mar-
riage for Hegel are its capacity to produce individuals who are self-
conscious moral agents, and its capacity to provide such otherwise
isolated individuals with a sense that they can be unified with others
in a way that preserves their individuality. This Article next explores
how Hegel's views compare with the Supreme Court's view of mar-
riage over the past two centuries.
A. Procreation
Lieber and Hegel recognized that the roots of marriage in pro-
creational activity cannot define or justify the complex social
institution that now exists?"6 Although marriage and procreation
have often been linked in the case law,31 any such reduction of mar-
riage to procreation fails to capture the quintessentially human and
social aspects of marriage. 8 If marriage is to be understood as fun-
damental, it cannot be based upon the necessity of exercising other
fundamental rights which have been only artificially confined to mar-
riage. Marriage is essential to procreation only where extra-marital
sex is criminalized and procreation is dependent upon sex. If the
right to marriage is reduced to a right to have children, then it would
be entirely dependent upon the criminalization of extra-marital sex31
316. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (expounding Lieber's view); supra
notes 139-55 and accompanying text (expounding Hegel's view).
317. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting that "if appellee's
right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only rela-
tionship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place");
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that "[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
318. See generally Hohengarten, supra note 37, at 1512 (arguing that both domestic
relations law and the right of privacy give a value to marriage independent of procreation);
Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
539, 544 & nn.30-31 (1991) ("[Cjourts are unlikely to fashion constitutional protections
regarding the institution of marriage based solely on the encouragement of and ability to
procreate."). But cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518-19 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(implying that since no constitutional question would be raised by the state's attempts to
prevent non-procreative sex by banning the sale or manufacture of contraceptive devices,
an essential connection exists between sexual relations and procreation in a legally recog-
nized marriage).
319. It is unlikely that the fundamental right to marriage, as developed by the Court in
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386, is based entirely upon the existence of a Wisconsin fornication
statute.
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and the unavailability of non-sexual reproduction.32 While the
Court has said that states can constitutionally regulate extra-marital
sex, and even criminalize it,32' there is no constitutional requirement
for its criminalization. Indeed, extra-marital sex has been success-
fully decriminalized in many states.32 Just as contemporary legal
reform has broken any necessary link between marriage and sex, our
contemporary ability to procreate through the use of artificial in-
semination and various in vitro fertilization techniques has made it
difficult to maintain the previously assumed necessary relationship
between sex and procreation. Although marriage still could be arti-
ficially linked to procreation by simultaneously criminalizing all
procreative sexual relations and limiting access to non-sexual repro-
duction to married couples,"' this is no different than the artificial
link created between marriage and procreation by the criminalization
of extra-marital sex. Arguably, modem American society still views
marriage as related to procreation, but considers the institution of
marriage socially valuable regardless of whether procreation takes
place.
In Turner v. Safley,2 the Court explicitly acknowledged the
merely supplemental connection that sexual relations, procreative or
otherwise, have to marriage. In Turner, the Court invalidated a Mis-
souri statute that had the effect of prohibiting prison inmates from
marrying, except when there was a pregnancy or the birth of an ille-
gitimate child. It recognized that, even when incarceration limits or
320. Artifical insemination and in vitro fertilization make procreation without sex a
possibility. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION,
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 86-88 (1995).
321. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
("The State of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of which is beyond
doubt, which prohibit adultery and fornication."); cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449
(1972) (noting that Massachusetts had the discretion to deter fornication through a variety
of means).
322. See Thomason v. Thomason, 355 So. 2d 908, 911 (La. 1978) (noting decriminaliza-
tion of private, consensual sexual conduct between adults); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403
A.2d 902, 907 (NJ. 1979) (same); Edwards v. Roe, 327 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (Civ. Ct. 1971)
(same); cf Iowa v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (finding criminal sodomy
statute unconstitutional as it applied to private sexual acts between consenting unmarried
adults of the opposite sex).
323. Justice Goldberg's prescient remark in Griswold that the right to use contracep-
tion is the other side of the right not to be forced to use contraception, see Griswold, 381
U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring), suggests that criminalization of all procreative sex-
ual relations would not be constitutionally permissible even though nonsexual reproductive
assistance was freely available.
324. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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entirely precludes consummation of the marriage, marriage can still
serve as an "expression[ ] of emotional support and public commit-
ment,', 32 and as "an exercise of religious faith., 326 In addition, the
Court noted that marriage triggers certain government benefits, such
as Social Security, and property rights, such as tenancy by the en-
tirety and inheritance rights.327 The importance of consummation as
an essential element of marriage was particularly minimized by the
Court's explanation of its earlier summary affirmance of a ban on
marriages for prisoners with life sentences. It explained that the ear-
lier decision was based not upon a determination that lack of
possible consummation resulted in a lack of a constitutionally pro-
tected marital relationship, but rather on a determination that the
government's interest in punishing those crimes which warrant life
sentences was sufficient to justify deprivation of the otherwise pro-
tected right of such prisoners to decide to be married.328 Thus, the
lack of any possibility of consummation, short of an executive par-
don, would appear to have little effect on marriage as a
constitutionally protected relationship. The Court's view is consis-
tent with an evolving social sense that sexual relations of any kind
are not essential to marriage as long as both partners are willing to
enter into the marriage under these conditions.329
B. Contract
Although Hegel viewed marriage as beginning in contract, he
also argued that the marriage relationship transcended the contrac-
tual relationship. 30 Given the difficulty in finding any constitutional
basis for a right to marry prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment,331 nineteenth-century litigants often argued that the
325. Id. at 95.
326. Id. at 96.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See, e.g., David B. Perlmutter, Annotation, Incapacity for Sexual Intercourse as
Ground for Annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589, 593, 619, 622 (1973) (noting that, in the absence
of a statute allowing annulment for incapacity, courts have no jurisdiction to annul; that, at
best, such incapacity makes a marriage only voidable, not void, and then only by parties to
the marriage; and that knowledge of the incapacity prior to marriage or subsequent ratifi-
cation would bar annulment); cf. T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993)
(holding that a Utah statute voiding marriages involving a person with AIDS violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993))).
330. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 163, at 112.
331. There can be little question that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to se-
cure an affirmative right to marry for formerly enslaved Americans, and not merely an
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Constitution's prohibition on laws impairing the obligation of con-
tract332 was a source of marriage rights that could limit state control
over marriage.33 However, the Court ultimately held that "marriage
is not a contract within the meaning of the prohibition" '334 because a
marriage contract does not vest "certain, definite, fixed private rights
of property." '335 As a result, marriage was frequently described by
courts as a privilege established by state law.36
In distinguishing marriage from the right of contract, the Court
was prepared to reduce at least some of the traditional incidents of
equal protection guarantee of whatever privileges of marriage happened to be granted to
white Americans. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v.
Wade, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 378-86 (1993) (revealing that the constant focus
of the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment was on eliminating the deprivations of
family liberty brought about by slavery). The denial of the slaves' right to marry and the
destruction of families through the separate sale of partners and children has been de-
scribed as the aspect of American slavery that most dramatized its radical evil both to
abolitionists and Americans more generally. See DAVID A.I RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 225 (1993). The horrific consequences of denying individuals a
right to marry clarified the critical role of marriage in securing human liberty. See gener-
ally Davis, supra, at 317-20, 334-38, 370-75 (recounting stories of enslaved men and
women choosing to commit suicide rather than endure permanent separation, of children
watching their parents being beaten or sold off for visiting their children, of infants and
children snatched from their parents' arms or left starved, ignored, and unsupervised while
parents were forced to work in the fields, and of the rape of women for the pleasure of
white men or for breeding purposes).
332. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
333. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1888) (argument for appellant)
(arguing that a legislative grant of a divorce, without the consent of the wife, to a husband
who had breached the marriage contract by abandoning his wife, was an impairment of the
contract); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 144-45 (1874) (argument for appel-
lant) (arguing that a legislative act allowing married women to release their dower
interests in property by means of a power of attorney was an impairment of contract);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 600 (1819)
(analogizing marriage to a contract right and noting that a divorce granted by the legisla-
ture impaired the obligations of the marriage contract).
334. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210; see also Randall, 90 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that mar-
riage is not a contractual relationship, but rather an entirely state-defined relationship, in
which "It~he public will and policy controls" the will of the parties).
335. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210.
336. See, e.g., Randall, 90 U.S. at 147. The Court in Maynard stated:
"When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they have not
so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and ob-
ligations of which rest not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the
State, statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and
obligations. They are of law, not of contract.... The reciprocal rights arising
from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from
time to time, and none other."
Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210 (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863)) (alteration in
original).
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marriage, including "till death do you part," to nothing more than
statutory privileges.337 It would be a mistake, however, to view these
decisions as suggesting that marriage itself should be viewed as
merely a statutory privilege, which could be freely abolished by state
law. During this period, statutory marriage laws were viewed as
overlays on a common-law right to marriage by words of present as-
sent,338 and were presumed not to abolish common-law marriage
without express language to that effect.339 The question of whether a
state could entirely abolish the right to marry was never at issue34 in
these cases, as state nullification of the common-law right to mar-
riage always took place in the context of statutes enacting statutory
forms of marriage.34' In describing marriage as a "thing of common
right,"'" 2 the Court showed that it recognized marriage as more than
a mere statutory privilege.
C. Natural Right
Hegel's rejection of a pre-social state of freedom and natural
rights theory in general34 precluded him from giving credence to the
idea that marriage is a right grounded in nature. The same cannot be
said for American case law, which seems to have promoted several
competing views of marriage as a natural right. The historical origins
of civil marriage in religious marriage" contributed to a theologically
337. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210-14; see also Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591,
593 (1855) (holding that marital community property rights were not constitutionally pro-
tected as privileges of citizenship, but were instead legal incidents of the marriage contract
determined by the place in which the contract was either made or performed).
338. See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76,78-79 (1877) (finding marriage by words of pre-
sent assent).
339. See id. at 79. This presumption was justified as necessary to allow courts to avoid
making illegitimate the offspring of such common-law marriages. See id. at 81. The com-
mon-law consequences of illegitimacy were severe, as illegitimate children were
considered "nullius filius, and incapable of inheriting as heirs either to their putative fa-
ther, or mother, or to any one else." Lessee of Brewer v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 178,
181 (1840) (argument for plaintiff).
340. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629
(1819) ("When any state legislature shall pass an act annulling all marriage con-
tracts.... it will be time enough to inquire, whether such an act be constitutional.").
341. See Meister, 96 U.S. at 79.
342. Id. at 81.
343. See Davis, supra note 331, at 312-13 (describing Meister as recognizing a right to
marry derived from presumptive validity of common-law marriage).
344. See supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
345. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 21-22 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that after the Norman Conquest, the power to regulate
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grounded view of marriage as a natural right. A right to marriage,
from this perspective, was an opportunity to conduct one's life in
consonance with God's law so as to ensure salvation. 6 However,
such a religiously grounded view of the right to marriage could, in
the proper case, be abandoned when it resulted in an improper en-
tanglement between church and state. Indeed, the Mormon claim to
religiously mandated polygamy sharply curbed any tendency the
Court might have had to view marriage as a natural right arising out
of religious duty?47 The conflict between religiously derived natural
rights and the perceived social destructiveness of polygamy forced
the Court to endorse a view of natural rights as necessarily consistent
with social duties." Consequently, the Court was forced to explain
the traditional Western prohibition against polygamy as arising from
a view of polygamy as a social offense "subversive of good order,"39
rather than as a religious offense. 5
In addition, the common-law roots of marriage have provided
an alternative to the theological view of marriage as a natural right.
By the middle of the twelfth century in England, ecclesiastical courts
marriage was put in the hands of the Church, which viewed marriage as a religious mat-
ter).
346. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (referring to marriage
as "a sacred obligation"); United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 529-30 (1854)
(argument for appellee) (enumerating the right to marry as among the natural rights of
humanity possessed by Native Americans and Europeans alike, when the Native Ameri-
cans at issue were "native civilized Indians, converted to the Christian faith, in full
communion with the established Catholic church"); Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456, 459
(Md. 1949) (same); Drach v. Drach, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 353, 55 WKLY. LAW BULL. 86
(stating that marriage is a "more important and sacred contract than others").
347. See infra text accompanying note 362.
348. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting Jefferson as stating that "man ... has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties").
349. Id. ("[F]rom the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an of-
fence against society.").
350. Eleven years after Reynolds, however, the Court described polygamy both as
"contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has pro-
duced in the Western world." Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890). The Court's easy reliance on Christianity as
the touchstone for American law is at least partially explained by the context of the case.
The case upheld the constitutionality of a federal law annulling the corporate existence of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the Territory of Utah and confiscating
all property held by the Church, other than places of worship, parsonages, and burial
grounds, because the vast wealth of the Mormon Church was being used "in preaching,
upholding, promoting and defending" the criminal act of polygamy "in defiance of law."
Id. This characterization of Mormon institutions as criminal made it easier to discount the
religious challenge Mormonism posed to the preeminence of Christianity. Nonetheless,
even here, Christianity is still closely linked to the social order it is viewed as producing.
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controlled legal marriage.35 1 However, the institution of common-law
marriage flourished there to such an extent that the ecclesiastical
courts were forced to recognize such marriages as legal. 2 The rec-
ognition of common-law marriage as legal in both the colonies and
newly founded states led to a commonly accepted view of marriage
as a right that was natural because it predated positive law. 53 Under
this view of natural rights, marriage was a natural right because it
was essential to personal and political emancipation.5 4 Indeed, inso-
far as the rise of common-law marriage reflected defiance of the
ecclesiastical courts,355 the tradition of common-law marriage is
rooted in a recognition that religious control of marriage is funda-
mentally incompatible with human freedom. Thus, marriage is a
fundamental right primarily as a political instrument of emancipa-
tion, rather than as a religious instrument of salvation. 6
Yet the Court's reliance on Francis Lieber's essentially political
351. See Franklyn C. Setaro, A History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U. L. REV.
102, 119-21 (1938).
352. See CLARK, supra note 345, at 22 (suggesting that the continued practice of com-
mon-law marriages forced the Anglican Church to recognize them in a belated attempt to
assert its authority over all marriage).
353. This view of rights as a "natural" property of human beings was reminiscent of the
philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and was consistent with the understanding of natural
rights commonly held by Americans in the late eighteenth century as "the freedom of indi-
viduals in the state of nature." Hamburger, supra note 43, at 918. American courts
accepted the natural-rights theory of marriage well into the twentieth century. See, e.g.,
Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 105 (Fam. Ct. 1942) (describing marriage as a natural
right, which was not created by law, and as a "right of personality"); Hine v. Hine, 157
N.E. 308, 309 (Ohio Ct. App. 1927) ("[M]arriage is a contract having its origin in the law
of nature, antecedent to all civil institutions."); Cumby v. Garland, 25 S.W. 673, 675 (Tex.
1894) (" 'Marriage existed before statutes; it is of natural right; it is favored by the law.'"
(quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, § 283, at 241 (6th ed. 1881))); In re McLaughlin's Estate, 30 P. 651, 653 (Wash.
1892) ("[M]arriage is founded on the law of nature, and is anterior to all human law.").
354. Under this view, natural rights were premised not on the need of the soul to con-
form to divinely ordered nature, but rather on the needs of inherently autonomous human
beings for maximum independence. Thus, natural rights were premised on a view of hu-
man beings in the state of nature as "equally free," and as seeking to preserve their
freedom. See Hamburger, supra note 43, at 924.
355. Cf Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law (established by the Hawaii
governor and legislature by Hawaii S.B. 888, sex. 3, 18th Leg., 1995 Sess.) (App. E) (Dec.
8, 1995) <http'J/www.hawaii.gov/lrb/solcvr.html> (detailing the effect on Quakers, Bap-
tists, and other sects of the seventeenth-century English rule that only marriages
celebrated by an Anglican priest would be recognized as legally valid).
356. The Mormon claim to religiously mandated polygamy forced the Court to further
develop the view of marriage as a natural right arising not out of religious duty, but out of
social life.
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explanation of the evils of polygamy makes it clear that the right in
question must be viewed as a social construct,"7 a view of rights
which is inconsistent with a view of natural rights as either religious
or pre-social. Indeed, Lieber's view of marriage as a fundamental
political institution was premised on a view of human beings as in-
herently social, 8 which required him to reject the possibility of a
pre-social state in nature.5 Thus, for Lieber, rights did not spring
full-grown from "the head of Jove,""36 but rather reached greatest
fruition in democratic governments "mediated by historically
evolved institutions."36' Any normative claim to a right to marriage,
from this perspective, would have to be explained with reference to
the underlying structure of the society in which it exists. Indeed,
Reynolds can be seen as rejecting both a theological grounding of
rights in order to avoid the theological basis of Mormon polygamy3 6
and a view of rights as grounded in a pre-social human nature, and
adopting instead a view of rights as inextricably connected with so-
cial duties.
The tension in American case law between the various views of
marriage as a religious, natural, or social right on one hand, and the
previously articulated view of marriage as a state-shaped and state-
controlled privilege on the other, may best be resolved by viewing
marriage as an acquired right. Like the right to vote,363 marriage may
be traced to, but not fully explained by, natural liberty in primitive
357. See Horenstein, supra note 79, at 2292.
358. See 1 LIEBER, POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 78, at 102-06.
359. See 1 id. at 106; see also 2 PARRINGTON, supra note 79, at 93-94 (describing Lie-
ber's rejection of natural-rights philosophy as the beginning of the end for natural rights
philosophy in nineteenth-century American legal thought); Horenstein, supra note 79, at
2294-95 (describing Lieber as viewing contract theory as a fiction, and notions of inherent
rights as misleading, since Lieber viewed rights as taking on their most perfect existence
only within highly organized society).
360. See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 334-35 (3d
ed. 1874) ("Liberty is a thing that grows, and institutions are its very garden beds. There is
no liberty which as a national blessing has leaped into existence in full armor like Minerva
from the head of Jove.").
361. Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: The Pragmatism of Lie-
ber's Legal Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2169,2171-72 (1995).
362. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-68 (1878) (grounding holding in
analysis of marriage as the foundation of democratic principles, rather than discussing
polygamy in terms of a pre-social theological or religious right); see also supra notes 61-
117 (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of Reynolds).
363. See Hamburger, supra note 43, at 927; see also supra notes 54-59 (discussing how




political conditions. Viewed as an acquired right which takes its
shape from the particular relationship between citizens and the state,
rather than as a simple natural right or an arbitrary state privilege,
the American understanding of marriage is consistent with the He-
gelian view of marriage as an institution which forms and is formed
by the civil society in which it exists. 114
D. Liberty
Hegel's view of marriage as the primary institution responsible
for developing citizens who were autonomous individuals365 is consis-
tent with the American emphasis on the relationship between
marriage and liberty, in which marriage is viewed as essential to pro-
viding the personal emancipation necessary to develop and exist as
an individual. In the nineteenth century, the view of marriage as
emancipatory was reflected most strongly in the frequent judicial de-
scriptions of marriage as the primary and most substantial
contributor to human happiness. 66 "[T]he right ... to pursue and
obtain happiness '367 was viewed, in turn, as a fundamental privilege368
because of the intrinsic connection between the pursuit of happiness
364. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 (describing the American understanding of marriage
by stating that "[u]pon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties").
365. See Landes, supra note 127, at 125.
366. See, e.g., Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 147 (1874) ("The happiness of
those who assume its ties usually depends upon it more than upon anything else.").
367. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cis. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
368. See id. (interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2,
as referring to "those privileges and immunities which are ... fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their be-
coming free, independent, and sovereign"). The Supreme Court implicitly adopted the
reasoning of Corfield in Ward v. State of Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870). If
privileges and immunities belong as of right to citizens of a state, it would appear that it
would be equally as wrong for a state to deny its citizens such rights as it would be to dis-
criminatorily deny citizens of another state rights granted to its citizens. However, as
written, Article IV assumed that there was little danger of states depriving their citizens of
such fundamental rights, and the focus of the language is on the discriminatory denial of
rights. See RICHARDS, supra note 331, at 138. Thus, while the very notion of fundamental
rights was inconsistent with wholesale state deprivations of such rights, and any such denial
would be recognizably wrong, see id. (quoting Representative Bingham during debates on
the Fourteenth Amendment as saying that "[n]o State ever had the right, under the forms
of law or otherwise... to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Repub-
lic, although many of them have assumed and exercised that power, and that without
remedy"), Article IV failed to give the federal judiciary the power to prevent such denials.
It was this failure that necessitated the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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and citizenship in a free government. 69 The contribution of marriage
to happiness, therefore, was based on the personal emancipation in-
herent in the institution.37
Justice Curtis eloquently developed this position in his dissent in
Dred Scott v. Sanford,371 when he emphasized the inconsistency be-
tween Dred Scott's marriage and his status as a slave:
That the consent of the master that his slave, residing in a
country which does not tolerate slavery, may enter into a
lawful contract of marriage, attended with the civil rights
and duties which belong to that condition, is an effectual act
of emancipation. And the law does not enable Dr. Emer-
son, or any one claiming under him, to assert a title to the
married persons as slaves, and thus destroy the obligation
of the contract of marriage, and bastardize their issue, and
reduce them to slavery. 2
Insofar as marriage presupposes free individuals vested with rights
to their bodies, their labor, and their conscience, participation in the
institution of marriage confirms that the individuals in question are
free in precisely these ways. Thus, the marriage of Dred Scott and
his wife gave rise to a legal status recognizing mutual rights and du-
ties of husband and wife entirely inconsistent with their status as the
chattel of another. Slavery and legal marriage are so contradictory
that permitting a slave to enter into legal marriage effects an emanci-
pation of the slave.
This same incompatibility of monogamous marriage and the
slave-status of the participants is at the heart of Hegel's explanation
of how monogamy defines the institution of marriage.7 Only the
free and mutual surrender374 of exclusive individuality375 that charac-
terizes monogamous marriage can produce the consciousness of self
in another376 that must characterize all freely chosen social bonds.
However, for marriage to produce this transcendent unity that pre-
369. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
370. Cf. Fredrick Crosson, Religion and Natural Law, 33 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 13 (1988)
(arguing that protection of the "pursuit of happiness" was meant to provide the liberty
necessary to realize individual definitions of human good).
371. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
372. Id. at 601 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
373. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 167, at 115 (stating that
"[i]n essence marriage is monogamy").
374. See id. 168, at 115.
375. See id. 167, at 115.
376. See id.
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serves individuality, 77 the participants must start as independent in-
dividuals 8 Therefore, monogamous marriage presumes a society of
individuals of equal personhood 79 It also presumes individuals who
have the capacity to contract,38 because marriage begins in contract,
or free consent, even though ultimately it is "a contract to transcend
the standpoint of contract."' As contract requires that "the parties
entering it recognize each other as persons and property owners,"382
the voluntary nature of marriage presumes individuals who can own
property and make contracts. Thus, the marriage of Dred Scott in-
evitably revealed the extent to which the personhood of slaves could
not be denied; marriage required capacity to contract and ownership
of one's body and labor.383
The nineteenth-century view of marriage as emancipatory
emerges in twentieth-century Supreme Court cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut and Poe v. Ullman,"5 which viewed marriage as
guaranteeing those liberties essential to the development of free in-
dividuality and a self-governing society. In his dissent to Poe, Justice
Douglas described marital privacy as "implicit in a free society" '386
and argued that it would be an anathema to the very concept of or-
377. See id. 158, at 110.
378. See id. 167, at 115 ("Personality attains its right of being conscious of itself in
another only in so far as the other is in this identical relationship as a person, i.e. as an
atomic individual.").
379. Cf Landes, supra note 127, at 137 ("The dialectic of love that Hegel outlines pre-
supposes a relationship between equals in a monogamous love match.").
380. See Theunissen, supra note 145, at 3, 7-8 (noting that for Hegel, the adults who
freely consent to marry must already have the abstract rights of a member of civil society).
381. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 163, at 112.
382. Id. remarks to % 71, at 57.
383. Recognition of the way in which monogamous marriage is premised on free and
equal individuals explains why today we can no longer sustain Hegel's view that hierarchi-
cal gender roles, which deny women full personhood, are essential to marriage; such
marriages would fail the demands for mutual recognition that define monogamy.
384. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the institution of marriage requires a
zone of privacy that prohibits the criminalization of the use of contraceptives); see also
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 626 (1980)
(arguing that Griswold was one of a number of cases that can be understood to promote
intimate association as important "to the development of a sense of individuality").
385. 367 U.S. 497, 501-09 (1961) (refusing to reach the merits of the constitutional
challenge to state criminal statutes prohibiting the giving of advice about contraceptives as
well as the actual use of contraceptives).
386. lId at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe addressed the
merits of the very issue that Griswold successfully raised later. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484. Therefore, it provides the background for his opinion for the Griswold Court, as well
as a more complete articulation of some aspects of his reasoning.
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dered liberty for the government to control the sphere of activity
created by the association of two people in the institution of mar-
riage.387 This view of marriage as creating a zone of privacy draws
upon Hegel's recognition that the modem state rests upon the twin
pillars of private family life and public economic life, and it is the
function of monogamous marriage to create a limited arena of pri-
vate life in which concrete individuality could be nurtured and
released.38  Thus, the family, in Hegel's view, necessarily creates a
realm of private liberty for exercise of various liberties of feeling
89
and the development of free moral agency in children through paren-
tal moral education. 90
E. Self-Governance
Like Hegel, Justice Douglas recognized in Poe that the devel-
opment of individuality within the family and other social institutions
is essential to a society premised on democratic principles of self-
governance:
"One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of
society is that it seeks to make all subcommunities-family,
387. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 515-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
388. Cf. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, 255, at 154; supra text ac-
companying notes 184-216 (recounting Hegel's comparison of how the polygamous family
denies and suppresses the existence of an individual outside the family with the way in
which the monogamous family nurtures individuality and steps aside to let men exercise
and further develop this individuality in the public sphere and in starting their own fami-
lies). See generally Siebert, supra note 145, at 180 (explaining that rights are "the abstract
moment of the definite individuality... [in] the sphere of civil society and the state"). For
women, this individuality is limited to the opportunity to have their own family, rather
than remaining a part of their birth families, see HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra
note 30, remarks to 180, at 120, or becoming an appendage to their husbands' families,
see id. app. Additions n.109, at 264 (referring to 172). The Hegelian and American insis-
tence on monogamy was, among other things, expressly justified by its effect of raising
women to a position of relative equality compared to the slavery implicit in polygamy. See
B. CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT 40 (1992) (describing concerns in the mid- to
late-1800's about the enslaving effect of polygamy on women); HEGEL, ELEMENTS, supra
note 120, at 440. Latent in this view of monogamy was the necessity of recognizing women
as fully equal to men. See infra note 527-28 and accompanying text (discussing the sym-
bolic equality of men and women in monogamous marriage).
389. Compare Hegel's views on the lack of individuation, liberty and free feeling within
the polygamous family with his view that marriage must involve free consent, see HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, T 168, at 115, and that continuation of marriage
cannot be forced, see id. 176, at 118.
390. See iL 175, at 117 ("Children are potentially free and their life directly embodies




school, business, press, church-completely subject to con-
trol by the State. The State then is not one vital institution
among others: a policeman, a referee, and a source of ini-
tiative for the common good. Instead, it seeks to be
coextensive with family and school, press, business commu-
nity, and the Church, so that all of these component interest
groups are, in principle, reduced to organs and agencies of
the State. In a democratic political order, this megatherian
concept is expressly rejected as out of accord with the
democratic understanding of social good, and with the ac-
tual make-up of the human community."39'
The "democratic understanding of social good" recognizes that the
proper source of what may be considered good stems from the indi-
vidual and various privately ordered associations of individuals,392
and that this understanding, therefore, requires the protection of the
liberty of proposing and actualizing diverse goods within each of
those associations.393
Justice Douglas's paean to marriage in Griswold further devel-
ops the importance of marriage as a unique form of social bonding.94
His description of marriage as "harmony in living" 395 and "bilateral
loyalty"396 invokes Hegel's concept of the transcendent nature of the
connection between marital partners, a connection which, Justice
Douglas argued, does not share the individualistic self-interest of
"causes[,] ... political faiths[, or] ... commercial or social proj-
ects. 397 This closely parallels the Hegelian view of marriage as a
distinctly different form of social organization characterized by love,
self-sacrifice, and mutual surrender of individuality.398 Justice Doug-
391. Poe, 367 U.S. at 521-22 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert L. Calhoun, De-
mocracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L.F. 31, 36 (1960)).
392. Cf. Hafen, supra note 12, at 482 (arguing that only the "formal family" created by
marriage "ensur[es] a political structure that limits government, stabilizes social patterns,
and protects pluralistic liberty through the power of its own relational permanency").
393. Under this view, marriage is an arena of protected fundamental liberties and, as
such, it is entitled to social protection. Consequently, it is constitutionally permissible for
the states to regulate conduct such as fornication and adultery because such conduct is
viewed as antithetical to and destructive of the institution of marriage. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).




39& Cf Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 113 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing marriage as socially "rehabilitative"); Hafen, supra note 12,
at 476-78 (arguing that only the loving yet demanding parent-child relationship can teach
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las's characterization of marriage as "an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions," '399 taken together
with his earlier linkage of the private association of marriage with
"'the democratic understanding of social good,' ,400 also reflects a
Hegelian view of the unique role of marriage in making possible a
freely chosen yet social definition of the good.
F. Fundamental Right
At the same time, Hegel's view of marriage as a "socio-ethical
duty''4' is a useful way to understand why the Court, in such cases as
Loving v. Virginia 2 Zablocki v. Redhail,4°3 and Turner v. Safley,4 4
has consistently construed marriage as such a strong affirmative
right,405 i.e., a right which the state must take affirmative steps to
moderation of self-interest, care for others, and internalization of moral standards, which
creates citizens with a sense of "moral and civic duty").
399. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
400. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cal-
houn, supra note 391, at 36).
401. Siebert, supra note 145, at 205.
402. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a miscegenation statute as an impermissible
denial of the fundamental right to marry as well as an improper racial classification).
403. 434 U.S. 374,383-86 (1978) (reaffirming the fundamental right to marry).
404. 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (noting that petitioner had to concede that marriage is a
fundamental right).
405. Concerns that the recognition of a constitutional right to marry would subject tra-
ditional limitations on who may be married to a level of scrutiny that they might not
survive, see Karst, supra note 384, at 671, led three Zablocki Justices to question whether
there is such an absolute right. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that "[s]urely" it is legitimate for states to prohibit marriages between
siblings, marriages to those under 14 years of age, marriages to individuals infected with a
venereal disease, or marriages to persons already married); id. at 399 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (arguing that a " 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt
on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and di-
vorce"); id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Powell's rejection of
marriage as a fundamental right); see also Wardle, supra note 8, at 29 n.111 (suggesting, in
the context of a challenge to claims that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right, that
the Supreme Court has not truly held that marriage is a fundamental right rather than a
"fundamental interest" or "basic right").
Nonetheless, Justices Powell and Stewart recognized that "in regulating the intimate
human relationship of marriage, there is a limit beyond which a State may not constitu-
tionally go." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); accord id.
at 397 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "there is a right of marital and
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the regulatory power of govern-
ment"). Furthermore, Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the majority opinion in
Turner, which described the petitioners as "conced[ing] that the decision to marry is a
fundamental right." 482 U.S. at 95. While the Turner majority applied a minimum
"reasonable relationship" test because a prisoner's rights were at issue, see id. at 89, the
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make possible. For Hegel, individual morality requires an ethical
community; moral duties cannot be defined by reference to an indi-
vidual will alone.416 "Morality needs a complement in the external
world, a world of public life and practices where it is realized." 7 A
view of marriage as a mere privilege that must be granted equally, if
at all,"8 makes state involvement in marriage inessential. This re-
flects a failure to grasp both Hegel's general point that morality is
not an individual achievement as well as his explanation of the im-
portance to the state and the individual of the institution of marriage.
If marriage is peculiarly suited to reveal the essential connections
between our individual existence and our social existence, then our
duty to the state must at the same time be a duty of the state to us.
Indeed, the Hegelian understanding of connection between
marriage and the state helps make sense of the implicit holding of
Loving that state recognition of marriage is an essential part of the
right to marry.49  Because it was the criminal convictions of the
Lovings that formed the basis of the suit,41 and their reversals that
formed the remedy41 1 the Court's primary focus was on the state's
attempt to make interracial marriage a felony,412 rather than on the
associated statute declaring" '[a]ll marriages between a white person
and a colored person... [to] be absolutely void without any decree
of divorce or other legal process.' ,,4013 This focus resulted in an
opinion that spoke more of the "freedom to marry,, 41 4 and "the free-
Court suggested heightened scrutiny may have been justified because the regulation in
question also burdened the fundamental rights of non-prisoners to get married, see id. at
97. Potential strict scrutiny of Missouri's prohibition on most marriages between prisoners
and non-prisoners cannot be reconciled with a refusal to subject the traditional state bars
on marriage to the same level of scrutiny.
406. Hegel argued that Immanuel Kant's attempt to derive the content of morality
from the formal structure of a rational will was impossible because form cannot generate
content. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to T 135, at 89-90.
Rather, the content of reason can be derived only from the actual embodiment of reason,
which is not an abstract individual, see id. 137 & remarks, at 90-91, but a rationally or-
dered community, see id 144, at 105; id. app. Translator's Notes n.144, at 347-48.
407. TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 430.
408. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that "an individual's interest in making the marriage decision ... is not, however, an inter-
est which is constitutionally immune from evenhanded regulation" (citation omitted)).
409. Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (discussing the role of the state in the
regulation of marriage).
410. Seeid. at3.
411. See id at 12.
412. See id at 4.
413. Id. at 4 n.3 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (Michie 1960) (repealed 1968)).
414. Id at 12.
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dom of choice to marry," '415 than the right to marry per se. Charac-
terizing the fundamental right in question as the "freedom to marry"
appears to treat marriage as if it were entirely within individual con-
trol, as speech might be said to be. Thus, a state's failure to
recognize a marriage would not prevent people from getting married
informally or within another jurisdiction.
However, despite the Court's characterization of the right to
marry as a freedom to marry, it is clear that the Court intended to
include among its holdings that the statute voiding interracial mar-
riages was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Both the
Court's specific reference to this statute and the Court's consistent
reference in its analysis to the "miscegenation statutes" ' 6 suggest that
the Court found the civil prohibition of interracial marriages as
"repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment" '417 as the statute crimi-
nalizing such marriages. The Lovings not only had a right not to
have their freedom to marry chilled by criminal penalties, but also
had a right to state recognition of their marriage. Thus, the
"freedom to marry" implicitly recognized in Loving must be under-
stood to mean that individual freedom to enter into a relationship
must be complemented by state recognition of that relationship, or
such "freedom" to marry is meaningless. This then reflects an un-
derstanding of the marriage that we must be free to enter as state-
recognized marriage.
The significance of state recognition for Hegel is revealed in his
claim that it is the civil component of a wedding ceremony, rather
than the sensuous moment of consummation, that captures the es-
sence of marriage because only a civil, public wedding can create a
uniquely ethical bond.418 The creation of such a bond must begin
with a verbal promise, as in a contract, because that is a determina-
tion of the will that takes precedence over any subjective desire to
act or not to act as promised. 9 Thus, the expression of commitment
in a civil ceremony goes beyond the mere feeling or physical passion
expressed in the consummation of the marriage." Beyond this,
however, the public character of the words of commitment forces the
speaker to acknowledge that the bond made by the words is not
415. Id
416. See id at 8, 11, 12 n.11.
417. Id at 12 n.11.
418. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, T 164, at 113.
419. See id. remarks to T 78, at 60.
420. See id. remarks to 164, at 114.
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based merely on the strength of individual will, but draws independ-
ent strength from the recognition of the bond by the immediate
personal community of the marital partners.421 This community will
expect and demand of them that they achieve some unity of exis-
tence. Finally, the legally binding character ef the words4 22 lends the
weight of the entire social bond of the state to the ethical bond,
which appears to the individual in the form of the legal protections,
privileges, and duties of state-recognized marriage, and the willing-
ness of the state to enforce this bond as necessary.4" The civil
wedding, therefore, embodied for Hegel the reciprocal connection
between marriage and the state: state recognition of the critical role
of marriage in the possibility of a free state, and individual recogni-
tion of the essential role of the state in making such a strong
connection coexist with individual freedom.424
A "civil" wedding that fails to have legal effect not only prevents
the formation of an ethical bond, but prevents the synergism of pri-
vate and public unity upon which both the institutions of marriage
and the state depend. The dangers of public indifference to the very
real bonds between those so wed are twofold. To begin with, the
need for the civil institution and the ethical bond it produces is
thrown into question. We are forced to define the nature of the con-
nection between those whose marriage does not receive public
recognition as merely emotional. Yet, because the power of that
connection cannot be denied, we become confused about the nature
of the connection in recognized marriages, which seem no different,
and view all marriages as "in essence" embodying a merely emo-
tional connection. It was for this very reason that Hegel found the
views of German Romantics, such as Friedrich Schlegel, so danger-
421. See id. 164, at 113.
422. See id. 103, at 262.
423. Cf. Hohengarten, supra note 37, at 1501 (noting that marriage provides a uniquely
stable basis for a committed relationship by imposing high procedural costs for terminating
the relationship).
424. See Dallmayr, supra note 220, at 327 (pointing out that, for Hegel, "in actuality,
public community precedes and renders possible the more limited forms of ethical experi-
ence," such as the family). The limited nature of monogamous marriage makes it possible
for modem free individuals to tolerate it. Modem marriage is controlled and prevented
from dragging us back to either the all-encompassing unity of the Greek state or the des-
potic state by insisting that marriage be monogamous, by limiting its role to a private
sphere, and by making the public sphere the sphere of rights. See supra notes 184-216 and
accompanying text (summarizing Hegel's views that polygamy fosters despotism); supra
notes 223-46 (summarizing Hegel's concept of social "Corporations" as opposed to the
"pure" democracy of Ancient Greece).
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ous, since they saw marriage as pure love and the wedding ceremony
as irrelevant and alien to the bond between those who wed.4" The
currency of such views can only lead to the degradation of the insti-
tution of civil marriage. 6
At the same time, the perceived irrelevancy of the legal institu-
tion of marriage will produce an alienation from a state that claims
civil marriage to be essential.427 As Charles Taylor has argued:
[A]lienation arises when the goals, norms or ends which de-
fine the common practices or institutions begin to seem
irrelevant or even monstrous, or when the norms are rede-
fined so that the practices appear a travesty of them.
What happens here is that the individual ceases to define
his identity principally by the public experience of the soci-
ety. On the contrary, the most meaningful experience,
which seems to him most vital, to touch most the core of his
being, is private. Public experience seems to him secon-
dary, narrow, and parochial, merely touching a part of
himself. Should that experience try to make good its claim
to centrality as before, the individual enters into conflict
with it and has to fight it.28
Hegel describes the bond of a marriage recognized by the state
through a civil ceremony as "ethical" precisely because it exists only
as a product of these individuals' particular commitment to each
other, the state's commitment to these individuals, and these indi-
viduals' commitment to the state. Civil marriage forges the private
bonds of individuals out of the social bonds of the state. In this way,
425. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 164, at 113.
426. Thus, many heterosexual couples choose not to get married, or delay marriage
until well after they have made a deep commitment to each other, because they feel that
legal marriage will involve a "selling out" to the state that undervalues the depth of their
emotional commitment. For an account of the growing numbers of cohabiting couples
since the 1970's, see J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudil, A Reconnaissance of Public
Policy Restrictions Upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93,
108-10 (1984).
427. See generally TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 264, at 508 (describing
the promotion of "revocable romantic relationships" by contemporary authors such as Gail
Sheehy as eroding "the strong identification with the political community which public
freedom needs").
428. TAYLOR, HEGEL, supra note 238, at 384 (describing, among other manifestations
of this perceived disconnection between private experience and public existence, the al-




the most private of experiences also is essentially public.
The failure to recognize some marriages, such as interracial
ones, destroys this unity of public and private experience for all. For
those whose marriages were declared void or non-existent, the state's
failure to recognize that bond that is most freely chosen-the bond
of love-makes it impossible to experience any freedom in their rela-
tionship to the state. Such a state can only be perceived as external
and oppressive. Those whose marriages have been legally recog-
nized also will be affected by the resulting alienation. When the
institution that binds some to the state excludes others, both the in-
stitution and the state are sullied. Marriage is of value to the state
not because two individuals participate in it, but because everyone
can do so, and most do so. The social significance of marriage de-
pends upon universalizing the transcendent unity of feeling that
marriage can produce as much as practicably possible.429 The less
universal marriage is, the less social meaning it can have. Indeed, as
an exclusive and exclusionary institution, the meaning of marriage is
social exclusion and lack of community. Who can experience a civil
marriage as a fully joyful event in which the participants are both one
with each other and one with the state, when all those participating
know consciously or unconsciously that they are thereby participat-
ing in an institution that denies the ability to some to connect both
with those they love and with society as a whole? Who can experi-
ence the state as universal and unifying, when that which binds them
to the state simultaneously alienates and excludes others? Any joy
in such a marriage must at the same time be mixed with shame.
Thus, we can understand the Loving holding-that a denial of state
recognition of interracial marriages was unconstitutional-as derived
as much from the Court's understanding of how deeply this inter-
fered with the civil function of marriage, expressed by the
characterization of marriage as a fundamental right, as from the
stated alternative, i.e., the effect this lack of legal recognition had
upon the equal protection rights of the individuals denied marital
429. See GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 461, at 276-77 (A.V.
Miller trans., 1977) (1807). Hegel explained:
The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality, finds it in the
family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away is his own self-
consciousness as a citizen of his nation. Or again, it is in knowing that the law of
his own heart is the law of all heart, in knowing the consciousness of the self as
the acknowledged universal order ....
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recognition.
G. Summary
We have seen, therefore, that the images of marriage which have
emerged over the past two centuries from American case law are
consistent with Hegelian views on the critical function of marriage in
a coherent and cohesive society of free individuals. The cases that
focus on marriage as integrally related to individual liberty can be
understood to reflect the Hegelian view of marriage as creating an
arena in which individuality and particularity can be nurtured and
expressed. The cases that emphasize the critical socializing function
of marriage can be understood to reflect the Hegelian view of mar-
riage as laying the foundation for a cohesive community which can
coexist with individual liberty. The Hegelian theory of marriage also
helps explain why the Court has insisted upon describing marriage as
a fundamental right which requires state recognition and involve-
ment, even in the face of threats about the dire consequences of such
a view.43 The unity of marriage is a mere emotional, sexual unity
without the state participation that makes it possible to achieve an
ethical bond that is simultaneously a bond between two individuals,
between these individuals and their community, and between these
individuals and their state. The unifying nature of marriage further
explains why it is essential that the state recognize all marriages
which are compatible with that aspect of the reconciliation of indi-
viduality and coherent government accomplished by monogamous
marriage.
V. MORMON POLYGAMY
As I have argued above, the only legitimate basis for the Rey-
nolds decision, as well as for the requirement in the enabling acts of
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah that the power to le-
gitimate polygamy be forsworn, 3' is an understanding of
monogamous marriage as having a fundamental role in the creation
and maintenance of the modem liberal state, and an understanding
of polygamy as a fundamentally illiberal institution which would un-
dermine the modem liberal state. The analysis of how marriage
430. See supra notes 401-29 and accompanying text.
431. See Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910); New Mexico
Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558 (1910); Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 3,
34 Stat. 267,269 (1906); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3,28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894).
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plays this fundamental role is well developed by Hegel and can be
applied to understand the role of marriage in the modem American
state without much difficulty. Monogamous marriage is uniquely
capable of producing free-thinking and independent individuals who
also are capable of choosing to be loyal and trusting citizens. Mo-
nogamous marriage harnesses the connecting forces of sex and love
for the production of modern, self-conscious individuals, who will
become citizens in a state only as individuals, not as family members.
As a result, the state must recognize the autonomy and freedom of
its citizens; it must be a state that recognizes individual freedom as its
substantial goal. Monogamous marriage also is the foundation of the
critical distinction between private and public,4 32 which is central to
the liberal state. The private sphere of monogamous marriage is suf-
ficiently limited and non-political that sexual and emotional feelings,
which can be highly destructive in the public sphere, may be given
free reign.433 Individuals may seek emotional fulfillment in marriage
precisely because a public realm also exists where they are merely
abstract individuals to one another, where they are free and equal in
a way they are not within a family, and where they are not responsi-
ble for others' happiness. Furthermore, a civil institution of
monogamous marriage also provides powerful reasons for individu-
als to identify with and value the government that makes it possible
for them to achieve a union with another which is more than sexual,
and therefore is more stable and fulfilling, and yet which is not all-
encompassing.
Hegel's analysis of polygamy, on the other hand, is rooted in the
historical practices of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century China. No
example of an emerging modem state existed at the time of his writ-
ing in which polygamy was a fully developed social institution.
Clearly, the Mormon polygamous family was not the same as the six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century polygamous families in China
described by Hegel.43 4 In many ways, polygamous Mormon families
might appear to have had more in common with contemporaneous
432. See Krouse, supra note 306, at 152 (noting that a "commitment to the preservation
of some irreducible sphere of private life, some public/private distinction, is absolutely
central to the liberal vision").
433. Cf. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Comment on So-
cial Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1522 (1993) (noting that family law arises out
of a culture's "need to constrain, channel, and accommodate ... elementary emotions,"
such as "rage, aggression, jealousy, sacrifice, loyalty, and fairness").
434. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 211-15; see also supra
notes 196-216 and accompanying text (describing Hegel's observations).
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American families constituted by non-Mormon monogamous mar-
riage. Indeed, nineteenth-century, and even twentieth-century,
monogamous marriage in America has been described as highly pa-
triarchal,435 and nineteenth-century Mormon views on the proper
gender roles for women were not particularly unusual, or out-of-step
with their non-Mormon contemporaries.436 To justify the result in
Reynolds, therefore, it is necessary to analyze the concrete personal,
social, and political relations that arose from the practice of Mormon
polygamy to demonstrate that it was not only fundamentally illiberal
but also dangerous to the integrity of the American state.
Justifying the result in Reynolds will be significant in a number
of ways. If Reynolds is grounded in an essentially political critique of
polygamy, then it cannot properly be used to support state prohibi-
tions on same-sex marriage that are rooted in quasi-religious moral
critiques of homosexuality. At the same time, modern First
Amendment scholarship has found the level of respect given to the
religious basis of Mormon polygamy to have been considerably less
than the Free Exercise Clause would now appear to demand. In the
absence of a convincing social evil promoted by polygamy, the Rey-
nolds opinion may have been wrongly decided, in which case
Mormon polygamy should be legally permissible. A critique of Rey-
nolds on these grounds, however, offers little comfort to proponents
of same-sex marriage, which cannot be credibly described as a relig-
ious practice. Therefore, if we understand precisely and concretely
how Mormon polygamy could be argued to undermine the liberal
state, then we may look to see whether same-sex marriage might
have a similar effect. If it can be shown that same-sex marriage does
not have a similar negative effect on the liberal state, then the legiti-
macy of the legislative attacks on polygamy can provide no support
for legislative attacks on same-sex marriage.
435. See OKIN, supra note 218, at 138 ("[G]ender-structured marriage involves women
in a cycle of socially caused and distinctly asymmetric vulnerability.").
436. See JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE
PRINCIPLE 104 (1987) (describing Mormon society as characterized by the same "'rigid
gender-role differentiation'" as American society as a whole (quoting Carroll Smith-
Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritua Relations Between Women in Nine-
teenth-Century America, in HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (K.G. Saur ed.,
1992))); LAWRENCE FOSTER, RELIGION AND SEXUALITY: THREE AMERICAN
COMMUNAL EXPERIMENTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 230-31 (1981) (describing the
Mormons as sharing the ideas of non-Mormon society on women's role in religion and as




A. The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Mormon Polygamy
What made Mormon polygamy distinctly and dangerously patri-
archal was its role in and relationship to Mormon society as a whole.
To understand this danger, one must understand the religious prin-
ciples that grounded Mormon polygamy. The anthropomorphic
Mormon view of God as a man07 meant that Mormon "men could
progress toward full godhood."43 As heaven and the after-life were
perceived as an extension of earthly life in which social relationships
established on earth would continue, the Kingdom of Heaven could
and had to be substantially achieved on earth.439 Godly power, on
earth and in heaven, could be achieved by the building of an expan-
sive social power base on earth."0 Such power over others could be
achieved only by "celestial marriage," in which a man and a woman
would be "sealed" to each other for all eternity, 1 and by the birth of
blood progeny from such marriages, who would then be linked to
their patriarch for all eternity as well."2 Through the "eternal in-
crease" of such godlike patriarchs by means of their children,
grandchildren, and further descendants, Mormon men eventually
would move on to rule over whole new worlds, achieving full god-
hood in conjunction with their wives in what could easily be seen as a
kind of cosmic "manifest destiny." 443
Polygamy was not merely permissible, but very important, as it
accelerated the process by which the Kingdom of Heaven could be
achieved on earth"& and by which individual men could achieve god-
hood."5 Because women could share in the blessings and glory of
priesthood and godhood only by being sealed to a man in celestial
marriage,44 women's status on earth and in heaven was determined
437. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 144 (quoting the words of Joseph Smith, the foun-
der and first Prophet of the Latter-Day Saints).
438. Id.





444. See id. at 166-67.
445. See id. at 145.
446. See MARILYN WARENSKI, PATRIARCHS AND PoLmCS: THE PLIGHT OF THE
MORMON WOMAN 36 (1978). Only men could achieve the Priesthood and possible god-
hood. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 230; see also WARENSKI, supra, at 31-36 (explaining
that, while the Mormon religion gives women unique religious roles and duties, sometimes
described as "Priesthood duties," this is not in any way equivalent to male Priesthood,
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by whom they married. Consequently, a woman in a polygamous
marriage attained greater status on earth and in heaven.Y7
B. Polygamy and Theocracy
Thus, nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy appears as the
primary instrument in the Mormon plan to create an eternal society
whose fundamental organizing principle was the patriarchal family.Y8
Given Mormon views on the continuity between life on earth and life
in heaven and the necessity of creating social relationships on earth
which would persist into eternity, the patriarchal Mormon polity also
was necessarily a theocracy, a state in which both the organizational
structure and the exercise of power was held by religious authorities.
For the Mormons, religious authority was grounded on modem-day
revelation, i.e., the direct communication of truth from God. While
all Mormons might be capable of receiving revelations, "women can
have revelations for themselves but not for the church." 449 Thus, the
social and spiritual authority of men was assured."' The possibility
of doctrinal revelations, however, was further limited to the head of
the Mormon Church, the Prophet.41  In the nineteenth-century
which gives all Mormon men eternal spiritual authority over women).
447. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 211-12 (noting that Mormon women in plural mar-
riages had higher status than Mormon women in monogamous marriages because
polygamous husbands "tended to belong to the religious and economic elite" and the in-
creased number of children fathered by such a husband would ensure a greater status in
heaven).
448. See id. at 239-40 (describing the "family and larger kinship networks" as "far more
than the basic biological unit" for the Mormons, but rather a representation of "their en-
tire community"). In such a society, authority would be concentrated in men by the
creation of extensive families of children whose harnessed energy would be controlled by,
focused by, and identified with their patriarch. See idU at 17 (describing Mormon polygamy
as the means for patriarchal leaders to gain the most status and power); WARENSKI, supra
note 446, at 146 (describing the motive for Mormon polygamy as the accumulation of
power).
449. WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 45.
450. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 230 (describing the male Mormon Priesthood as
giving the "ultimate basis of religious and social authority" solely to men).
451. Cf. EMBRY, supra note 436, at 42 (quoting one Mormon leader as describing the
Prophet as the "'one man in all the world ... who can hold the keys' to receive 'new
revelation' "). Foster explained:
What was essential-and what remains essential in the Mormon Church to this
day-is that there be a consensus that the head of the Mormon Church is ulti-
mately able authoritatively to determine the specific social forms through which
the underlying spirit is expressed as the Church deals with the ever-changing
temporal circumstances affecting its existence.
FOSTER, supra note 436, at 168.
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Mormon theocracy, therefore, the ideal of the patriarchal family as a
basis of societal structure was accompanied by a notion of absolute
truth that would be handed down by authoritative religious lead-
ers. 
4 5 2
C. Polygamy and Individuality
Hegel claimed that one of the negative features of a patriarchal
society was that it neither developed individuals nor valued their
freedom. Lawrence Foster has argued that historically, Mormonism
can be understood as an attempt "to overcome.., rampant, exploita-
tive Jacksonian individualism., 45 3 The period in which Mormonism
developed was characterized by a proliferation of competing relig-
ious sects, and the existence of numerous sects undermined the
security of religious faith and social authority.454 This period also was
characterized by increasing economic differentiation, which took
men out of the home and left women exclusively responsible for do-
mestic concerns, 455 and by greater geographic mobility, which allowed
individuals to escape from parental control and make their own fa-
milial and lifestyle choices.456  Coupled with the growing
individualism of society was an "emphasis in the ante-belum period
on individualistic 'romantic love' as the basis for marriage.,,411 All of
these factors led to a perception that the family was threatened with
destruction.458 Foster has argued that Mormonism, as a social phe-
nomenon, can be understood as an attempt to return to "medieval
ideals in which religious and social life were inextricably intertwined,
and the good of the community took precedence over individual
'self-interest.' ,,4' The retreat to the more primitive political form of
452. While many modem evangelical Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious sects also
maintain strong patriarchal views of women's inferior position without an adherence to
polygamous marriage, I would argue that these views are tempered by the inherently
equalizing features of monogamous heterosexual marriage. See infra text accompanying
notes 527-28.
453. FOSTER, supra note 436, at 139.
454. See id. at 10-12.
455. See id. at 12; see also DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, THE FAMILY INTERPRETED:
FEMINIST THEORY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 129-31 (1988) (arguing that the split of family
and market place into distinct spheres divided along gender lines simultaneously devalued
women's domestic work, yet gave women greater responsibility and freedom to run the
domestic domain).
456. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 13.
457. Id.
458. See id. at 12.
459. IM at 139.
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patriarchy was therefore a deliberate attempt to suppress the in-
creased religious, economic, social, and sexual autonomy of
individuals in American society.
460
Nineteenth-century Mormons viewed the institution of polyg-
amy as crucial to their project.46' As Mormons attributed the social
chaos of their times to a loss of patriarchal authority, polygamy was
seen as "allow[ing] men to reassert their proper authority and lead-
ership, 462 by freeing them "from the unnatural sexual influence
women hold over men in a monogamous system. 463 Polygamy also
undermined the "careless individualism of romantic love ' 46 4 for men
and women.46' For Mormon plural wives, marriage could not be
founded on romantic love, as the necessary exclusivity would be
missing.46 Nor would marriage provide constant companionship,
deep emotional support, or even exclusive economic support. 67
Marriage was rather a religious and social duty, an opportunity to
build a kingdom on earth which would have its reward in heaven.""
Polygamy created an institution demanding sacrifice by men as
well. Certainly, it would have been easier for men to satisfy sexual
desires for multiple women by employing prostitutes, rather than en-
tering the emotional maelstrom of a family with multiple wives who
were jealously competing for affection and time, and siring enormous
numbers of acknowledged children requiring economic support.46 9
460. See KLAUS J. HANSEN, MORMONISM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 163-64
(1981) (arguing that Mormon polygamy was designed to reverse the development of indi-
viduality which monogamous marriage promoted).
461. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 139.
462. Id. at 176.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 139.
465. See id. at 207.
466. See RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 103 (1986)
("A polygamous wife basing her relationships on romantic love often found the emotional
foundation of marriage weakened by jealousy. Women who were not overly fond of their
husbands in a romantic sense seemed to make the easiest adjustment to the situation.").
467. See id. at 207-09; see also B. CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT: THE
MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE 91 (1992) (describing Brigham Young's admonishment
to wives that "[t]hey should not be concerned with whether they were loved 'a particle' by
their companions"); id. (noting Brigham Young's advice to husbands that they should
"'never love [their] wives one hair's breadth further than they adorn the Gospel, never
love them so but that [they] can leave them at a moment's warning without shedding a
tear' ").
468. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 208-09.
469. See id. at 209; see also Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 34
("Polygamy was not instituted merely to satisfy the lustful desires of Mormon men; the
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Indeed, Foster describes the institution of polygamy as a "means of
de-sexualizing and redirecting the husband-wife relationship so that
relations between the sexes became first and foremost goal-
directed."47 A polygamous man also had to give up his own ideals of
romantic love and take on a second wife, knowing that he was deliv-
ering a crushing emotional blow to his first wife, with whom he may
well have had a deep romantic relationship. The knowledge that this
blow was coming might even have steered men away from romantic
first marriages, so as to avoid the inevitable emotional heartache.
Furthermore, in order to maintain harmony within a polyga-
mous marriage, men had to display an equitable impartiality toward
their many wives and children.4 " The impossibility of maintaining
intense emotional involvement in polygamous families made it easier
for polygamous men to dedicate their time and energy to Church
business,472 thus requiring polygamous women to rely upon their
children as emotional anchors.473 Polygamous men were particularly
likely to be in leadership roles in the Church because they were
likely to be the most ambitious and energetic men in the commu-
nity474 and because they had demonstrated their commitment to the
Church by taking on the burden of a polygamous family.475 Because
polygamous men were particularly likely to be frequently absent
from their families on Church business,476 polygamous marriage was
an effective means of redirecting the individualistic focus of roman-
tic, monogamous marriage toward the goals of the larger social
group, which included populating Utah with Mormons and building
a social and economic infrastructure to keep succeeding generations
dedicated to the religious commitments of their parents.477
In addition to undermining the way in which monogamous mar-
riage makes possible the kind of emotional support that nurtures the
individuality of the marital partners and the emerging individuality
of the children, the patriarchal underpinnings of Mormon polygamy
great expense of more than one family was so prohibitive that only the sincerely religious
would undertake it.").
470. FOSTER, supra note 436, at 210.
471. See id. at 209.
472. See id. at 211.
473. See id. at 212.
474. See KiMBALL YOUNG, ISN'T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 105 (1954).
475. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 148.
476. See id. at 150 (noting that polygamous men were particularly likely to be called to
travel on Church missions for years at a time).
477. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 210-11.
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were designed to repress the development of independent individual
conscience and critical evaluation. Indeed, as the founding Mormons
viewed a society of individuals attempting to determine their own
religious and social views as an invitation to social chaos, it is not
surprising that they would have devised a social system which inhib-
ited the development of such individuality. Certainly, a society
which unquestioningly concentrates political and religious authority
in patriarchs does not value or encourage independent thinldng.478
Early Mormons "were expected to become 'as clay in the hands of
the potter'; totally subordinating their wills to that of the group, they
would allow themselves to be reshaped into a new and more perfect
social form as Latter-day Saints."'479 The role of polygamy in the
process of de-emphasizing the independent individual Mormon voice
was substantial. For the founding Mormons, polygamy served,
among other things, as "one of the chief tests of the total loyalty
which [Joseph] Smith... demanded of his closest followers.""48
Among later Mormons in Utah, polygamy continued as a test of
loyalty for further advancement in Church leadership positions."'
Therefore, religious and social power was substantially distributed to
men whose faith in religious authority was strong enough to over-
come their desire to both express and nurture their individuality
through a family created by romantic love.4 2 Commitment to polyg-
478. See WILLIAM J. McNIFF, HEAVEN ON EARTH: A PLANNED MORMON SOCIETY
53 (1940) (explaining that "the individual searcher for truth was likely to run into conflict
with the authorities" because the Mormons believe that "intelligence should be subservi-
ent to God's will as interpreted by those who held the keys-that is, the Church
authorities").
479. FOSTER, supra note 436, at 167 (quoting Brigham Young's counselor Heber C.
Kimball).
480. Id. at 150. Foster writes:
Men or women who had once engaged in polygamous practice were in no position
to apostasize, because the air would be blue with stories of their licentious be-
havior. Likewise, if a man's daughter had been sealed as plural wife to Joseph
Smith or another leader of the Church, effective opposition to the practice be-
came exceedingly difficult. To oppose polygamy under such circumstances would
be tantamount to disowning one's own children, as well as everything to which
one had previously committed one's whole life.
481. See EMBRY, supra note 436, at 8,62-65.
482. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 466, at 97-98 (noting that the church put extreme
pressure on monogamous men to enter into polygamy if they desired advancement in the
church or even to remain members); YOUNG, supra note 474, at 106-10 (noting that Mor-
mon men entered into polygamous marriages because they believed it was required by the
church as the socially responsible thing to do and because "the social climate of the time
fostered obedience to the system").
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amy, either in practice or theory, served to define a culture in which
obedience to religious authority could and should overcome the most
personal individual judgments.
D. Polygamy and Liberty
Much of the extreme hostility toward Mormons in the nine-
teenth century was generated by fear that Mormon social cohesion,
combined with Mormon beliefs in religious control of political and
social organization, would have a distorting effect on a democratic
society that maintained individual liberty only by denying the possi-
bility of a completely social definition of what was true, right, and
good."3 Indeed, Hegel had argued that one cannot ensure freedom
merely by providing a people with a constitution, but a constitution
must be an organic development of a people whose substantial exis-
tence promotes the very freedom which the state maintains and
protects.4 Lieber expressed concern that even if the Mormons were
to set up a representative political structure, it would merely be "pro
forma" and would reproduce the underlying theocracy.485 Thus, the
patriarchal structure of the family would tend to be replicated in the
political structure of a Mormon state. In such a state, the free-
thinking individual would not be valued.4 1 In Mormon society, po-
lygamy served to elevate the group over the individual by "vastly
expand[ing] the network of personal loyalties and the range of possi-
ble relationships. 48 7 Polygamy worked to reconstitute a group of
otherwise unrelated individuals into a tribe in which personal loyalty
and tribal loyalty would be virtually synonymous.4 8 This in turn en-
hanced the ability of the group to demand the sacrifice of the
483. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 242 (explaining the enormous hostility toward the
Mormons prior to the spread of knowledge of the Mormon practice of polygamy as pro-
voked by "the Mormons' extraordinary group solidarity").
484. See HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, supra note 120, at 174-75.
485. See Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted to the Union?,
PUTNAM'S MONTHLY, Mar. 1855, at 225,231.
486. Not valuing free-thinking individuals might be demonstrated by a lack of tolerance
of those who are unwilling to conform. Thus, in 1988, three former members of a funda-
mentalist Mormon sect were murdered by other sect members. See Otto, supra note 5, at
883 n.10 (citing James Coates, Mormons Fear Sect's Death List, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1988,
at C19).
487. FOSTER, supra note 436, at 151. Within the short period polygamy was practiced
by the Mormons, it created such complex ties of blood and marriage that an elderly man
could, at the time of his death, be related to more than 800 people. See id. (citing
BENJAMIN F. JOHNSON, MY LIFE'S REVIEW 388 (1947)).
488. See id. (pointing to the Mormon view of itself as "New Israel").
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individual for group goals and policies.
Consequently, polygamy would promote and expand blind fam-
ily/social loyalty to a level which could compete with, if not replace,
federal political authority. At the same time, participation of Mor-
mons in the federal political structure would threaten the liberties of
Americans because the failure of Mormon society to value individual
conscience as supreme would in the end justify preventing non-
Mormons from disagreeing and having the right to live differently.
Thus, the targeting of Mormon polygamy by mainstream American
society in the late-nineteenth century, while also motivated by relig-
ious and moral antipathy, was substantially based on a recognition of
the connection between polygamy and the cohesive patriarchal soci-
ety the Mormons sought to develop.
E. Polygamy and Equality
Polygamy can also be seen as undermining important ideals of
equality that underlie democracy. Laura Betzig has made the Dar-
winian argument that because human beings, from an evolutionary
perspective, "should have evolved to seek out positions of strength
as a means to reproduction, '489 where possible, "power is exploited to
the end of reproduction. 49 1 Polygamy in particular is an institution
designed to give those with power an opportunity to reproduce in
greater numbers than those who do not have such power.491' This is
obvious from the fact that polygamy will take place in a society with
relatively equal numbers of men and women. The polygynous
492
marriages of some, and their increased reproduction, means no mar-
riage and possibly no reproduction to a number of other men. This
will be possible only if the polygamous men can succeed in overpow-
ering those men whose basic biological urges are being frustrated.
Therefore, polygamy can be a viable institution only where there are
significant imbalances of power between men.
489. BETZIG, supra note 195, at 2.
490. Id. at 3.
491. See id. at 8-9.
492. As explained supra at note 216, "polygyny" refers to the marriage of one man to
multiple women. "Polyandry"-the marriage of one woman to multiple men-is so so-
cially unusual that it is impossible to speculate on its political implications. See EMBRY,
supra note 436, at 3 (noting that polyandry has occurred in less than one-tenth of one per-
cent of 862 societies surveyed, while polygyny in some form was present in 84%). The
possibility of a coherent social order in which both polygyny and polyandry were present is
difficult to imagine. As a result, I have made no attempt to consider the political implica-
tions of a practice of polyandry, whether in conjunction with polygyny or not.
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The official doctrine of the Mormon Church was that "polygamy
was necessary in order to provide earthly bodies rapidly enough for
the innumerable spirits awaiting the opportunity to become Saints on
earth." '493 However, a system based entirely on monogamous mar-
riages could have been equally reproductively successful,494
particularly since there was never an imbalance in the number of
men and women in Utah.49 With this in mind, it is important to rec-
ognize that polygamy was practiced by no more than twenty percent
of Mormon men.4 96 These were men who had chosen to undertake
the burden, expense, and responsibility of plural marriage,4 97 and
who had received the permission of church elders to enter into plural
marriage.' 9' It would appear from the polygamy prosecutions that
the elders of the church constituted a significant proportion of those
who chose and were permitted to enter into plural marriages.419 This
concentration of polygamists among the religious leaders"' suggests
that the purposes of polygamy included permitting high-achieving
men to have the privilege of increased reproduction and diverting
these same men into Church service by converting their private lives
into a burden justified only by religious belief. Thus the Church,
through polygamy, served to control who would have the opportu-
nity for increased reproduction, and who would not.50 .
493. Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 310.
494. See EMBRY, supra note 436, at 35 (noting that there is no evidence to suggest that
polygamy increased the Mormon population more than monogamy would have, since po-
lygamous women tended to have fewer children than monogamous women did).
495. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 210.
496. See id. (citing Stanley S. Irvins, Notes on Mormon Polygamy, 10 W. HUMAN. REV.
230 (1956)). But see LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BrITON, THE MORMON
EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 199 (1979) (claiming that polyg-
amy was practiced by only five percent of Mormon men during the nineteenth century).
497. See Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 311.
498. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (stating that part of Rey-
nolds' First Amendment argument was that he had been given permission to enter into
plural marriages by the recognized authorities of the Church).
499. See Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 370 (stating that "[t]he leading
elders might have been polygamists"); Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 2, supra note 5, at 582
("Hundreds of [the Church's] leading elders were in prison. Hundreds were in exile.").
500. See Linford, Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 310 (citing B.H. ROBERTS, A
COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
57 (1930)); see also EMBRY, supra note 436, at 45 (explaining the view that polygamy pro-
vided a better chance that children would be raised by two parents who were active and
committed members of the Church).
501. Polygamy also made it more likely that the children born would be particularly
devoted to the Mormon Church and its religious doctrine. As Jessie Embry reports, chil-
dren brought up in polygamous families even after polygamy was repudiated by the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
As long as the number of men and women remained relatively
equal, the practice of polygamy would have to create two classes of
men: those privileged to reproduce at a high rate, and those who
might have only one wife and family, if any."' To the extent this
stratification within Mormon society could have been avoided by im-
porting a greater number of female converts than male to replenish
the supply of women for existing Mormon men,"3 the practice
threatened to make non-Mormons second-class citizens, with less
reproductive potential than Mormons. Thus, polygamy was both a
vehicle for exercising power and a means for concentrating power,
504
and this power was controlled by and through the Mormon
Church.5 Consequently, what was so disturbing about polygamous
marriage in Mormon society was not simply that it rested upon an
unegalitarian belief as to the greater religious righteousness of some
men, but that it would have established a concrete society in which
equality was markedly absent. Indeed, Francis Lieber argued that
Mormon polygamy was intended to produce an aristocracy or a he-
reditary order of priests who would have the political power in
Mormon society."6 The concentration of reproduction and political
Mormon Church accepted the religious necessity of polygamy and maintained a certain
defensive emotional attachment to polygamy as their family lifestyle. See EMBRY, supra
note 436, at 190-91.
502. Demographic evidence shows that polygamous Mormon men had more children
than monogamous Mormon men. See id at 36.
503. Even before the exodus of the Mormons from Nauvoo, Illinois to Utah, the Mor-
mons were engaged in a large-scale recruitment of converts, both at home and abroad. See
FOSTER, supra note 436, at 184-85 (noting that by 1846, more than 4,000 British converts
had joined the Mormons in Nauvoo); id. at 200 (noting that the 1852 official Church an-
nouncement of Mormon belief in polygamy coincided with a large-scale assignment of
elders to three- to seven-year foreign missions, in which they were told to "gather the
sheep together," but warned not to "make selections before they are brought home and
put into the fold").
504. One author has said of Mormon polygamy," 'Religion was the pretext; power was
the motive.'" WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 146 (quoting DENNIS MICHAEL QUINN, THE
MORMON HIERARCHY 1832-1932: AN AMERICAN ELITE (1976)).
505. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 204. In actual practice, all plural marriages "had
to be formally cleared with the President of the Mormon Church, even when the lower
levels of the hierarchy made the initial judgment." Id
506. See Lieber, supra note 485, at 225, 231. In fact, it may well have accomplished this
end. A modern commentator on Mormon society has noted:
It is a curious fact, however, that those in charge of the Church have been pre-
dominantly successful businessmen whose family names have appeared
repeatedly throughout Mormon history. Whether spirits borne into prominent
Mormon families are endowed more abundantly with righteousness or their rise
in the hierarchy is of a political nature as some critics suggest, the eternal pro-
gression of well-named Mormon spirits is noticeably accelerated. The Mormon
[Vol. 751588
1997] SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1589
power produced by Mormon polygamy denied the abstract concept
of equality and produced a society structured by inequality.
F. Polygamy and Gender Equality
Discerning the unique effect of Mormon polygamy on the possi-
bility of gender equality is complicated by a number of facts. First,
monogamous marriages in nineteenth-century America were based
on the same patriarchal ideas about women's nature and gender
roles as polygamous Mormon marriages."7 Second, nineteenth-
century Mormon women often are described as having more eco-
nomic choices, having more personal independence, and being more
financially self-reliant than their Eastern contemporaries,. 8 who were
often prevented from engaging in domestic labor and excluded from
the marketplace."9 Finally, during the height of polygamy in 1870,
aristocracy is recognized as a prevailing force in the system and derives its status
more from a heritage of church leadership than from accumulated wealth.
WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 65-66.
507. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 212 (noting that the Mormon emphasis on the role
of women as mothers and homemakers was "strikingly similar" to the views of their Victo-
rian contemporaries); WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 149 (noting that Mormon views on
the patriarchal family order, aside from polygamy, were similar to those of early New
Englanders).
508. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 214 (describing women running farms, exercising
equal responsibility for financial management, and constituting a "relatively large class of
professional women in Utah," including a dominant portion of the medical profession, as
well as having an equal opportunity for university education at the University of Deseret,
a co-educational institution since 1850); see also WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 9-12
("[T]he women out in Utah territory were realizing many of the feminists' goals. With no
doors closed to them regarding work, they were participating in almost every business and
profession known to man.").
509. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 153 (quoting a non-Mormon visitor to Utah in
1869 as saying that "'womanhood (in Utah) is not as petted and spoiled as in the Eastern
States' "). The Women's Exponent, a well-known Mormon periodical from 1872-1914,
expressed positions on the inequitable treatment of women in the public sphere as radical
as those of their Eastern feminist contemporaries. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 215;
WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 170-72. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, Mormon femi-
nists even defended polygamy on the ground that it was an essentially liberating institution
for women. See id. at 156-57. Among other things, they argued that women could be freed
from child-rearing for professional life because they could leave their children with a
"sister wife." See id at 157. More recently, it has been suggested that polygamy proved
liberating for women because the less intense emotional involvement of husbands and
wives in polygamous marriage freed plural wives to pursue their own interests, or because
the lower degree of financial support offered to plural wives necessitated that they assume
a greater presence in the economic world. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 215-16 (quoting
Gail Casterline, "In the Toils" or "Onward for Zion": Images of the Mormon Woman,
1852-1890, at 80-81 (1974) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Utah State University) (on file with
author)). However, the freeing possibilities of having "sister wives" to take care of work-
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Mormon women were given the right to vote almost fifty years be-
fore full female suffrage was achieved by the rest of American
women.
5 10
It would be a mistake, however, to view these various achieve-
ments as proof that polygamy is more likely to promote gender
equality than monogamy. To begin with, the impressive achieve-
ments of some Mormon women and the independence and economic
contributions of many Mormon women of that time can be substan-
tially attributed to the exigencies of frontier life,51' and to the
absorption by the Church of an enormous amount of men's time and
energy on Church business within Utah and on missions abroad.
Under these circumstances, women's labor and talents could not be
wasted. The apparently liberating effects of polygamous marriage
also were more likely the consequence of placing nineteenth-century
women51 4 in an ancient institution in a frontier economy. Putting
such women in an emotionally unsatisfying or economically inade-
quate marriage in a society in which men's Church involvement left
significant gaps in the marketplacec5 quite predictably produced pro-
fessional and working women at a level that could not have occurred
in the highly populated and economically developed East.
While the Mormon Church has often pointed to the early suc-
cess of women's suffrage in Utah as evidence of "progressive and
ing wives' children can be seen as less a function of polygamy than as a function of eco-
nomic wealth and the unusual circumstances of settling the frontier. See WARENSKI, supra
note 446, at 12 (noting that many women famous as Mormon pioneer achievers "enjoyed
servants and a surprising number of privileged-class advantages," possibly because of their
"close relations with the patriarchy").
510. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 144 (noting that a Mormon woman was the first
American woman to vote on February 14,1870).
511. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 214.
512. See id at 213.
513. See id at 214.
514. Given the limited period in which, and extent to which, polygamy was officially
practiced by Mormons, see supra notes 494-96 and accompanying text, it seems likely that
most of these independent plural wives must have been converts raised in non-Mormon
monogamous homes or first- or second-generation Mormons raised in monogamous
homes. Such women already would have developed as individuals before they entered a
polygamous marriage.
515. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 130 (noting that the concentration of women in
medicine was the result of Brigham Young's distrust of non-Mormon doctors, a great need
for maternity health care, and the need to reserve men "'for the more important work of
building the kingdom'" (quoting Brigham Young)); id. at 151 (noting that Brigham Young
pressed women into accounting when it became apparent that many of the male account-
ants were needed for Church missions).
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liberal attitudes toward women, a significant reason for the
Church's support for suffrage at that time was the political advantage
it gave Mormons as a whole! 17 The move to give women the vote in
Utah actually began with congressional anti-polygamy activists, who,
believing that no woman would voluntarily support polygamy, as-
sumed that giving Mormon women political power would help end
polygamy in the Territory."' Once suggested, Mormon men em-
braced the idea, and women's suffrage was enacted by the Utah
legislative body.5"9 Mormon women, although happy to have the
vote, had not previously sought it themselves. 20 Nor did the male
decision to give women the vote reflect any sense that Mormon
women, or any women, were equal to men. 21 The Mormon Church
supported giving women the vote because they knew that Mormon
women were fully committed to the principles of the Church and that
this move would therefore "increase the Mormon electorate" in
Utah.22 Later, when Utah was approved for Statehood and was
drafting its constitution, the debate over the inclusion of women's
suffrage centered around its effect in ensuring that the Mormon
Church would have control of Utah government, rather than
women's rights.5
Polygamy, therefore, made little or no unique contribution to
the "liberation" of nineteenth-century Mormon women.524 Indeed,
516. Id. at 179.
517. See id.
518. See id. at 162.
519. See id. at 163.
520. See id. at 164.
521. While women were given the vote, they were not given the right to hold high-level
executive, legislative, or judicial offices because "women ought not to be raised above the
level of man to be his governor, guide or law-giver, or invested with powers for which na-
ture has not fitted her." Id. at 163 (citing T.A. Larson, Woman's Suffrage in Utah, UTAH
HISTORICAL Q., Winter 1970, at 20).
522 Id. at 164. Female suffrage was also perceived as improving the chance for Utah
to obtain Statehood. See id.
523. See id. at 179.
524. As the exigencies of frontier life and populating the Territory of Utah disap-
peared, the extreme patriarchal Mormon views on women's subordination to male
authority, and on women's primary role as mothers have re-emerged. See, e.g., id. at 83-89
(pointing out how the modern Mormon doctrine requiring women to marry and have chil-
dren in order to attain eternal salvation makes marriage and motherhood a religious duty
for women that is seen as being compromised or threatened by choosing to delay marriage
or children, or choosing to work outside the home or develop expertise in non-domestic
labor); see hi at 226-27 (explaining that Church doctrine discourages women from re-
maining single because single women merely will be "'ministering servants'" in heaven,
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the intended role of polygamy in Mormon society was to institution-
alize patriarchy so as to prevent women from gaining power and
authority equivalent to men.2 Nineteenth-century Mormon polyg-
amy thus created a social imbalance of power, grounded in religious
doctrines of female inferiority, which was inherently inconsistent
with the modern understanding of gender equality.526
Monogamous marriage, on the other hand, is at least potentially
consistent with gender equality, even though patriarchal ideals have
influenced the structure of monogamous marriage since its inception.
To begin with, monogamous marriage grants women some power
over men's sexuality and reproductive potential. More importantly,
however, monogamous marriage symbolically states that one woman
is the measure of one man. Indeed, when seventeenth-century Eng-
lish Royalists suggested that the absolute power of the husband in
marriage lent legitimacy to their claim for absolute royal authority,
English Parliamentarians were quick to see that the despotism of ab-
solute male authority in marriage, premised upon female inferiority,
was as illegitimate as the despotism of absolute royal authority
premised upon royal superiority. 7  Although nineteenth-century
with no possibility of godhood); id. at 244-45 (indicating that modern Mormon women who
are unmarried get a clear message that, in order for them not to be blamed in Heaven for
not being married, they must make every effort to be desirable for marriage, including
changing their habits, speech, appearance, weight, and eccentricities). This subordination
has confounded many Mormon women who had taken their pioneer predecessors as role
models of independence and achievement. See, e.g., id. at 181-224 (documenting how pro-
ERA Mormon women were often inspired by what appeared to be a progressive Mormon
past, and chronicling their surprise and disenchantment at the substantial efforts of the
Mormon Church in 1975 to defeat the ERA in Utah and subsequently nationwide).
525. See FOSTER, supra note 436, at 176. Polygamy restricted women's authority by
depriving women of most, if not all, of the power they would have held in monogamous
marriages. Since a woman in a polygamous marriage can and will be replaced, she cannot
exercise equal power in the relationship. Her love and affection can be lost without great
consequence to the man, but his loss is of great consequence to her. This can be demon-
strated by the Mormon views on divorce. While Mormon polygamous men could not as
easily divorce their wives as their wives could divorce them, men could always take on
another wife. See id. at 218. Under the Mormon doctrine of divorce, however, a woman
who obtains a civil divorce will still be sealed to her ex-husband for all eternity. If she
seeks a temple divorce, she "forfeits her place in the Celestial Kingdom, and the children
of the union remain sealed to their father as part of his individual kingdom in heaven."
WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 248 (noting that "a second marriage for a woman is for time
only and not for eternity," although special permission for a second eternal marriage can
be granted by Church officials if the woman is worthy).
526. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (explaining that
classifications based on sex "may not be used ... to create or perpetuate the legal, social
and economic inferiority of women" (citation omitted)).
527. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth-
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critics of polygamy did not necessarily believe in women's suffrage or
gender equality, their concern about the way in which polygamy ap-
peared to degrade women5 can be recognized as based on notions of
female dignity and worth that were inherent in monogamous mar-
riage. These ideas of dignity and worth were the foundation for the
ideals of gender equality which eventually emerged.
G. Summary
Despite what nineteenth-century critics claimed, 29 Mormon po-
lygamy was not motivated by male desires to have multiple sexual
partners or by female desires to share their sexual partner.30 As this
Article has explained, polygamy was accepted by nineteenth-century
Mormons because of a patriarchal religious doctrine that made prog-
ress to godhood possible to men only through the building of
kingdoms of progeny on earth, and made celestial glory possible for
women only through their eternal marriage to a man who built such
a kingdom. However, the practice of polygamy, which most perfectly
realized this doctrine, was in fact reasonably perceived as constitut-
ing a threat to traditional American ideals of separation of church
and state, individual autonomy, individual liberty, and equality of all
men, and would now be perceived as threatening the modem Ameri-
can ideal of equality of men and women. The decision in Reynolds,
therefore, cannot be understood as based on a moral/religious rejec-
tion of Mormon sexual mores, but must be understood as based on a
determination that the anti-democratic and unegalitarian conse-
quences of the practice of polygamy justified what would otherwise
have been a significant infringement upon First Amendment rights.
Reynolds, therefore, provides the parameters for any legitimate legal
analysis of same-sex marriage, requiring that we evaluate the practice
Century English Political Thought, in THE FAMILY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note
127, at 80, 81 (noting that John Locke suggested that nothing about monogamous mar-
riage, viewed as a freely entered contract, required that women be subordinated to men);
see also Krouse, supra note 306, at 154-56 (noting that Thomas Hobbes and John Locke
were able to justify the patriarchal family only "at the price of violence to the logic of their
own principles").
528. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 144-45.
529. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 466, at 89 (arguing that the Eastern image of
polygamy as creating a "Mormon harem, dominated by lascivious males with hyperactive
libidos" was "the creation of Gentile travelers to Salt Lake City more interested in titil-
lating audiences back home than in accurately portraying plural marriage").
530. See id. (noting that Mormon polygamy was "essentially puritanical"); Linford,
Polygamy Cases, pt. 1, supra note 5, at 369 ("As any informed student of Mormon polyg-
amy must concede, the system was not founded upon the lust and carnal desire of men.").
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of same-sex marriage in light of the beneficial role of heterosexual
monogamous marriage in the modem liberal state and the pernicious
effects which polygamous marriage would have brought about.
VI. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
If polygamous marriage is antithetical to the modem free state,
the question this Article must now consider is whether same-sex
marriage similarly undermines the liberal ideals that ground Ameri-
can democracy. In his dissent in Romer v. Evans,53' Justice Scalia
argued that the Court, by striking down the Colorado constitutional
amendment that would have prohibited any governmental action
protecting the rights of homosexuals qua homosexuals, had thereby
incorrectly "concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is
a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm
of homosexuality is not. '3 In what follows, I will demonstrate that
the monogamous nature of same-sex marriage, together with the
fundamental personal, religious, political, ideological, and geo-
graphic diversity of homosexuals, prevents same-sex marriage from
being a threat to our political ideals in the way Mormon polygamous
marriage was. This means that the reasoning in Reynolds cannot be
relied upon to justify state and federal legislative attacks on same-sex
marriage. Therefore, current federal and state refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage" or a subsequent federal effort to prohibit same-
sex marriage" can have no legitimate constitutional purpose.
A. The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Same-Sex Marriage
Any comparison of Mormon polygamy and same-sex marriage
must begin by considering whether an institution of same-sex mar-
riage would be grounded, as Mormon polygamy was, on any shared
religious or philosophical doctrines. In what follows, I will argue
that same-sex marriage rests upon a coherent set of philosophical
531. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The Court in Romer held unconstitutional a Colorado con-
stitutional amendment prohibiting all action at any level of government to protect
homosexuals from discrimination on the grounds of homosexual orientation, conduct, prac-
tices, or relationships. See id. at 1629.
532. Id. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
533. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (to
be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7).
534. While no current federal legislation prohibits recognition of same-sex marriage by
a state, as was done regarding polygamy in the Territory of Utah, I have little doubt that
those who oppose same-sex marriage would seek to follow this precedent if they thought it
had any chance of success.
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principles about sex, love, gender, and the legal institution of mar-
riage. Only by considering the social and political implications of
these principles will it be possible to show that a change of this na-
ture in the institution of marriage will not have profound and
antidemocratic results.
Although critics of homosexual rights or same-sex marriage of-
ten suggest that these practices are based on doctrines ranging from
atheism,35 communism, or feminism," it must be patently obvious to
anyone who has actually surveyed the gay and lesbian community
that the movement consists of individuals of every religious persua-
sion537 and every political ideology.3 8 A number of religions have
recognized that homosexuality is consistent with their religious doc-
trines, 39 but for those religions that have not, or insist that it is
impossible, there remain gay and lesbian adherents to those faiths
who believe that their homosexuality is not inconsistent with their
535. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 9, at 441-42 (describing protesters seeking gay rights
as "Christophobic" and as having "a regulatory agenda aimed at stopping the Church").
536. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, America's "Culture War"-The Sinister Denial of
Virtue and The Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 183, 204 (1993)
(suggesting that President Clinton's "efforts to proclaim the homosexual lifestyle as nor-
mal" are based on a "sinisterly antireligious" "constitutional misinterpretation" based on
prevailing ideologies of "materialism, empowerment or economic redistribution").
537. The World Congress of Gay and Lesbian Jewish Organizations coordinates many
synagogues serving predominantly gay and lesbian communities. See Lewis John Eron,
Homosexuality and Judaism, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND WORLD RELIGIONS 103, 126
(Arlene Swidler ed., 1993) [hereinafter WORLD RELIGIONS]. Homosexuality is "openly
practiced in Western Buddhist communities." Jos6 Ingacio Cabez6n, Homosexuality and
Buddhism, in WORLD RELIGIONS, supra, at 81, 94; see also PECULIAR PEOPLE:
MORMONS AND SAME-SEX ORIENTATION 324-28 (Ron Schow et al. eds., 1991) (noting
that the Mormon community also has gay members); Chris Glaser, The Love That Dare
Not Pray Its Name: The Gay and Lesbian Movement in America's Churches, in HO-
MOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH: BOTH SIDES OF THE DEBATE 150, 150 (Jeffrey S. Siker
ed., 1994) [hereinafter HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE CHURCH] (noting the existence of gay
Quakers, Baptists, Lutherans, Catholics, Presbyterians, and Latter Day Saints).
538. In the 1988 presidential election, gays and lesbians registered to vote with numer-
ous political parties: Democratic, 62%; Independent, 19.5%; Republican, 13.1%, Socialist,
2.3%; Libertarian, 2.6%; Other, 2.4%. See THE GAY ALMANAC 337 (Berkeley 1996).
539. For example, the United Church of Christ passed a resolution in 1991 that "invites
all persons ... to experience the struggle and joy of the journey towards openness and
affirmation of all lesbian, gay and bisexual persons as children of God in the community of
faith." HOMOSEXUALITY INTHE CHURCH, supra note 537, app. at 205 (Selected Denomi-
national Statements on Homosexuality). Buddhist doctrine has been found "essentially
neutral on the question of homosexuality (at least as neutral as it is in regard to heterosex-
ual relations.)" Cabez6n, supra note 537, at 94-95. The attitude of Hinduism toward
homosexuality has been described as one of "mild amusement bordering on indifference."
Arvind Sharma, Homosexuality and Hinduism, in WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 537, at
47,70.
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specific religious beliefs or their spiritual advancement."' At the
same time, none of these religions suggests that being a homosexual
or entering into a same-sex marriage is a religious duty. No gay or
lesbian person chooses to practice homosexual sex or to enter a
same-sex marriage for the reasons Mormons chose polygamy, i.e.,
because it was essential to their salvation, even if thought distasteful
and unpleasant. 1 Not only does no coherent set of religious beliefs
exist among American gays and lesbians, but no religious doctrine
would motivate a gay person to seek to enter into a same-sex mar-
riage rather than a heterosexual marriage.
Of course, the same is true of American heterosexuals. While
the desire to be married may be motivated by religious doctrine, the
motivation for wanting a heterosexual marriage does not arise from
religious beliefs. This is not to suggest that many religions do not
make heterosexual marriage a sacrament in which a religious person
might desire to participate. Rather, what I am suggesting is that, for
the most part, heterosexual marriage is not chosen because religious
doctrine demands it. Heterosexuals simply channel their inclination
to couple into the prescribed religious institution. 2
Nor can desire to enter into a same-sex marriage be linked to
any single coherent set of political beliefs. Gay and lesbian Ameri-
cans come in every political stripe and are members of myriad
diverse organizations.43 Again, some of these organizations make
official doctrinal statements that are compatible with homosexuality.
Other organizations have doctrinally condemned homosexuality, yet
540. See, e.g., CARTER HEYwARD, OUR PASSION FOR JUSTICE 44-45 (1984) (arguing
that "God's being is in loving" including both heterosexual and homosexual love by a les-
bian Espiscopal priest); John J. McNeill, Homosexuality: Challenging the Church to Grow,
in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE CHURCH, supra note 537, 49, 50-52 (an argument that Ca-
tholicism and Christianity in general should view homosexual love by a gay Catholic priest
as "holy"); see also LETHA DAWSON SCANzONI & VIRGINIA RAMEY MOLKUKOTr, IS
THE HOMOsExuAL MY NEIGHBOR 135 (1994) (listing gay support groups for Catholics,
Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, Mennonites, and Pentecosts among others).
541. See supra note 461-77 and accompanying text (describing how polygamy was
adopted by Mormon men and women for religious reasons rather than sexual or romantic
reasons).
542. Indeed, the only ones who might be said to choose heterosexual marriage purely
on religious grounds are religiously devout homosexuals who find their religious beliefs
incompatible with their desires. A homosexual entering into a heterosexual marriage for
religious reasons is quite comparable to a devout Mormon forcing him or herself into a
polygamous marriage despite a disinclination to do so.
543. See, e.g., J. Jennings Moss, Log Cabin Fever, ADVOC., Mar. 18, 1997, at 35-37
(discussing gay Republican groups including the Log Cabin Republicans).
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their gay and lesbian members continue to believe that in essence
they may remain ideologically committed to the organization without
compromising their sexuality.
Despite this surface ideological diversity, it might still be possi-
ble that the choice to enter into a same-sex marriage could be
understood as grounded in some set of coherent beliefs, and that
these beliefs could be used, as the doctrinal underpinnings of polyg-
amy were used, to assist in determining the compatibility of same-sex
marriage with traditional American political ideals. The question,
then, is whether there is a set of beliefs which could be seen as moti-
vating homosexuals to want to enter into same-sex marriage.
Three moments in a choice to enter same-sex marriage can be
analytically isolated: same-sex sexual desire, homosexual identity,
and a decision to enter into a same-sex marriage. Indeed, three
similar moments in the choice to enter Mormon polygamy could be
isolated: desire for eternal salvation, Mormon identity, and a deci-
sion to enter into a polygamous marriage. The moment of sexual
desire has no more relevance to this analysis, however, than the mo-
ment of religious desire had in our analysis of the Mormons. There
are many theories about the etiology of religious and sexual desire,
ranging from the sociobiological to the psychoanalytic.5" However,
these etiological explanations often have no experiential resonance
for those whose behavior is being explained. Nor will these etiologi-
cal explanations assist us in considering the political and social
implications of polygamy or same-sex marriage. Indeed, our evalua-
tion of the political and social implications of Mormon polygamy did
not take into account that religion can be explained as a species prac-
tice which enhances chances for survival, or as an epiphenomenon of
Oedipal identification. It was not necessary to take etiological ex-
planations into account because the institution of polygamy was
shaped to achieve the acknowledged ends of Mormon beliefs and
doctrines, and that shape is not changed by the origins of those be-
liefs or doctrines. Therefore, to examine the political and social
implications of same-sex marriage, one need not open the Pandora's
box of etiological explanations for same-sex sexual desire.
The moment of Mormon identity, however, was crucial to an
understanding of Mormon polygamy. That identity was achieved by
544. See generally PAUL E. SIMONDS, SEXUALITY, EVOLUTION AND HUMANITY 53-82
(1992) (explaining the adaptive benefits and disadvantages of sexual reproduction);
EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 560-62 (1975) (explaining
religion as an evolutionary adaptation to the environment).
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accepting Mormon religious doctrines as true and by seeking to live
in a manner consistent with such beliefs. In determining whether an
analogous set of shared beliefs or doctrines constitutes or defines
homosexual identity for all homosexuals seeking to enter into same-
sex marriage, one should begin by noting that Mormon identity was
partially constituted by recognition of membership in the Mormon
Church. Such membership was authoritatively given by the Mormon
Church through the ritual of official baptisme ' and could be taken
away through the ritual of an excommunication trial.m6 Certainly no
authoritative institution or official ritual determines homosexuals'
membership in some clearly delineated "homosexual community."
Just as this Article carefully distinguished internal accounts of
Mormon identity, i.e., Mormon self-descriptions as shaped by relig-
ious doctrine' 7 from external accounts of Mormon identity," i.e.,
Eastern non-Mormon accounts of sexually rapacious men and pro-
miscuous or enslaved women," we must also be careful to
distinguish internal accounts of homosexual identity from external
accounts.55 ' However, even in internal accounts of homosexuality, no
single set of features or beliefs could be accepted as definitive by all
those who identify themselves as homosexual. Indeed, the question
of what constitutes gay or lesbian identity is a matter of passionate
controversy among those who identify themselves as homosexual.Y
545. See JOHN W. GUNSON, THE MORMONS 46 (1972).
546. For example, at least one Mormon woman was excommunicated from the Mormon
Church because of her support of the ERA. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 295.
547. See supra notes 468-69 and accompanying text (explaining that Mormons believed
polygamy was a religious duty); see also WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 151 (describing
Mormon women as entering into polygamy willingly).
548. Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and
the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REv. 1833, 1844 (1993) (making a distinction be-
tween internal and external identity).
549. See WARENSKI, supra note 446, at 152.
550. External accounts are problematic because they can easily slip between descrip-
tions of identity as consciously held by homosexuals and identification of homosexuals by a
particular etiological theory, for example, "homosexuals are self-consciously communists"
versus "homosexuality is a communist plot." They are also problematic to the extent they
fail to take into account internal descriptions of identity. A failure to take account of in-
ternal descriptions will result in speculative accounts of identity, which, as did many
accounts of Mormon identity, bear no resemblance to reality.
551. See generally Ortiz, supra note 548, at 1849 (arguing that the numerous apparently
conflicting descriptions of gay identity need not be seen as conflicting if identity in general




Those who would espouse an essentialist55 2 definition of homo-
sexuals as those who experience same-sex desire553 are confronted
with, on the one hand, individuals who may experience same-sex de-
sire but define themselves as heterosexual either because they do not
act on their desires or because they do not accept such desires as
their own ss and, on the other hand, individuals who do not experi-
ence same-sex desire, but who identify themselves as homosexual
because they experience deep same-sex emotional connections."5
Those who would define homosexuals as those who experience ex-
clusively same-sex desire are confronted with contemporary
individuals whose desire is bisexual, but who define themselves as
homosexual.556 Those who would define homosexuals as those who
act on same-sex desire5 7 are confronted by contemporary individuals
who choose not to act on their same-sex desires, but nonetheless de-
fine themselves as homosexual.-" 8 A constructivist ss9 definition of
552. Essentialist definitions of homosexuals focus on "an intrinsic property, one that
does not vary across history or culture." Id. at 1836.
553. See, e.g., John Boswell, Categories, Experience and Sexuality, in FORMS OF
DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY
133, 137 & n.8 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) (defining those who experience same-sex desire as
homosexual regardless of when in history they lived or where); see also Ruthann Robson,
Embodiment(s): The Possibilities of Lesbian Legal Theory in Bodies Problematized by
Postmodernisms and Feminisms, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 37, 49 (1992) ("In its grossest form,
the decision about whether or not one is a lesbian can be decided upon the basis of the
gender of the person(s) one desires as a sexual partner.").
554. For example, those who identify their desires as having an external source, for
example, coming from the devil, do not experience these desires as integrally related to
who they are.
555. Adrienne Rich argues that there was a continuum of lesbianism which ranged from
women-identified women, to women who derive primary emotional sustenance from other
women, to women whose emotional and sexual affiliations are strictly with women. See
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND
GAY STUDIES READER 227, 239 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993); see also Robson, supra
note 553, at 48 ("While there are a plethora of definitions advanced for lesbianism, all rest
significantly upon some sort of sexuality, although this sexuality can be variously described
as eroticism, attention or emotional commitment.").
556. See, e.g., Katie Cotter, Dating a Man, ADVOC., Feb. 18, 1997, at 41 (reporting that
JoAnn Loulan, a renowned lesbian sex expert and therapist, continued to identify herself
as a lesbian despite being romantically and sexually involved with a man).
557. See Robson, supra note 553, at 48-49 (noting some essentialist attempts to define
lesbians as women who are sexually engaged with women and not with men).
558. For example, a celibate priest could identify himself as homosexual. See Judith
Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY
THEORIES 13, 17 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) ("Is it not possible to maintain ... homosexual
identifications and aims within heterosexual practices?").
559. Constructivists view identities as labels constructed and imposed by society. See
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homosexuality, on the other hand, might view homosexual identity
as constituted by a combination of same-sex desire, sexual transgres-
sion, and subversion of traditional gender roles. 60 However, some
self-identified homosexuals have accepted as definitive very rigid and
traditional gender roles. 61 Furthermore, many lesbian theorists have
argued that not only does no coherent essence define gay men and
lesbians as homosexuals,562 but no coherent essence defines all lesbi-
ans across race, class, and ethnicity lines.563 Some theorists,
therefore, believe no homosexual identity exists. 64
Given the extreme difficulty of settling upon a definition of who
is a homosexual or what defines homosexual identity, or finding a
coherent set of beliefs which are uniquely held by homosexuals, one
might turn instead to the moment of same-sex marriage, and ask
whether those who believe same-sex marriage is desirable share any
doctrinal beliefs that might help predict the political and social impli-
cations of such an institution. In fact, it may well be the case that
those who view same-sex marriage as a social good that ought to be-
come a civil institution base this evaluation upon a relatively
coherent set of doctrines and beliefs. I would divide these beliefs
into two main areas: the value of romantic love and non-procreative
Robson, supra note 553, at 42 & n.16. As a result, constructivist definitions of homosexual
identity are limited to a particular temporal and cultural setting. See Ortiz, supra note 548,
at 1836-37. Under this view, the possibility of a coherent homosexual identity was impos-
sible prior to the nineteenth century. See id. at 1846 (citing David M. Halperin, One
Hundred Years of Homosexuality, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15, 15
(David M. Halperin ed., 1990)).
560. See Ortiz, supra note 548, at 1843 (setting out this constructivist description of
homosexual identity).
561. Compare LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTcH BLUES passim (1993) (describing, in a
fictionalized autobiographical account of the butch/femme community in Buffalo, New
York in the 1960s and 1970s, how emerging feminism served to confuse the stone butch
position such that the narrator revised her identity from "lesbian woman" to
"transgendered person," i.e., a person of male gender in a female body), with Robson,
supra note 553, at 48 (suggesting that butch/femme was never a seriously questioned part
of lesbian terminology, even though regarded as possibly non-feminist).
562. Cf Robson, supra note 553, at 66-68 (insisting upon the necessity of a "lesbian
legal theory" as opposed to a "homosexual" or "queer" legal theory, on the ground that
otherwise lesbians will continue to be only "the shadows of gay men").
563. See id. at 47 (noting that lesbian theorists resist the "false unity" of essentialist
definitions of lesbianism by focusing on the heterogeneity of culture, race, class, and eth-
nicity); see also Ortiz, supra note 548, at 1847-48 & n.43 (noting that lesbian theorists often
take up an antiessentialist position critical of universal descriptions of women).
564. See e.g., Butler, supra note 558, at 14 ("To install myself within the terms of an
identity category would be to turn against the sexuality that the category purports to de-
scribe; and this might be true for any identity category which seeks to control the very
eroticism that it claims to describe and authorize, much less 'liberate.' ").
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
sex, and the value of a civil institution of marriage.
1. Romantic Love and Non-Procreative Sex
The choice to enter into a same-sex marriage might well be ex-
plained as grounded in the following set of beliefs and doctrines
regarding romantic love and non-procreative sex that, in part, pro-
vide a coherent account of the meaning of same-sex marriage:
a. a belief that non-procreative sex can be a social good as
opposed to a view that only procreative sex is socially valu-
able;
b. a belief that romantic love is a social good as opposed to
a view that all romantic love is illusory or socially destruc-
tive;
c. a view of non-procreative sex and romantic love as im-
portant as expressions of personal individuality and as
forces which break down barriers of independent individu-
ality and establish a concrete unity of partners;
d. a belief that the expressions of individuality are valuable
because concretely developed individuals are a prerequisite
for the demand for and exercise of personal liberty;
e. a belief that the unity of partners is valuable because it
allows such partners to experience their individuality as
most real only in the context of a relationship in which they
sacrifice their individuality, thus preparing individuals for
identification with larger communities and the state; and
f. a belief that same-sex romantic love and non-procreative
sex, and heterosexual romantic love and non-procreative
sex provide the same opportunities for the development of
concrete individuality and unity of partnership.
Points d, e and to some extent c should be recognizable as basic
elements of Hegel's explanation of the critical importance of mar-
riage to the possibility of a free society. The Hegelian theory has
already been shown to provide the most coherent explanation of
both the decision in Reynolds and the modem case law holding that
marriage is a fundamental right. The appropriateness of using this
Hegelian theory of marriage to legitimate same-sex marriage, how-
ever, depends upon the extent to which the underlying explanations
for points a, b, and f are consistent with the theory in general. Such
beliefs about the value of non-procreative sex, both heterosexual and
homosexual, are certainly controversial, as are the beliefs about the
possibility of achieving unity of partnership through homosexual ro-
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mantic love and non-procreative sex. These beliefs, therefore, must
be carefully explained and contrasted with similar beliefs about het-
erosexual sex and heterosexual unity.
Although homosexual sex is no more a necessary part of same-
sex marriage than heterosexual sex is a necessary part of heterosex-
ual marriage, it would be foolish to pretend that those who seek
same-sex marriage do not view homosexual sex within a same-sex
marriage as at least equivalent in value to heterosexual sex within a
heterosexual marriage. Obviously, this is the sticking point for many
opponents of same-sex marriage.565 What might be seen as the doc-
trinal basis of equating homosexual and heterosexual sex? From the
Hegelian perspective, heterosexual sex within marriage can be so-
cially valuable in only two ways: first, as a way of overcoming the
boundaries of individuality through intimacy, love, and care; and,
second, as the expression of personal individuality. I shall start with
the belief that the same "unity" can arise from same-sex sexual inti-
macy as can arise from heterosexual sexual intimacy.
One argument against same-sex marriage derives heterosexual
unity from the biological/genetic unity that arises from the birth of a
child in a heterosexual marriage and that is therefore inaccessible to
homosexuals who cannot unify their genetic material into a single
being. Indeed, many courts confronted with claims to establish or
recognize same-sex marriage have cited the impossibility of two peo-
ple of the same sex biologically parenting the same child as a basis
for rejecting such claims.566 Yet we have seen that, as much as pro-
565. See John Gallagher, Love and War, ADVOC., July 23, 1996, at 22,26.
566. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The legal protection and special status afforded to marriage ... has
historically ... been rationalized as being for the purpose of encouraging the propagation
of the race."); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307,332 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]n
recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the Court has only contemplated marriages
between persons of opposite sexes-persons who had the possibility of having children
with each other."); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (stating that mar-
riage "uniquely involv[es] the procreation ... of children"); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("[It is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility
of the birth of children by their union."). But cf Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61-63
(Haw.) (relying on language in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967), for its rejection of
the state's "tautological and circular nature" argument that same-sex marriage is imper-
missible because it is "intrinsically unnatural"), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d
225 (Haw. 1993).
It is possible for two lesbians to be the biological parents of the same child if one were
to serve as the egg donor to the other, who would act as the surrogate. See BLANK &
MERRICK, supra note 320, at 99 (noting the possibility of genetic and gestational mother-
hood). At least for the time being, however, two men or two women cannot be the genetic
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creation has been linked with marriage in modern case law, an un-
derstanding of marriage as distinct from and independent of
procreation has emerged.6 7 Furthermore, the current impossibility
of same-sex procreation cannot, in itself, bar same-sex couples from
marriage where similar reproductive inadequacy has no similar im-
pact on heterosexual couples568 for whom it will be impossible to
reproduce569 because of age, sterility,... illness,71 dysfunctional 72 or
surgically-constructed sexual or reproductive organs, 3 or lack of
physical access.5 74 Heterosexual marriage is understood to produce
unity, even in the absence of children to serve as reifications of that
unity.
Indeed, modern science has revealed the biological unity of par-
ents in their offspring to be something of an illusion, insofar as no
more than half the genetic material of either parent is incorporated
in the child, and that half can consist of recessive traits that have
never emerged in the parent and with which it would be difficult for
parents of the same child. But see id at 92-93 (noting the possibility that emerging tech-
nology may someday allow egg fusion, in which two women produce a daughter with two
mothers and no father).
567. See supra notes 316-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
decisions on marriage, within the context of procreation).
568. See Karst, supra note 384, at 684 (arguing that it is difficult to explain privileging
heterosexual unions that may not produce children over homosexual unions).
569. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV.
1419, 1428 n.21 (1993) (noting that a definition of marriage as essentially procreative
"excludes different-sex couples who are unable to bear children"); Mark Strasser, Family,
Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 981, 1009-12 (1991) (arguing the obvious irrelevance of lack of procreative ability to
marriage by considering the likely unconstitutionality of any statute that attempted to
make possible or likely procreation a condition of heterosexual marriage).
570. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269,270-71 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding that the
"[i]nability to beget or bear children does not debar a person from entering into a mar-
riage provided such person is capable of having the sexual intercourse which may result in
the conception and birth of children" (citations omitted)).
571. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 12 I. & N. Dec. 663, 665 (1968) (holding that lack of sex-
ual relations due to chronic illness had no effect on whether marriage was bona fide).
572. See, e.g., Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294, 296 (Mass. 1919) (holding that relatives
contesting a will could not seek to have marriage declared void due to incapacity of wife to
have sexual relations).
573. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,211 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (allowing
a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to marry a man after successful genital re-
placement surgery).
574. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (pointing to the reasonable expecta-
tion of consummation of prisoner marriages, and noting that for those serving long prison
terms, if the wife reaches menopause before the end of the term, consummation and pro-
creation may be impossible, but forbidding the state from prohibiting such marriages
nonetheless).
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the parent to identify.5  Thus, we recognize the uniqueness of chil-
dren and their right to be accepted for who they are. In addition,
most heterosexual adoptive parents would further argue that the
unity of nurture which arises from joint parenting can be as profound
as the unity of nature which arises from biological parenthood . 7
The accepted social value of marriages in which biological offspring
of the marriage partners are impossible prevents this argument from
explaining why same-sex unity is impossible. Heterosexual unity is
seen as possible with or without heterosexual sex, with or without
biological children, and with or without children at all.
An alternative argument given for the exclusive unity of hetero-
sexual marriage is that this unity is uniquely possible because it arises
out of the differentiation of sex.7 Under this view, the unity of mar-
riage arises out of heterosexual romantic love and non-procreative
sex, both of which are predicated upon biologically based distinc-
tions between the physical, intellectual, and emotional capacities of
men and women. Thus, it is the lack of sexual distinctiveness that
prevents marriage from occurring between those of the same sex.
This is probably what is behind the view of those courts that simply
rely on the definition of marriage as a relationship between a man
and a woman to deny the possibility of same-sex marriage.7
575. Cf JEFFREY J.W. BAKER & GARLAND E. ALLEN, THE STUDY OF BIOLOGY 451-
52 (4th ed. 1982) (explaining how pigmented human parents can have albino children if
both parents carry a single recessive gene for albinism); F. CLARKE FRASER & JAMES J.
NORA, GENETICS OF MAN 135-36 (1986) (explaining how parents who each have a single
recessive gene, i.e., are "heterozygous" for this gene, can produce offspring who inherit
both recessive genes, i.e., are "homozygous" for this gene, and therefore exhibit the char-
acteristics of the recessive gene).
576. Cf Hohengarten, supra note 37, at 1519-20 (arguing that notions of biological
parenthood must be supplemented by notions of legal parenthood and functional parent-
hood).
577. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1049, 1064-66 (1994) (arguing that "in sterile and fertile marriages alike,
the communion, companionship, societas and amicitia of the spouses-their being mar-
ried-is the very good of marriage" and that such communion can be reached only through
the biological unity of (married) male and female reproductive organs, even if sterile); id.
at 1069 (arguing that same-sex sex "cannot really actualize the mutual devotion which
some homosexual persons hope to manifest and experience by it"); Wardle, supra note 8,
at 39 ("The essence of marriage is the integration of a universe of gender differences
(profound and subtle, biological and cultural, psychological and genetic) associated with
sexual identity.").
578. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (quoting from three
dictionaries that define "marriage" as being between a man and a woman); Baker v. Nel-
son, 191 N.W.2d 185,186 (Minn. 1971) ("[M]arriage ... [is] a union of man and woman.").
Similar statements have also been made in cases annulling or declaring a nullity marriages
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This view corresponds with Hegel's logical argument that unity
can arise only out of difference and his political argument that both
the unity of family and the unity of society depend upon rigid gen-
der, class, and occupational distinctions."9 As this Article explained,
however, his insistence that social unity could be achieved only
through class distinctions and that family unity could be achieved
only through gender distinctions made Hegel's views incompatible
with traditional and contemporary American political ideals.8 He-
gelian unity required the exclusion of women from civil and political
life,58' and a rigidly class-structured society that would reproduce the
economic powerlessness of both peasants and workers by making
political power the prerogative of landowners, corporate officials,
and elite civil servants.582 However, Hegel's convictions about the
inherent rationality and historical necessity of hierarchical social
classes and the necessity of confining women to the domestic arena
proved to be false. 3 Both proved incompatible with the continued
emergence and development of the modem liberal individual and
the modem state.?
Yet, Hegel's logical insight continues to ring true. A coherent
and free social and political unity can arise only if individuals de-
velop forms of social cohesion that serve to universalize their
infinitely particular interests, while at the same time identifying im-
portant and distinct particular interests for greater social
consideration and negotiation.85 Marriage, in particular, continues
to play a critical role in the development of citizens who value their
individuality and the liberty necessary to develop and express it, and
yet who understand the way in which accommodating others can af-
firm individuality even where it may constrain particular liberty.586
However, as I argued earlier, the Hegelian marriage cannot success-
in which one partner was, unbeknownst to the other, a transsexual born the same sex as
the petitioning spouse. See, e.g., B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712,' 717 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
("[M]arriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman ...
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (expressing similar
viewpoint); see also Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1421,1427-28 (noting that "[o]pponents of
same-sex marriage argue that the concept is oxymoronic").
579. See supra notes 123-217 and accompanying text.
580. See supra notes 218-315 and accompanying text.
581. See supra notes 265-315 and accompanying text.
582. See supra notes 220-64 and accompanying text.
583. See supra notes 247-52, 283-91 and accompanying text.
584. See supra notes 253-64, 292-315 and accompanying text.
585. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
586. See supra notes 123-82 and accompanying text.
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fully perform even its stated function of developing the social indi-
viduality of the husband, unless husbands see their full human
potential reflected in their wives and wives see their full human po-
tential reflected in their husbands. 87 A marriage in which each
partner is confined to rigid and distinct gender roles cannot produce
a fully developed individual. Consequently, if the modem hetero-
sexual marriage is to result in the kind of unity capable of producing
a fully developed individual, that unity must arise out of a differen-
tiation that is grounded, just as modem political and social groupings
are, in the actual particularity of participating individuals, rather
than in a rigid and imposed differentiation that stifles individuality
and real universality.
In fact, the modem individuation of women has resulted in the
kind of fluidity of gender roles for men and women that makes the
promise of unity and fully developed individuality arising out of mar-
riage more of a reality. Feminine emotiveness and nurturing self-
sacrifice or masculine rationality and pursuit of individual independ-
ence and self-development, or both, may now be realized by men
and women. Thus we may find heterosexual marriages in which the
husband and wife each have developed these capacities. We may
also find heterosexual marriages in which the husband has primarily
taken on the nurturing role and the wife has primarily taken on the
independent self-development role, or vice versa. Because there is
no guarantee that an individual of a particular sex will have the de-
sired complementary capacities, whether a combination of capacities
or fairly exclusive development of just one, a marriage that is to be
successful from the Hegelian point of view cannot be arranged
merely by assuring that one partner of each sex is present. The op-
position of sex alone is no longer a necessary or sufficient basis for
marriage. 8 For precisely this reason, a view of marriage as rooted in
romantic love589 flourishes today more vigorously than ever. The fo-
587. See supra notes 283-315 and accompanying text.
588. See Koppelman, supra note 283, at 422-23 (arguing that linkage of "the total com-
mitment that is the telos of marriage" with a gender-based view of "sexual
complementarity" grounds marriage on what Rosemary Radford Ruether has described as
"'a sadomasochistic view of male and female relations'" which " 'demands the continued
dependency and underdevelopment of women in order to validate the thesis that two kinds
of personalities exist by nature in males and females and which are partial expressions of a
larger whole'" (quoting Rosemary Radford Ruether, From Machismo to Mutuality, in
HOMOsExuALITY AND ETHICs 29,30 (Edward Batchelor ed., 1980))).
589. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 264, at 290 (describing the his-
torical development of "companionate marriage," i.e., a voluntary emotional and personal
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cus of romantic love is on the interplay of differentiated individual-
ity, rather than the mere opposition of sex. The notion that there
may be one perfect person, one true love,-90 puts enormous emphasis
on features of individual particularity such as personality, interests,
style, education, values, etc.
91
At the same time that romantic love focuses attention on non-
sex specific features of individual particularity in choosing a marriage
partner, the occurrence of romantic love itself develops individuality.
Individual development is enhanced in a romantic relationship
through close exposure to and identification with a differently devel-
oped individual. 92 Hegel likely was ambivalent about romantic love
as a basis of marriage'93 precisely because he recognized that roman-
tic love would necessarily individuate women to such an extent that
the sacrifice of women to male individuality would then result in a
sacrifice of male individuality as well.5 94 However, the modern
grounding of heterosexual marriage in romantic love gives voice to
the reality that the twentieth-century development of individuality
has made gender of as little relevance as social class in the nine-
commitment, as arising out of increased individuation).
590. See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-
1800, at 282 (1977) (describing romantic love as "the notion that there is only one person
in the world with whom one can unite fully at all levels").
591. Cf Koppelman, supra note 283, at 423-24 ("[N]o two persons of the same sex are
sufficiently alike for their relationship to be free of risk and therefore of the need for
trust.").
592. Cf. Karst, supra note 384, at 635-37 (arguing that intimate associations "have a
great deal to do with the formation and shaping of an individual's sense of his own iden-
tity"); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note
262, at 25, 36 (stating that "[l]ove relationships ... are also crucial because they are the
crucibles of inwardly generated identity").
593. Compare HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 30, remarks to 162, at
111-12 (arguing that an arranged marriage is ethically superior to a marriage motivated by
love), with id. app. Additions n.104, at 262 (referring to 162) (noting that a marriage
arranged without consultation of the potential husband and wife is a reflection of a culture
that "hold[s] the female sex in scant respect"), and id. 168, at 115 (insisting that the unity
of marriage requires that the individuals have personalities as different as possible, but
viewing sameness of personality as simply a function of being part of the same social cir-
cle).
594. David Farrell Krell has argued that Hegel's choice of the undeveloped
(intellectually as well as physically) girlish figure of Antigone, see id. remarks to 166, at
114-15, rather than the educated and sensuous, fully developed figure of Friedrich
Schlegel's Lucinde as the ideal modem woman, see id. app. Additions n.106, at 263
(referring to % 164), reflects a realization that such a fully developed personality cannot be
sacrificed to the unity of the state, as was Antigone and as would be modem women under
Hegel's view. See David Farrell Krell, Lucinde's Shame: Hegel, Sensuous Woman, and the
Law, in HEGEL AND LEGALTHEORY, supra note 145, at 287, 296-97.
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teenth-century development of individuality.
If the unity of heterosexual marriage results from a romantic
love that cherishes all that is distinctive about a person rather than
that which is non-distinctive, such a unity is certainly possible where
such romantic love exists between two individuals of the same sex.
As with heterosexuals, such love cannot occur between any two per-
sons of the same sex, but can occur only between two very distinctive
and carefully chosen individuals.595 To the extent such unity de-
pends, under the Hegelian view, upon the presence within the
relationship of at least one partner who can create emotive unity and
one partner who can develop rational independence, no more reason
exists to assume that both such capacities cannot be found within a
same-sex relationship than to assume that both such capacities will
be found within every heterosexual relationship.
Modernity's emphasis on increasing individuation and romantic
love can also help explain how non-procreative sex has come to be
valued as a social good through the disengagement of sexual desire
from procreative sex. The notion of sex as purely procreative can be
traced to a view of nature as embodying a rational, God-ordained
teleological order accessible only through reason, an order that is
imposed upon us and to which we must conform."6 Thus, the bio-
logical distinctions of sex, as well as sexual desire, are understood as
provided for the God-given purpose of reproduction. 7 The notion
of sex as purely procreative, therefore, denies that the sensuality of
sex has any independent significance. In contrast, Romantic indi-
vidualism views nature not as rationally ordered, accessible to
reason, and the subject of a universal truth, but as uniquely shaping
595. Cf. Robson, supra note 553, at 80 (arguing that "the richness of difference be-
tween lesbians is what 'dazzles,' what 'frightens, seduces, astonishes, stupefies and in the
end it is absolutely instructive'" (citation omitted)); David A.J. Richards, Book Review, 4
CONST. COMMENTARY 463, 467 (1987) (reviewing ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE:
A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC (1986)) (arguing that it is "the subtle variations
of temperament and personality and character that are the differentiating loci of erotic
attraction and love, both heterosexual and homosexual").
596. See DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 37-38 (1982) (explicating the Augustinian
view of sexuality as essentially procreational). For a contemporary restatement of this
view in the context of an argument against same-sex marriage and sexuality, see Herbert
W. Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327,338-39,342
(1994) (arguing that since both true legality and liberty can be found only "in discovering
God's design and conforming oneself to that design," sexuality must be limited to the pur-
pose of procreation in heterosexual marriage).
597. See Titus, supra note 596, at 343.
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each individual and a source of personal truth grasped only by pas-
sion and feeling. 98 Because nature is essentially multiple, it is a
source of originality for individuation rather than a universal model
to which individuals must conform.599 It is therefore necessary to give
proper significance to our desires if we are to be in touch with our
unique nature."0 Furthermore, we must express these passions both
as a means of self-definition and self-articulation."' Thus, the explo-
sion of Romantic literature, music, and art can be seen as expression




According to this Romantic view, sexual desire and sensuality,
which became inextricably connected with procreation only as the
result of an analysis focused strictly on function, attain an independ-
ent significance as modalities of self-definition and self-expression. °
When sensuality takes on an individuating significance independent
of procreation, sexual behavior itself is freed of the constraints of
reproductive function. Indeed, in the face of lingering demands that
sex be strictly procreative, intentionally non-procreative sexuality
may be seen as even more individually expressive than the biological
act that reflects our universal animal nature. Thus, heterosexual sen-
suality may take forms that, even in the absence of contraception,
could not possibly lead to conception, yet which have value and sig-
nificance. This, in turn, makes it difficult to distinguish between acts
of heterosexual non-procreative sex and acts of homosexual non-
598. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 264, at 371 ("It is through our
feelings that we get to the deepest moral and, indeed, cosmic truths.").
599. See id. at 376.
600. See id. at 372.
601. See id. at 175; see also STONE, supra note 590, at 282 (stating that romantic love
views "the giving of full rein to personal emotions [as] admirable, no matter how exagger-
ated and absurd the resulting conduct may appear to others").
602. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OFTHE SELF, supra note 264, at 376.
603. See Krell, supra note 594, at 293 (" 'She was not a little surprised, although she
sensed it all along, that after the surrender he would be more loving and faithful than be-
fore.... They were altogether devoted and one, and yet each was altogether himself, or
herself, more than they had ever been ....'" (quoting SCHLEGEL, supra note 148, at 66-
67) (references to the original German version omitted)); see also ANTHONY GIDDENS,
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 119-22 (1990) (arguing that relationships, and
erotic relations in particular, which are "path[s] of mutual discovery" and emotional "self-
disclosure," have taken the place of "community and kinship networks" as the basis of the
personal trust that is the foundation for the trust in impersonal principles that is essential
to modernity); TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 264, at 373 (suggesting that
the fulfillment of romanticism vis-A-vis sensuality has perhaps occurred only in contempo-
rary times).
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procreative sex. 64
The significance of such sensuality, however, is not only as a
means of individual expression. As the Romantics understood, more
than radical individuality could be developed by acknowledging and
expressing our natural impulses and feelings. Contact with nature
could also have the effect of forcing us to recognize that
we are part of a larger order of living beings, in the sense
that our life springs from there and is sustained from there.
Recognizing this involves acknowledging a certain alle-
giance to this larger order. The notion is that sharing a
mutually sustaining life system with other creatures creates
bonds: a kind of solidarity which is there in the process of
life.6 5
Thus, sensuality has the potential to break down barriers between
individuals and create bonds of partnership and communal purpose,
while at the same time putting the individual profoundly in touch
with his or her self.60 6 The capacity for mutual expressions of sensu-
ality to create such bonds is independent of the procreative
possibilities of these expressions and, therefore, is equally present in
heterosexual and homosexual expressions of sensuality. The great
value of non-procreative heterosexual sex within marriage, a unity of
body that is a concrete symbol of the complex emotional and social
bonds that define the marital unit and a powerful force in the discov-
ery and development of these bonds, is also the value of non-
procreative homosexual sex within marriage.
This analysis has revealed that the modem unity of heterosexual
marriage is based on a combination of romantic love, which places
primary emphasis on non-gender specific features of personality and
style, and a sexuality which is neither constrained nor valued strictly
in relation to procreation. The possibility of romantic love between
two individuals of the same sex is based upon the same emphasis on
604. Thus, for example, heterosexual sodomy does not differ from homosexual sodomy.
Those who argue that erotic experience is essentially heterosexual because it arises out of
the mystery of gender difference which cannot be experienced by homosexuals repudiate
the modem view of individuality as independent of gender. See Richards, supra note 595,
at 467.
605. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 264, at 384.
606. But see Wardle, supra note 8, at 39-44 (arguing that the Supreme Court has taken
a rather different approach to sexuality because, in his view, the right to privacy in hetero-
sexual marriage should not be understood as "condoning" or "approving" of sexuality as




unique features of personality and style upon which heterosexual
romantic love is based. Modem views about marriage require that
non-procreative heterosexual sensuality be valued, and the value of
non-procreative heterosexual sensuality is difficult to distinguish
from the value of homosexual sensuality. Sensuality, whether het-
erosexual or homosexual, is an experience of nature that makes
possible authentic expressions of individuality by connecting indi-
viduals to feelings which are undeniably true, real, and fundamental
to self. The romantic view of the experience of nature as a source of
solidarity and community supports the belief that homosexual sexual
intimacy can break down barriers between individuals, thereby cre-
ating socially valuable bonds of partnership and community in
precisely the same way it supports a belief that non-procreative het-
erosexual sexual intimacy can produce such bonds of partnership and
community. The doctrinal underpinnings of same-sex marriage-
romantic notions of radical individuality, nature as a source of indi-
vidual inspiration and bonds of solidarity, and the erosion of rigid
gender roles and sexual constraints which have characterized con-
temporary radical individuality--can be seen as indistinguishable
from the doctrinal underpinnings of modem heterosexual marriage
founded on romantic love and sexual desire and reshaped by gender
equality.
2. The Value of Civil Recognition
The doctrinal underpinnings of same-sex marriage set out thus
far fail to explain why those who seek homosexual marriage are not
satisfied with a romantic and sexual relationship, but desire the pos-
sibility of entering into the civil institution of marriage. The points
that follow, taken together with the five doctrinal points set forth
above, are necessary to more fully articulate the doctrinal underpin-
nings of a desire for same-sex marriage:
a. a belief that civil marriage is a socially valuable institu-
tion because it creates an enduring legal/social connection
between individuals;
i. a belief that the existence of an enduring legal/social
marriage bond is valuable because only such an exter-
nal connection creates a protected space in which
individuals can make commitments to each other that
will be more stable than a connection based purely on
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variable emotions;..7
ii. a belief that enduring commitment between indi-
viduals in a marriage is valuable because such
commitment is the basis for citizens' willingness to sac-
rifice particular liberties for the sake of the state and
society as a whole;..
b. a belief that the existence of a legal/social marriage bond
is valuable because it demonstrates to individuals that the
bonds of society make possible the individual development
and fulfillment that occur within marriage;
i. a belief that experiencing the critical role of the state
in the very possibility of individual happiness recon-
ciles individuals to the apparent loss of personal liberty
which social existence requires;
c. a belief that the social cohesion provided by the com-
monality of the experience and the status of married or
potentially married persons makes the civil institution of
marriage a coherent point of social unification which count-
ers the socially disintegrating effects of fully developed
individuality.
Those who seek same-sex marriage begin with a belief that it is
both personally and socially valuable. However, much controversy
abounds among the gay and lesbian community on this point. A
consideration of some of these arguments will help reveal the ways in
which support for the institution of gay marriage is based on the very
functions of heterosexual marriage that give it political and social
significance.
One argument made against same-sex marriage is that marriage
is inherently patriarchal and that the extension of this institution into
607. Cf MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 116-
17 (1993) (arguing that the legal status of being married fosters intimate commitment by
limiting the vulnerability arising out of relationships that "help shape personal identity"
and "by fostering the cultivation of a coherent self that is capable of making and keeping
promises"); Hafen, supra note 12, at 486 ("Legal marriage is more likely than is unmarried
cohabitation to encourage such personal willingness to labor and 'invest' in relationships
with other people, whether child or adult."); Karst, supra note 384, at 633 (noting that
constitutional protection for casual intimate associations is necessary to allow them to
"ripen into durable intimate associations"); Hohengarten, supra note 37, at 1499 (arguing
that marriage makes possible stable mutual commitments that "overcome the deep-seated
individualism of contemporary life").
608. Cf. REGAN, supra note 607, at 120 (arguing that same-sex marriage is entirely
compatible with the "moral aspiration [of] marriage" as "responsibility based on the culti-
vation of a relational sense of identity").
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gay and lesbian life will simply strengthen patriarchy even more."9 It
seems likely that those who support the idea of legalized same-sex
marriage would counter that marriage is inherently patriarchal only
if viewed as essentially arising out of a relationship between a man
and a woman. Insistence on the fundamental significance of biologi-
cal sex thus serves as a state-perpetuated foundation for the
continuation of patriarchal ideas about gender roles and capacities. 10
Under this view, extension of marriage to same-sex partners will
serve to erase the importance of biological sex as a determiner of in-
dividual roles and, thereby, erode patriarchy. 1 This suggests that
same-sex marriage may well be founded on beliefs that could be de-
scribed as anti-patriarchal or non-patriarchal.
A second argument made against same-sex marriage suggests
that inviting state involvement in the definition of homosexual rela-
tionships would take away the considerable liberty homosexuals
have, in the absence of the possibility of marriage, to define the pa-
rameters of those relationships and, therefore, themselves." 2 Thus,
609. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1540-41, 1549 (1993) (arguing that since the most persuasive argu-
ment for same-sex marriage is that it is not really different or unconventional, advocacy
for same-sex marriage will result in suppression of critiques of marriage and therefore
eliminate the transforming potential of same-sex marriage); see also Eskridge, supra note
569, at 1486-87 (describing this as the "marriage-is-rotten" argument); Sylvia Law, Homo-
sexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 232 n.215 (noting that
"[gliven the deeply patriarchal way in which marriage has traditionally been defined,
achieving gay access to marriage may be equivalent to women gaining access to traditional
male roles, on male terms").
610. See Law, supra note 609, at 232 (describing as "heterosexist" objections to same-
sex marriage supported by "a sex-differentiated, patriarchal conception of marriage").
611. See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &
SEXUALrY 9, 18 (1991) (arguing that same-sex marriage would "denaturalize the histori-
cal construction of gender at the heart of marriage").
612. See DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF THE HOMOSEXUAL 185-90 (1982) (arguing that less oppressive
and more varied relationships have been made possible between homosexuals because
marriage has been unavailable); Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1488 (characterizing this
argument as fearing that same-sex marriage will "declaw gaylesbian radicalism"); id. at
1491 (noting concerns that same-sex marriage will make some homosexuals "insiders" and
leave the rest as "outsiders"); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Libera-
tion?, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401, 402-04 (William B. Rubenstein ed.,
1993) (arguing that same-sex marriage will suppress the radical possibilities of homosexu-
ality as different from heterosexuality, will have the effect of marginalizing and oppressing
non-married homosexuals, and will primarily benefit white, middle class gay men); Steven
K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 527 (1994) ("If marriage
can work the social magic of 'legitimizing' same-sex relationships, it is only at the cost of a
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homosexuals are free not to partner at all; to make a partnership of
more than two; to engage in multiple partnerships over time; to con-
tinue a single partnership; to form specific relations of economic
independence; or choose particular forms of economic dependence.
While the availability of legal same-sex marriage will not technically
destroy this freedom any more than the availability of legal hetero-
sexual monogamous marriage destroys the freedom of heterosexuals
to experiment with alternative forms of relatedness, the attractive-
ness of legal marriage for homosexuals will function just as it does
for heterosexuals-to minimize interest and need for experimenta-
tion outside the parameters of the civil institution.613
Those who seek the option of entering into a legal same-sex
marriage must believe that the individual and social benefits of sub-
stantially constraining gay and lesbian emotional and sexual
relationships within this form of permanent monogamous coupling
'1 4
outweigh the apparent loss of individual freedoms that might re-
sult.6"5 While the benefits most frequently noted are government
entitlements and presumptions for married couples,6"6 or simply the
recognition of equality and non-discrimination that same-sex mar-
riage implies, 17  these rationales would evaporate should
heterosexual marriage be abolished. Ultimately, support for same-
sex marriage must be founded upon an appreciation of the funda-
mental value of the institution of heterosexual marriage.' Viewed
massive conscription of lesbians and gay men into the project of re-writing gay life.").
613. See Ettelbrick, supra note 612, at 404 ("If the laws change tomorrow and lesbians
and gay men were allowed to marry,.where would we find the incentive to continue the
progressive movement we have started that is pushing for societal and legal recognition of
all kinds of family relationships?").
614. But see Polikoff, supra note 609, at 1549 (decrying a strategy to legalize same-sex
marriage which "values long-term monogamous coupling above all other relationships").
615. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1485 (admitting to "substantial ambiva-
lence" as to the presumed beneficial effects of same-sex marriage for the happiness of
homosexuals or for the homosexual community or movement, but concluding that "gay
lesbian doubts about same-sex marriage are overstated and that having the marriage op-
tion is useful and productive").
616. See Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 612, at 398, 399-400 (pointing out tax,
inheritance, citizenship, Social Security, and other benefits of legal marriage).
617. See id. at 400-01 (describing the political and philosophical justifications for same-
sex marriages).
618. Critics of same-sex marriage within the homosexual community make the same
point in an opposite direction, i.e., since marriage is a socially destructive institution, we
ought not to seek same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 609, at 1541 (arguing
that "a concerted effort to achieve the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage will valor-
ize the current institution of marriage"). What I have sought to provide here is a coherent
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in this light, the benefits of marriage over romantic love and lust
must be those critical functions that marriage has in the development
of an individuality that is inherently social and a society that is re-
spectful of individuality. Only a Hegelian view of marriage can
explain why the legal institution of marriage, whether heterosexual
or homosexual, is personally and socially valuable.
B. Comparison of the Social and Political Implications of Same-Sex
Marriage and Polygamy
The doctrinal underpinnings of a belief in same-sex marriage, as
suggested above, differ radically from the doctrinal underpinnings of
the Mormon belief in polygamy. As a result, the social and political
implications of the practice of same-sex marriage would be quite dif-
ferent from the social and political implications of the practice of
polygamy. The practice of same-sex marriage would not lead to des-
potism or undermine democracy, as the Reynolds Court feared
polygamy would, nor would it undermine the way in which hetero-
sexual marriage functions to teach, in a deep and concrete way, the
lesson that the apparent sacrifices of individuality, required by the
community, ultimately reestablish and strengthen individuality.
This Article has explored the way in which the institution of
polygamy was integrally related to the existence of an actual Mor-
mon theocracy. While Mormon polygamy was based on religious
beliefs about the spiritual authority of men over women and Proph-
ets over men, and the continuity between life on earth and in
heaven,619 no such religious bases for same-sex marriage exist to co-
herently unite all or even most homosexuals who seek same-sex
marriage." Belief in same-sex marriage does not arise from accept-
ing religious authority external to personal conscience, but rather
from the same trust in personal conscience that underlies American
democratic ideals. Consequently, while the religious value of polyg-
amy caused Mormons to accept the practice whether it conformed to
personal inclination and morality, no threat exists that homosexuals
will seek to impose same-sex marriage upon others, as this would be
contrary to the emphasis of individual authenticity that legitimates
account for the existing "valorization" of heterosexual marriage independent of patriar-
chal justifications. This account, while it stresses long-term monogamy and the legal
institutionalization of marriage as socially valuable, would not provide a justification for
the continuing influence of patriarchal ideas within marriage.
619. See supra notes 437-52 and accompanying text.
620. See supra notes 535-41 and accompanying text.
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the notion of same-sex marriage in the first place. Same-sex mar-
riage is of no value unless freely chosen because of the existence of
fulfilling emotional connections between individuals. Same-sex mar-
riage is therefore not a tool of theocracy or any other political system
based upon faith in or submission to external authority over individ-
ual conscience. For the same reasons, same-sex marriage cannot be
seen as a threat to the development of individuality and individual
conscience or to the individual and political liberty of others, as was
polygamy.
This Article also has demonstrated that the institution of Mor-
mon polygamy would necessarily lead to relations of inequality
between polygamous men and non-polygamous men."1 This ine-
quality was buttressed by Mormon doctrines suggesting that
polygamous men were the most righteous, deserving of greater re-
productive and institutional power. Same-sex marriage, in contrast,
is not based on any claim that homosexuals are superior to hetero-
sexuals or that homosexuals are entitled to more rights or social
goods than heterosexuals." Supporters of same-sex marriage do not
seek to create a privileged class like that envisioned by Mormon po-
lygamists.
However, the question remains whether same-sex marriage
would in fact create relations of inequality which would deprive
some men or women of the opportunity to marry. If some women
marry women, those women are not available to be married by men,
and, conversely, if some men marry men, those men are not available
to be married by women. Does same-sex marriage, therefore,
threaten todeprive some heterosexual men of wives and some het-
erosexual women of husbands, thereby creating a class of people
with unequal relationship possibilities? To begin with, such depriva-
tion is possible only to the extent that the number of lesbians and
gay men are not approximately equivalent. Supposing, however,
that the number of lesbians and gay men did not balance each other
out, would that mean that some heterosexuals would be deprived of
the opportunity to marry because some women married women and
some men married men? To suggest that heterosexuals are being
deprived of the opportunity to marry homosexuals is strange, when
arguably such a relationship would not be a very fulfilling or desir-
621. See supra note 489-506 and accompanying text.
622. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1626-27 (1996) (finding that laws providing




able one for either party.6' While plural wives probably would have
chosen to enter into monogamous marriages in the absence of a po-
lygamous alternative, most homosexuals who would choose same-sex
marriage would not enter heterosexual marriages in the absence of a
same-sex alternative. 6' 4 Therefore, same-sex marriage likely would
not decrease the opportunity for heterosexuals to marry.
Finally, the patriarchal doctrines underlying polygamy and its
practice perpetuate inequalities of power between men and women
that are antithetical to modem American understandings of gender
equality. The vestiges of patriarchy retained by contemporary het-
erosexual marriage derive from the presumption that marriage is
made possible because of the inherent differences between men and
women.61 Same-sex marriage would presume that the differing
qualities of partners that make marriage possible are not confined to
one sex or the other, thereby eroding these patriarchal ideals. How-
ever, same-sex marriage is not necessarily a gender-blind institution.
Most homosexuals do not love their partners "despite" their gender,
but may well seek out and value partners of that gender. Both gay
men and lesbians have been implicated in and parties to divisive and
sexist gender binaries.626 It might well be asked whether patriarchal
(or matriarchal) ideas might not flourish where marital partners are
not forced by the act of marriage to acknowledge the equality of a
differently gendered person.62' But if we transpose this argument tothe sphere of same-race marriages versus interracial marriages, it
623. Cf. Strasser, supra note 569, at 995-96 (suggesting that forcing homosexuals and
heterosexuals to marry hardly would lead to happy or stable relationships or a healthy
family environment).
624. See i at 995 (arguing that those denied same-sex marriage most likely would not
marry at all).
625. See Wardle, supra note 8, at 83-84 ("Differences in human development of males
and females are relevant to gender-based distinctions in laws regulating marriage and
family relations.").
626. See Butler, supra note 558, at 23-24.
627. Those who argue against same-sex marriage seem particularly fond of making this
argument, despite otherwise patriarchal leanings. See, eg., Bruce Fein, No: Reserve Mar-
riage for Heterosexuals, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 43 (arguing that "[t]he likelihood of
gender prejudice is ... reduced" in heterosexual households because "[t]he child enjoys
the opportunity to understand and respect both sexes in a uniquely intimate climate");
Wardle, supra note 8, at 87 ("Legalizing same-sex marriage, on the other hand, would send
a message that a woman is not absolutely necessary and equally indispensable to the so-
cially valued institution of marriage, weakening rather than strengthening equality for the
vast majority of women."). But see Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1510 (noting that while
same-sex marriages could "contribute to gender hierarchy" in a society that maintained
strong patriarchal beliefs, it would not do so in the context of contemporary culture).
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would be like saying that, due to the lingering poison of racism, we
should require all whites to marry blacks and all blacks to marry
whites and forbid same-race marriages as arenas where racism might
fester and grow. Some battles cannot, and ought not, be fought in
the bedroom. Sexism will not be strengthened by same-sex mar-
riages any more than racism is strengthened by same-race marriages.
Same-sex marriage, therefore, does not pose the kind of threat
to the foundation of the modem liberal state that polygamy may
have posed, because it is a practice founded in respect for individual
difference, autonomy, and equality, as well as social unity. The He-
gelian account of the value of modem marriage developed here
cannot distinguish heterosexual monogamous marriage from homo-
sexual monogamous marriage. This means that Reynolds may not be
used to support attacks on same-sex marriage such as the Defense of
Marriage Act."' However, under the account of marriage that has
been developed here, legislation such as the Defense of Marriage
Act is not invalid merely because it lacks a rational justification.
Proper appreciation of the universalizing function of marriage re-
veals that such legislation necessarily undermines the very institution
it seeks to protect.
C. The Negative Consequences of Failure to Legally Recognize Same-
Sex Marriage
Until now, this Article has focused on the positive contribution
of the legal institution of marriage for the development of individu-
ality and social unity. There are also negative consequences arising
out of the arbitrary denial to some individuals of the opportunity to
participate in this institution in a meaningful way. The failure to
recognize same-sex marriage, which essentially is indistinguishable
from heterosexual marriage, will have negative social consequences
as profound as its possible positive consequences. Ultimately, these
negative consequences undermine the institution of marriage itself.
Legal marriage, which is more than lust and romantic love,
makes possible a unifying bond between individuals that is stronger
and more stable than mere passion. The presence of such a bond
allows individuals to learn the important social lesson that the sacri-
fice of particular liberties for some greater good ultimately promotes
their own particular interest. If lesbians and gay men are denied the
628. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1783C and 1 U.S.C. § 7).
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experience of this stable and enduring commitment, the ability of
such individuals to make lasting personal commitments, as well as
abstract and less personally rewarding commitments to the state and
society as a whole, may be stunted.29 Under this Hegelian view of
marriage, the private liberty that appears to be maximized for gays
and lesbians when the enduring commitment of legal marriage is not
available to them should be understood as a destabilizing force
which creates a cult of the individual and encourages resistance to
institutionalized structures of social unity. Provision of the legal in-
stitution of same-sex marriage, on the other hand, would allow
individual choices about sexuality and emotional connection to be
sources of common individuality rather than a basis for alienation of
homosexuals and heterosexuals from each other and from the
state.63
Legal marriage also gives the state credit for the possibility of a
unity which reaffirms individuality, so that citizenship itself is under-
stood to reaffirm individuality. When the state refuses to insert itself
into relationships which have such individual affirming significance,
those who are in such relationships do not experience the state as
essential to the possibility of their individual existence and happi-
ness. Thus, gays and lesbians who wish to marry but are not
permitted to do so, and who are thereby denied the ability to have
children,63' to ensure their children a stable family,632 to provide for
629. Cf. REGAN, supra note 607, at 120-21 (suggesting that the lack of institutional
support for fidelity and self-restraint in gay male relationships disrupts attempts to develop
committed relationships and encourages distinctly uncommitted forms of relating to oth-
ers); Hohengarten, supra note 37, at 1529 (arguing that eliminating marriage in general
would "produce an isolated legal subject whose capacity to embark upon committed proj-
ects with others is limited to the sphere of self-interested economic transactions-homos
economicus in its purest form").
630. See Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward. A Feminine Moral Discourse on
Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE Li. 1783, 1798 (1988) (arguing that state recognition of
marriage produces "a sense of belonging to the community through mutual public identifi-
cation"); see also Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1490 (arguing that "meld[ing] back into
society's mainstream" would be positive for homosexuals, and suggesting that fears of
assimilation are fueled more by the anger of rejection than by the value of permanent
outsider status).
631. For example, homosexuals may be denied access to the services of sperm banks,
fertility clinics, or adoption agencies because they are not married. See BLANK &
MERRICK, supra note 320, at 106 (noting the exclusion of unmarried women and lesbians
from assisted reproduction services).
632. For example, except in cases where second-parent adoptions have been allowed, a
biological child of one member of a gay or lesbian couple has no assurance that, if the bio-
logical parent were to die, the gay or lesbian partner-parent would be able to obtain legal
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their partner's financial stability should they die,633 or to engage in
legal sexual relations, must view the state as either indifferent or ac-
tively hostile to their happiness. In such circumstances, whole-
hearted loyalty and commitment to such a state come only at the cost
of internalizing this hostility or indifference as self-hatred.6 4 Yet for
many, this self-hatred is preferable to the rejection of self which
would come from a rejection of our connection to and affection for
this country. As a result, this affection sometimes resembles a child's
tenacious love for an abusive parent, springing as much from the
child's recognition of how much love and care such a parent needs as
from the child's desperate need for a parent's love and care. The
resulting personal cost to gay and lesbian citizens for our deep devo-
tion to this country is enormous.635 It is justified, however, because
we know that this country cannot be all it claims to be without us,
nor can we be all we claim to be without it. The desire for same-sex
marriage reflects a deep commitment to bringing the reality of this
country closer to its ideals. As painful as this commitment often is, it
is preferable to the alternative belief that this country's ideals are
already fully mirrored by the current state of affairs.636
custody. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parent-
hood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. LJ. 459,531-33 (1990).
633. For example, a homosexual partner may be unable to pass on Social Security con-
tributions to a surviving partner, and estates left to such partners that would be tax free if
left to spouses are taxable. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of
Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbians and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447,
474-75 (1996) (stating that gay and lesbian couples are not entitled to an exemption from
estate taxes or social security survivor benefits).
634. Cf MARTIN S. WEINBERG & COLIN J. WILLIAMS, MALE HOMOSEXUALS: THEIR
PROBLEMS AND ADAPTATIONS 153-55 (1974) (documenting how the negative attitudes of
others toward homosexuals are more likely to be internalized as low self-esteem when
those expressing negative attitudes are held in high esteem).
635. For example, gay and lesbian members of the military risk their lives for a country
that claims they are not worthy to do so; gay and lesbian lawyers commit themselves to a
legal system that views them as criminals or outlaws; gay and lesbian teachers dedicate
themselves to the flourishing of children's individuality at the cost of suppressing and hid-
ing their own; gay social workers struggle to keep other families intact when they can do
little to keep their own families intact.
636. Some homosexuals may respond to public rejection by becoming hostile toward
the state. While this plays into the stereotypical belief that homosexuals should not be
given positions of public trust because they are not loyal to their country, the vast majority
of homosexuals overcompensate for their rejection by increased loyalty and the belief that
someday things will be better, preferring personal sacrifice over the loss of civic ideals.
Compare, for example, two famous English homosexuals, Alan Turing and Guy Burgess.
Turing, the English mathematical and computing genius whose work on the German en-
crypting device Enigma was critical to the British war effort, committed suicide two years
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In addition, social indifference to the emotional bonds between
gay and lesbian partners leads to an understanding of the civil insti-
tution of marriage as potentially coercive and antithetical to
individual liberty. This perception of the irrelevance or intrusiveness
of marriage is not limited to those who are denied same-sex mar-
riage, but will extend to heterosexuals who may then choose not to
participate in the legal institution of marriage.637 Currently, same-sex
couples are being married in religious and non-religious ceremonies
throughout the country638 and drawing up partnership contracts that
set out the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties. The more
it makes sense to them and to others to say that they are married,
even if they are not legally married, the less the legal institution ap-
pears to accomplish, other than to privilege some married people in
some ways and penalize them in others.6 9 Marriage reverts to being
a primarily private, or possibly religious, institution over which the
state has lost control. Indeed, such social indifference to the emo-
tional bonds between lesbian and gay male partners paradoxically
leads to a privileging of these emotional and physical connections
over legal and ethical connections. This is why Hegel made a point
of emphasizing the ethical legal bond as the true essence of marriage,
rather than any romantic love that also may have been present. As
the English ecclesiastical courts learned, the development of com-
after being convicted of gross indecency and being sentenced to a period of hormone
treatment which caused him to grow breasts. See generally ANDREW HODGES, ALAN
TURING: THE ENIGMA (1983) (arguing that Turing's personal commitment to his country
through his war work meant that the political was so personal that he could not put the
"the personal above the political" and betray his country for personal reasons). Burgess,
on the other hand, was a Soviet mole in British intelligence whose treachery arguably was
rooted in the social rejection caused by his homosexuality. See CHAPMAN PINCHER,
TRAITOR: THE ANATOMY OF TREASON 103 (1987) ("The social and legal condemnation
of homosexuals may well have converted some of them into 'outsiders' with a chip on their
shoulder, deeply resentful of a society which made a serious offense of the sexual expres-
sion which they found natural.").
637. Cf. DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 135 (1989) (noting that enormous
increases in heterosexual cohabitation rather than marriage may be explained by changing
attitudes toward marriage, among other things).
638. See Eskridge, supra note 569, at 1483 (noting that thousands of religious same-sex
marriages have been performed).
639. Cf. Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law (established by the Hawaii
governor and legislature by Hawaii S.B. 888, sex. 3, 18th Leg., 1995 Sess.) (App. E) (Dec.
8, 1995) <http:lwww.hawaii.govllrb/solcvr.html> (noting the necessity of distinguishing
between "marriage" and "being legally married" due to the celebration of formal religious
marriage ceremonies by same-sex couples and the parallels with Quaker and other non-
Anglican Protestants in seventeenth-century England when they were refused government
marriage certificates because they were not married by an Anglican priest).
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peting privately controlled marriage institutions, as common-law
marriage was then, threatens the social control and utility of the
public institution.6" Recognition of same-sex marriage would allow
the emotional and physical bonds between lesbian and gay male
partners to shrink in importance next to the state-provided legal and
ethical bonds, and would, therefore, reinforce for everyone the criti-
cal importance of the state in making any such bonds possible.
Finally, legal marriage allows all citizens to share a similar and
equivalent experience of themselves and the state, which promotes
social cohesion. For many people marriage is experienced as a right
of passage into a full and responsible adulthood. Denial of desired
access to the experience and identity of marriage transforms the
meaning of marriage for everyone from unification and commonality
to exclusion and distinction. Marriage cannot have the same luster
to anyone, even heterosexuals, when it is understood as the equiva-
lent of eating at a segregated lunch counter or swimming in a public
"whites only" pool.641 Such a state-sponsored institution of exclusion
and distinction creates rifts that undermine the possibility of social
unity. Provision of the legal institution of same-sex marriage would
allow individual choices about sexuality and emotional connection to
be grounds of common individuality rather than a basis for the al-
ienation of homosexuals and heterosexuals from each other and
from the state. Same-sex marriage is as essential to the achievement
of the social unity of heterosexuals and homosexuals and the fully
realized individuality of men and women as recognition of interracial
marriage was to the possible social unity and the fully realized indi-
viduality of white and black Americans.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unlike polygamy, same-sex marriage poses no threat to Ameri-
can ideals of separation of church and state, individual autonomy,
equality of all men, and equality of men and women. The doctrinal
underpinnings of same-sex marriage are indistinguishable from the
doctrinal underpinnings of heterosexual marriage, as revised to con-
form to modem norms of gender equality. Same-sex marriage can,
640. See CLARK, supra note 345, at 22 (noting that the ecclesiastical courts were forced
to recognize common-law marriages in order to maintain authority over the institution of
marriage).
641. Imagine the heterosexual experience of obtaining a marriage license if homosex-
ual couples engaged in regular "sit-ins" at county clerks' offices, demanding the same
service as heterosexual couples.
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in fact, be seen as an inevitable development when the civil institu-
tion of heterosexual marriage is based upon ideals of romantic love
and non-procreative sex which are inconsistent with patriarchal views
regarding the natural superiority of men and inferiority of women.
Same-sex marriage not only undermines the patriarchal views of men
and women that proved so problematic with polygamy, but may also
be viewed as a necessary last step in freeing monogamous marriage
from the vestiges of its patriarchal past. As a result, the reasoning in
Reynolds is inapplicable to same-sex marriage and neither Reynolds
nor its progeny can be read to provide support for governmental at-
tacks on same-sex marriage. Thus, Justice Scalia's reliance in Romer
v. Evans?2 on Davis v. Beason"3 to support a claim that the legiti-
macy of regulating polygamy provides support for regulation of
homosexuality was not justified.
Nor can same-sex marriage be seen as a threat to the institution
of marriage itself, as those who promoted the Defense of Marriage
Act have argued.6" Marriage must be understood as having constitu-
tional significance as a mediating institution that promotes and
reconciles individuality and social unity. The greatest threat to the
institution of marriage is posed by the vestiges of patriarchal princi-
ples in heterosexual marriage. The continuing social value of
marriage as a reconciliation of social unity and individual liberty de-
pends, in part, upon an accommodation of women's need for
individuation. It is incoherent to acknowledge that female individu-
ality is not a function of gender, yet insist that the unity of marriage
is dependent upon the differentiation of gender. The Defense of
Marriage Act must be seen for what it is: a defense of an institution
of patriarchal marriage that more closely resembles nineteenth-
century Mormon polygamous marriage than the contemporary vision
of marriage as a partnership of equals. The recognition of same-sex
marriage will advance a non-patriarchal reconstitution of marriage.
Marriage also has enormous value to Americans as an institu-
tion that makes social unity possible, even in a world in which
642. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1635 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
643. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In Davis, the Court held constitutional a statute depriving
polygamists or supporters of polygamy of the right to vote. See id. at 347. In Romer, the
Court held that Davis was "no longer good law" to the extent it deprived persons of the
right to vote merely because of their beliefs. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
644. See 142 CONG. REC. H7494 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith that
"[s]ame-sex marriage demeans the fundamental institution of marriage" and "threatens
cultural values").
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individuality has been fully cultivated. Recognition of same-sex mar-
riage would strengthen the social unification function of marriage,
not only by allowing additional individuals to experience their indi-
viduality as sustained and nurtured by society as a whole, but also by
making the practice of marriage more universal and thereby pro-
moting a similarity of experience which universalizes individual
needs and desires and promotes social cohesion. Maintaining mar-
riage as an exclusive and excluding institution, as the Defense of
Marriage Act seeks to do, both distorts the essence of marriage and
undermines its positive social meaning. The Defense of Marriage
Act, and legislation like it, must therefore be seen as an attack on
marriage, rather than a defense of it.
